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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, auctions have become increasingly important as a way to determine the price
for items on sale. Governments use auctions to assign contracts and privatize state-owned
assets, and through the rise of the internet also millions of households found themselves
exposed to the challenges of a novel environment for economic activities. With the recent
proliferation of online market platforms such as amazon.com or eBay.com, sales on the
internet have become increasingly popular and constitute a real alternative to the classic
retail business, and many of these platforms employ some auction format as a way to allocate
goods among their customers.
The theoretical literature on the economics of auctions that has emerged since the seminal
contributions of Vickrey (1961), Riley and Samuleson (1981), Myerson (1981), and others,
gives us a fundamental understanding of how a rational subject should optimally behave in
diﬀerent auction environments. Today, the ﬁeld covers a wide range of topics ranging from
the optimal selling and bidding strategies over multiple-unit auctions to collusion among
bidders and bidding rings to name only a few. In general, the most basic task for bidders
is to ﬁnd an optimal bidding strategy according to their valuation for the item on sale that,
conditional on the employed mechanism, ensures them a maximum rent in case they win the
auction. Similarly, auctioneers are challenged to make choices that ensure them a maximum
expected payoﬀ from the auction, e.g. by implementing the optimal auction format or, if the
latter is predetermined, setting a revenue maximizing reserve price for a given mechanism.
However, auctions are still an important and active ﬁeld of research. Many of the theoretical
predictions rely on a set of simplifying assumptions which are not always met in prac-
tice. In particular, the frameworks of auction markets are complex and potentially aﬀected
Introduction 2
by numerous confounding factors. By now a broad range of empirical studies has docu-
mented and established substantial deviations from fully rational behavior in many areas of
individual decision making. In the context of auctions on the internet, economists have
analyzed diﬀerent auction formats under diﬀering information regimes (e.g. Lucking-Reiley,
1999), phenomena like last minute bidding (e.g. Roth and Ockenfels, 2002), or the existence
of a winner’s curse (e.g. Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003).1 Regarding a micro-foundation of the
determinants of bidder and seller behavior, however, with few exceptions (e.g. Reiley, 2006,
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007, Lee and Malmendier, 2007) the empirical evidence is rather
scarce. Importantly, other than in ﬁnancial markets, in auctions it are potentially those
people who make the biggest mistakes that determine the ﬁnal price. In light of this fact
and the increased popularity of auctions on the internet, it is important to understand what
the choice sets of buyers and sellers are, and what motivates and drives their decisions in
practice.
A second crucial development for this analysis is that many of the goods that are auctioned oﬀ
have become increasingly complex in nature to the extent that they consist of a multitude
of characteristics, and thus of multiple dimensions of quality. With increasing frequency,
bidders are challenged to evaluate goods like mobile phones, personal computers, or even
cars on the basis of a plethora of information provided on the various attributes when forming
their bids. The same applies to the sellers, when facing the task to choose their reserve price,
which in turn requires thorough deliberations on the expected valuations of the potential
bidders in the population. While economic theory suggests that a rational agent should
pick all relevant pieces of information that are available on such goods, there is only little
empirical work done along these lines.
In this doctoral thesis I analyze the determinants of bidder and seller behavior in (online)
auctions and similar environments to gain new insights into the eﬃciency of information
aggregation and the interplay of various factors that inﬂuence peoples’ choices. In doing
so, I exploit the enhanced availability of large data sets on auctions and sales on the
internet, which constitute an unique testing ground to empirically analyze whether the
theoretical predictions are in accordance with the actual behavior observed in the ﬁeld.
1For a comprehensive survey on the existing empirical literature on auctions on the internet see e.g. Bajari
and Hortacsu (2004) and Lucking-Reiley (2000).
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In particular, Chapter 2 empirically analyzes bidding behavior in auctions within the highly
controlled virtual economy of a popular online game and provides strong evidence for a
systematic underutilization of available information. Closely related to this study, Chapter 4
examines whether a similar eﬀect persists in a real-world market that involves large stake
purchase decisions and further substantiates the presence of biased information processing.
The remaining two chapters are concerned with the instruments of sellers to inﬂuence
the auction outcome. Extending the analysis from Chapter 2 to the supply-side of the
virtual-economy, Chapter 3 deals with the determinants and eﬀects of reserve prices and
the implications of suboptimal minimum bids in terms of expected revenue. In the context
of auctions with asymmetric bidders, Chapter 5 studies theoretically the possibilities and
incentives of a seller to favor a speciﬁc bidder by using other instruments than reserve prices
and direct mechanisms of discrimination. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read
independently.
Chapter 2 of this thesis is based on the paper Does Bidding for Complex Goods
Reflect All Relevant Information? Field Evidence From Online Gaming.2
In this paper, we take a novel approach to empirically examine individual bidding behavior in
a highly controlled auction environment, where all crucial information on the oﬀered complex
goods is openly accessible. Using detailed ﬁeld data from Hattrick, one of the largest and
most popular online games, we analyze which of the characteristics of a virtual football
player, essentially a multi-dimensional vector of attributes, are reﬂected in the winning bids
when he is traded in an auction on the games internal transfer market. We present strong
evidence that bidders systematically fail to eﬃciently aggregate the information provided
on the age attribute of these players and thus ineﬃciently utilize crucial parts of valuable
information when forming their bids. The users in the game seem to disproportionately
cling to the ﬁgure displayed in the nosier information on the age-group of a player, while
being inattentive to the ﬁner information embodied in the precise age in units of days. As
a consequence, the pattern of winning bids exhibits substantial discontinuities for otherwise
identical players, i.e. close substitutes, as many people systematically overpay for players
close to their birthday. Since the market environment in the game is highly structured and
provides a considerable degree of control, some of the potential sources commonly brought
forward in the light of overbidding in other auction markets do not apply. For instance, the
2This paper is joint work with Florian Englmaier.
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eﬀect is too systematic to be compatible with a non-standard utility of winning (“bidding
fever”) and also framing eﬀects due to heterogeneous product descriptions can be ruled out.
Moreover, by exploiting the natural experiment of a small change in the game design that
reﬂects an exogenous variation of the search cost in the market framework, we are able to
analyze whether this “birthday eﬀect” can be explained by classic search costs. We ﬁnd that
the intensity of the documented frictions due to ineﬃcient information processing is clearly
attenuated but still preeminent, suggesting that the observed individual behavior is at least
partly a result of heuristic decision making. However, these ﬁndings clearly illustrate that
available information is not always used eﬃciently and that seemingly minor details of the
search environment may have a substantial impact on the outcome of auctions.
In Chapter 3, which is based on the paper Determinants and Effects of Reserve
Prices in Hattrick Auctions,3 we use a diﬀerent hand-collected data set of Hattrick
auctions to extend the analysis from Chapter 2 to the supply side of this virtual-economy. In
particular, we study the determinants and eﬀects of reserve prices. Conveniently, unlike many
other online auction platforms (e.g. ebay.com), in this framework there is no proportional
relation between the minimum bid and the transaction fees a seller is charged, which could
bias the individuals in their choice of a reserve price. Moreover, for the duration of the
auction all relevant information concerning the quality of a virtual player becomes publicly
available, such that there is no information asymmetry between buyers and sellers and the
reserve price is the latters’ only variable of choice. It turns out that we ﬁnd evidence for
both, very sophisticated and suboptimal behavior by the sellers. On the one hand, reserve
prices are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the resulting sales price pattern. This reﬂects
the theoretical prediction that the sellers take into account the expected valuations of the
potential bidders when choosing their reserve price. On the other hand, we provide evidence
for the sunk cost fallacy as there is a substantial positive eﬀect on the reserve price when
the player has been acquired previously, even though the market environment is highly
competitive. In addition, we also ﬁnd that reserve prices are too clustered at zero and at
multiples of e 50,000 as to be consistent with fully rational behavior. If, as in our data,
entitlement and clustering eﬀects are persistent and quantitatively relevant, the option of
choosing a reserve price might be an impediment to market eﬃciency as sellers set too high
reserve prices resulting in too little trade. On the upside, our ﬁndings suggest that simple
3This paper is joint work with Florian Englmaier.
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microeconomic theory gives us a lot of mileage in explaining market behavior in complex
environments. We document that many sellers very ﬁnely adjust their behavior to demand
patterns and try to strategically exploit potential arbitrage possibilities. Moreover, we are
able to show that the adoption of heuristic pricing rules by the sellers does not aﬀect the
expected revenue from an auction dramatically, as long as the chosen reserve price lies below
the optimal level and competition among the bidders is suﬃciently intense.
The fourth chapter is based on the paper The Evaluation of Complex Goods -
Evidence From Online Car Sales.4 It adds to the results presented in Chapter
2 by analyzing whether individuals eﬃciently aggregate all relevant information on the
constituent characteristics of a complex good in a situation, where their decisions involve
large monetary stakes. In particular, we focus on the market for used cars, in which the
basic situation is comparable to that of the buyers in the virtualHattrick-economy: People
are presented with many details of a complex good and have to form their valuation for it.
Based on detailed ﬁeld data on more than 80,000 used car oﬀers in a large online vehicle
marketplace, we ﬁnd evidence for biased information processing also in this market. While
the precise date of ﬁrst registration is publicly and prominently stated for each car, we
identify an ampliﬁed value adjustment for otherwise identical cars where the year-count
changes. These distinct discontinuities in the price pattern indicate that individuals over-
react to the ﬁgure displayed in the latter, while underrating the ﬁner information on a
car’s age as conveyed through the month of ﬁrst registration. While similar ineﬃciencies
in the utilization of information have been substantiated for small stake purchases (Lee
and Malmendier, 2007) and in ﬁnancial markets (Gilbert et al., 2008), we are able to
document that analogous inattentiveness also persists in situations involving large stake real
money decisions, indicating that inattentiveness within markets can have sizeable economic
consequences. More generally, it stands to reason that such eﬀects also exist for other
markets, or to use the words of Akerlof (1970): “The automobile market is used as a ﬁnger
exercise to illustrate and develop these thoughts. It should be emphasized that this market
is chosen for its concreteness and ease in understanding rather than for its importance or
realism.” (cf. p.489)
4This paper is joint work with Florian Englmaier.
Introduction 6
The last chapter is based on the paper Strategic Seller Actions in Auctions with
Asymmetric Bidders. In this paper, we examine theoretically a setting where the auction-
eer faces two asymmetric bidders. The novel feature of this model is that, in addition to well-
established interferences into the competitive process like handicaps and aﬃrmative action,
it allows for another dimension of strategic choice for the auctioneer to support speciﬁc
bidders and thereby alter the auction outcome to her beneﬁt. In particular, Cantillon (2008)
shows in a general framework that a reduction in the degree of asymmetry among the bidders
increases the expected revenue for the auctioneer. Intuitively, asymmetry hurts the seller, as
competition among bidders is reduced resulting in a lower expected ﬁnal price. We use this
ﬁnding to analyze its implications for the strategic scope an auctioneer may have once the
auction format has been set and committed to. Employing a simple two-bidder second-price-
auction setting, we examine the possibilities of the seller to manipulate the valuations of the
bidders without violating the speciﬁed rules of the implemented auction, and analyze how
she optimally acts to maximize her expected revenue. We ﬁnd that favoring the potential
“losing bidder” is an optimal strategy for the seller. Intuitively, by taking actions to support
the weaker of two participating bidders, the seller can make them more competing rivals,
which in turn leads to an increase of her expected revenue. Furthermore, we show that this
result holds true even if this favoritism causes a negative impact on the valuation of the
competing “strong” bidder. However, this results in ex post ineﬃciency in terms of social
surplus, whenever strong bidder still wins the auction and the seller “invested” in the ex-
post losing bidder. At a policy level, these results suggest that in merger analysis and public
tenders involving auctions, interference with the competitive outcomes may occur through
more subtle and indirect channels, other than handicaps or aﬃrmative action, and should
be accounted for. We also discuss some possible applications, where such opportunities may
indeed arise in practice.
Chapter 2
Does Bidding for Complex Goods Reflect
All Relevant Information? Field Evidence
From Online Gaming
2.1 Introduction
In recent years auctions on the internet experienced a vast increase in popularity. Today, all
kinds of products are traded on market-platforms like eBay.com or amazon.com. In contrast
to retail markets, where the price is typically ﬁxed by the selling party, the outcome of
an auction directly stems from buyer-level evaluations. Many of the featured items are of
complex nature to the extent that they exhibit multiple dimensions of quality, like computers,
mobile phones, or even cars. We are especially interested in the behavior of individuals
when they have to decide on how much to bid for such items: Do they incorporate all of the
available information, or do they neglect important aspects in their evaluation of the good?
Economic theory suggests that the ﬁnal price fully reﬂects all pieces of available information
that are pertinent to the item’s value. In this paper we take a novel approach to empirically
examine individual bidding behavior in a highly controlled auction environment, where all
crucial information on the oﬀered products is openly accessible. We provide strong evidence
that bidders neglect substantial parts of valuable information, even if it is readily provided.
We ﬁnd that people systematically fail to eﬃciently aggregate the available information on
speciﬁc attributes of the items on sale.
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Our evidence is based on detailed ﬁeld data from Hattrick (HT ), one of the largest and
most popular online games. We argue that the elaborate framework of this game provides
an excellent data source to empirically address our main question. Founded in 1997, HT
is a browser-based free online football manager game with over 950,000 registered users
and is available in over 124 countries, mostly in the native language. The basic concept
of the game is to manage your own virtual football club consisting of virtual football
players. The tasks for the human managers are manifold combining the elements of economic
management, tactical options, and community interaction. Alongside a sportive component,
the competition with teams of other human participants, the game demands from the user
to develop a sound ﬁnancial strategy for his club.1 Typically this includes to proﬁtably
train virtual players and to trade them with other managers on the game’s internal transfer
market.2
Since the virtual football players in the game resemble complex goods, HT ’s transfer market
exactly provides the very situation that is of interest to us: The managers have to decide
on how much they are willing to pay for a speciﬁc player, while they are provided with very
detailed information on his attributes. More precisely, they learn his full attribute vector
and thus there is no information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. On this basis, each
bidder has to independently estimate the market value, where his individual valuation can
be aﬀected by various other factors like a budget constraint or the acuteness to acquire a
new player. Hence, the private value paradigm applies best to this situation. Conveniently,
the selling mechanism implemented in HT ’s transfer market resembles an English ascending
auction and thus the winning bid reﬂects an individual buyer’s evaluation. Our large sample
of transactions from this market allows us to empirically analyze to what extent the various
attribute properties of the virtual players account for their market values. In turn, we test
if the provided information is reﬂected in the actual prices, or whether important parts of it
were excluded from individual managers’ bidding considerations.
We obtained detailed information on 17,510 virtual players aged between 17 and 20 years,
all listed as keepers on HT ’s transfer market between May 01, 2008 and May 15, 2008. A
key feature to our identiﬁcation strategy is that the players in our sample can be regarded
1Source: http://www.hattrick.org
2Henceforth we will refer to the human users as “managers”, while using the term “player” to address
virtual football players.
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as close substitutes in the dimension of their skill levels.3 For reasons, which we will lay
out in more detail below, this allows us to identify the impact of the second-most inﬂuential
element to a player’s value, namely his age, which is represented in the form “X years and
Y days”. By the design of the underlying game algorithm, the eﬀect from training ceteris
paribus declines with age. However, a player who is just a few days older than another -
being otherwise identical - should not be worth much more, since the diﬀerence in their total
age, and thus in their potential training-beneﬁts, is marginal. Moreover, the above reasoning
remains true even if the one player already turned a year older while the other’s birthday
lies just ahead - a fact that was fully conﬁrmed to us by the makers of HT. Our leading
hypothesis is thus that the transfer price should decrease continuously with the total age as
measured in units of days, an information that is readily available and explicitly stated to
every potential bidder.
Our data tell a diﬀerent story. In contrast to our predictions, the value of a player does
not decline smoothly in his total age, but exhibits systematic discontinuities in the price
pattern, a ﬁnding which we label the “birthday eﬀect”: Depending on whether players
are sold one week before or after their birthday, we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences of
sizeable magnitude in prices paid. For example, ceteris paribus a keeper who just passed
his eighteenth birthday loses up to 21% in market value compared to a seventeen year old,
whose birthday lies just a few days ahead. However, the only real diﬀerence between them is
a unit increase in the former’s year-count. Importantly, and conﬁrmed by the makers of HT,
the behavior we observe cannot be rationally justiﬁed through anything in the underlying
game algorithm. Our intuition is that even though the exact age is clearly stated in the
form “X years and Y days” when they submit their bids, the managers largely focus on
the years of age while insuﬃciently incorporating the ﬁner information given in the days of
age.4 Though we incorporate the ﬁner information of the precise age in day units in our
estimation analysis, we ﬁnd that the age-group still has a large and highly signiﬁcant impact
on the observed prices. However, the latter contains less and noisier information than the
former and hence should not play any role at all. Thus, we ﬁnd that redundant information
3Throughout the paper, we distinguish between a player’s “skills” and “characteristics” in the set of his
attributes. Pre-drawing on section 2.2.3, the term “skill” captures eight abilities that determine a player’s
type. To all other entries in the attribute vector we will refer to as “characteristics” or “traits”.
4Figure 5 in Section 2.2.3 below shows an example for the typical in-game interface where a manager
submits his bid for a player. The exact age is clearly stated among the ﬁrst details given on the player.
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is evidently inﬂuential, reversely implying that the managers in reality do not suﬃciently
incorporate the ﬁner information on the precise age at hand in their decision making process.
This establishes our main result: A majority of managers in HT obviously overreacts to the
number displayed in “years” while at the same time underweights or simply ignores the
ﬁner information on this attribute as given by “days” of age. As a consequence, we observe
substantial discontinuities and overly high bids for players that are about to turn older in the
near future. This result remains robust across various speciﬁcations and additional controls.
In the second part of the paper, we identify possible driving forces behind our ﬁndings. Two
possible explanations suggest themselves: First, if individuals are constrained in time, it
might simply be too costly to search and cross-compare the prices of several players equivalent
in terms of age. Second, the systematic bias in the bidding pattern we observe may be the
outcome of the managers simplifying their decision making by generically adopting heuristic
pricing rules. A small change in the search engine used to screen the transfer market of
HT during September 2008 constitutes a natural experiment that allows us to distinguish
between these possible explanations. While initially only the age-group was depicted in
the post-search results overview, in the revised design now the precise age of a player is
displayed. Since this reduces the time and number of clicks necessary to compare diﬀerent
players, it is reasonable to argue that this amounts to an exogenous reduction in the search
costs of a buyer. Hence, if it is classic search costs that drives our result, if anything, the
“birthday eﬀect” should be mitigated in the revised design. We indeed ﬁnd evidence that
the discontinuities are attenuated relative to the situation before the change, but the price
discontinuities do not fully disappear. We thus conclude that the eﬀect is aﬀected by but not
solely explained through search costs. From the perspective of optimal market design, our
results imply that careful considerations should be given to the way in which information
is presented to the bidders, if even the cost for a few “clicks” to view some internet page
suﬃces to trigger large discontinuities in the price pattern.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the analysis of how information aﬀects economic decisions.
Similar to our results, Pope (2008) shows that people overly base their evaluation of hospital
quality on reported ordinal rankings, while additionally a more precise measure in form of
a continuous quality score is stated. In the context of auctions on the internet, the existing
literature mainly focuses on the comparison of diﬀerent auction formats under diﬀering
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information regimes (see e.g. Lucking-Reiley, 1999; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2004). We add to
this branch of research by analyzing whether available information is used eﬃciently at all.
Moreover, a key feature of our ﬁndings is that they stem from novel data created in a highly
controlled environment that allows us to derive complementary insights to existing studies
on information usage in bidding behavior. For instance, Lee and Malmendier (2007) provide
evidence for overbidding at the online-auction platform eBay. They ﬁnd that bidders anchor
on an irrelevant retail-store price of a good (if stated by the seller), while at the same time
many of them neglect a lower price oﬀered in form of a “buy-it-now”-option. In this paper,
we demonstrate a similar information neglect on part of the managers in HT with respect
to the age attribute. However, our data diﬀers from theirs in several ways. First, in our
framework all items on sale are presented in an exogenously pre-determined standard. Unlike
in eBay, we therefore can rule out the mode of presentation and the informational content
as an instrument for the sellers to take inﬂuence on buyer behavior. Second, there exists no
outside market for the virtual players traded in HT that could potentially aﬀect the prices on
the transfer market. Third, the particular piece of information we ﬁnd to be systematically
neglected is explicitly presented to all bidders with certainty, while information like the
“buy-it-now”-option in eBay are generally less easily accessible. Finally, the transfer market
in HT exhibits no risk of post-auction default and is free of transaction costs. By design, we
are thus able to rule out some of the common explanations brought forward in the context
of biased bidding behavior. For instance, a non-standard utility of winning an auction, also
referred to as “bidding fever”, cannot explain our ﬁndings, since otherwise we would expect
to observe overpayment for any arbitrary player in our sample, not just and systematically
for those close to their birthdays.
We are well aware that there may be reservations to working with data from a source like
HT, which is clearly labeled as a game and where all ﬁnancial transactions are carried out
in terms of virtual money. However, success in the game requires patience and a long-term
planning horizon and according to the developers, an individual manager typically keeps
playing actively for about three years. Moreover, they also state that as many as 500,000
managers visit their account every single day. Above that, even though the basic access
to the game is free of charge, roughly 20% of registered managers not only devote much of
their time to the game, but they also voluntarily invest real money in HT by opting for a
Bidding for Complex Goods 12
costly premium account.5 These stylized facts underpin our view, partially inferred from
own introspection, that the HT managers are very ambitious and that the game provides
rather strong incentives. Plausibly, the within game motivation can be regarded as high as
that of participants in laboratory experiments or small stake internet sales. Moreover, in a
recent study Castronova (2008) provides suggestive evidence that economic constraints like
the law of demand apply similarly in virtual environments with virtual money as they do in
the real world. It thus seems reasonable to argue that it is possible to retrieve meaningful
insights on individual behavior also for real life situations involving real money.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief description
of some basic concepts of HT and details on the transfer market, the virtual players, and
the sample selection. The descriptive statistics of our data are presented in Section 2.3. In
Section 2.4 the estimation model is speciﬁed and the main results from the empirical analysis
are established. Section 2.5 discusses possible explanations and analyzes how a change in
the game design aﬀects our results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background and Sample Selection
Our analysis is based on data on virtual players sold in Hattrick’s transfer market. After
a brief introduction into the game’s basic principles, we discuss the implementation of its
transfer market and bidding system.6 We then provide more details on the goods traded,
i.e. the virtual players, before we turn to a detailed description of our dataset.
2.2.1 Background on the Game and its Mechanics
Over the last few years games on the internet have become increasingly popular. More than
ten years after its invention in 1997, HT is still among the most rapidly growing browser-
based online games. The basic concept of the game is to manage your own virtual football
club, combining the elements of economic management, tactical options, and community
5“Supportership” enables a package of further features and tools like bookmarks and statistics at a fee of
about $30 per year on a non-subscription basis. The managers take no technical advantage in their in-game
performance from this supporter status, but it merely “make[s] your time at Hattrick easier as well as
more fun”, as the operators of the game put it. (Source: http://www.hattrick.org/Help/Supporter/)
6All descriptions of the game relate to the time of our data collection.
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interaction. To consistently perform well, it is necessary for a manager to utilize all three
of these elements. Your team plays at least one weekly game in a national league system
against teams coached by other managers. HT is played in semi-real time: While a match
takes ninety real-time minutes to complete, a season in HT lasts for an in-game year that
is normalized to 112 real-time days. The outcome of matches is determined by random
simulation on the basis of the chosen strategies of the opponents, skills of the virtual players
and other factors that determine the probabilities to win. The tasks for a manager to lead
his team to success are numerous, ranging from decisions on match tactics and line-ups, over
hiring team staﬀ like doctors and co-trainers, over “drafting” a new player from the team’s
youth squad and either selling, keeping, or ﬁring him as needed, to monitoring the team’s
training program. Many managers complete all of these tasks almost on a daily basis.
In addition to the sportive component, the game requires managers to develop a sound
ﬁnancial scheme for their clubs. The most promising way to raise (virtual) money in HT
is to train and improve one’s players and proﬁtably sell them to other managers. Hence,
trading players on the transfer market is a crucial element of the game. Financial success
typically starts with specialization in a certain training strategy since the skills improve very
slowly and only one out of eight can be trained at a time. For any skill, it takes several
weeks until a “trainee” player “pops up” to the next higher level. Moreover, whether a
player receives training at all and to what extent depends on the position he was lined-up
in the last match he played. Although a complete description of the complex rules of the
game even regarding only the training would be beyond the scope of this paper, the following
example should illustrate the underlying mechanisms: Assume a manager chooses to train
the skill keeping. In this case, only those players having played as goalkeepers during the
week’s matches will receive keeping training. Thus, any eﬃcient training strategy requires
considerable long-term persistence.
Usually, the managers stick to one particular training type and continually “produce” a
speciﬁc player type. This is where the second key component to ﬁnancial success comes into
play, namely to proﬁtable trade developed “trainees” and newly “drafted” youth players
with other managers on the transfer-market. This latter task is of primary interest to
us. It allows us to analyze how a manager evaluates a virtual player, essentially a multi-
dimensional attribute vector, which in addition to his skills also contains other characteristics
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like personality traits, wage, and current form. Figure 2.3 in Section 2.2.3 presents a graphical
illustration of a typical player proﬁle in HT and the various attributes are discussed in more
detail. For now, it is important to understand, that the quality of a player and his suitability
to play certain positions in the team is completely determined by his attribute vector. Thus,
the same is true for his market value. When oﬀered on the transfer market, a player’s
complete attribute vector is freely accessible to any potential bidder, such that there is no
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. Importantly, for our analysis, on the
web interface where the managers submit their bids, the age of a player is explicitly stated
in the form “X years and Y days old” (see Figure 2.3).
2.2.2 Transactions: The Transfer Market
With an average of about 40,000 players oﬀered for sale each single day, the transfer market
in HT has a remarkable trading volume.7 At any time, a manager can decide to oﬀer one
of his own players for sale. To do so, on the proﬁle page of a particular player the manager
sets a reserve price and hits a sell-button. After the submission of the sell order, the player
is oﬀered for exactly 72 hours from then on.
Figure 2.1: Transfer Market Search Mask
(Source: http://www.hattrick.org)
7Source: http://www.databased.at/HT/htpe
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The selling mechanism implemented is an automatically extended English ascending open-
bid auction: If someone places an oﬀer less than 3 minutes before the deadline, the deadline
will be extended for another 3 minutes. This continues until all bidders but one retire.
All players are displayed following an exogenous standard and the sellers have no means to
aﬀect the way how their player is presented to potential buyers. Figure 2.1 shows the typical
user interface a manager is presented with when he enters the transfer market. It displays
the search engine, which allows to ﬁlter for various player attributes like age, current bid,
and - most importantly - up to four playing skills and their desired levels of ability.8
Figure 2.2: Transfer Market Search Results
(Source: http://www.hattrick.org)
A search returns up to 250 oﬀered players matching the selected ﬁlter, where an abstract of
their main characteristics is displayed as shown in Figure 2.2.9 Per default, results are sorted
by closeness to deadline. By clicking on a player’s name, his individual proﬁle page opens
displaying the full vector of attributes (see Figure 2.3). This is also the interface from which
an actual bid can be submitted. Placed bids are binding and irreversible. Once the auction
8In the terminology of the game, skill levels are denoted as adjectives. To simplify the notation, we use
integer values to address them, e.g. “passable” corresponds to score 6 of 20. Table 2.10 in Appendix 2.7.2
shows the detailed ranking, which can also be found in the game’s manual.
9Observe that this preview only contains information on a player’s age-group but not his precise age. In
Section 2.5 we discuss why and analyze how a change of this display may alter our ﬁndings.
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ends, the player is automatically transferred to the winning manager’s team and the seller
receives the winning bid.10 Thus, in this framework there is no risk of post-auction default.
Having described the market from which our data stems, we now turn to a more detailed
discussion of the goods traded in it, namely the virtual players and their attribute vectors.
2.2.3 Goods: The Virtual Players
The attribute vector of an individual virtual player has about thirty dimensions. Figure 2.3
shows the typical proﬁle of a virtual player that is listed on the transfer market. Importantly,
note that this is also the page where any prospective buyer submits his bid: To the right
of the attribute vector the auction details are displayed and bids can be placed via the
“bid!”-Button.
Figure 2.3: Virtual Player Proﬁle
(Source: http://www.hattrick.org)
As we discuss in detail below, our leading hypothesis is that the value of a player should
ceteris paribus continuously decrease with his total age as measured in day units. Therefore,
we are especially interested in how this attribute is presented to the managers. As Figure
2.3 shows, literally topmost all information on the exact age is stated in the form years
and days.11 In addition, also the next birthday of the player is displayed, stating the
actual calendar date when the player turns one year older. Factually, this attribute repeats
10Implemented to discourage excessive day-trading a small percentage of the price is deducted as a fee,
which decreases with the time a player was member of a team.
11In the following, we use italics to denote the variable name in our data corresponding to an attribute.
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the informational content contained in the variable days in yet another form. The precise
information on the age attribute is thus clearly visible to any potential buyer.
Of major importance for the value of a player are the eight attributes displayed in the middle
of Figure 2.3, which we denote as his “skills”. While stamina and set-pieces are general skills,
the remaining six - playmaking, winger, scoring, keeping, passing, and defending - determine
a player’s suitability to play in certain positions in the line-up. For instance, a player
with his best skill being keeping is rationally classiﬁed as goalie. The player-skills are the
only attributes that can be actively inﬂuenced by the manager via training and they drive
the players’ value to the largest extent. While in general the skills of a player are private
information to his owner, if he is oﬀered on the transfer market his full attribute vector
becomes public information. Therefore, all attributes are freely accessible for any potential
buyer. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the attributes and variables in our sample and
displays the individual values they can take in the game.
Table 2.1: List of Variables
Variable Description Range
Player attributes years Age in years (1 HT -year ≡ 112 real-time days) 17+
days Age in days (1 HT -day ≡ 1 real-time day) {0,..,111}
totalage Total age in day units (contructed/normalized) {0,..,448}
days17-days20 Interaction term of days and age-group dummies {0,..,111}
form Current form of player {0,..,8}
total skill index Noisy indicator of overall quality of player N+
wage Salary (exogenous; in virtual Euro) N+
keeper Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
playmaking Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
winger Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
scoring Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
passing Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
defense Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
setpieces Playing skill for all player types {0,..,20}
stamina Playing skill for all player types {0,..,20}
gentleness High value if agreeable (ascending order) {0,..,5}
aggression Low value if player aggressive (descending order) {0,..,4}
honesty High value if honest (ascending order) {0,..,5}
player experience Experience of player {0,..,20}
leadership Leadership qualities of player {0,..,7}
Auction Data price Auction end price paid by winning bidder N+
dtime Time of deadline hh.mm.ss
dday Day of deadline dd.mm.yy
buyer countryID Country of origin for buyer N+
buyer searchcost Proxy for buyer search cost based on broadband data {0,1}
Dummy variables age17 - age20 Dummy for age-group {0,1}
(1=yes, 0=no) peakhour Auction deadline ended 5:30 p.m. - 10:00 p.m. {0,1}
mon - sun On which day does the auction end? {0,1}
acquired Proxy for previous sale (player countryID = seller countryID) {0,1}
expert Proxy for buyer experience by leaguelevel {0,1}
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Among the remaining characteristics, a player’s total skill index (tsi) is the one most likely to
have a (positive) inﬂuence on market value, which represents a noisy measure for his overall
abilities. To see this, note that HT calculates the skill-levels are as real numbers including
hidden decimal places, the so-called “sub-skills”, while the player proﬁle only displays the
adjective corresponding to the current integer value for each skill. With each training a
player receives, the trained skill increases by a marginal increment (which is declining in
age), and so does the tsi. While also correlated to other attributes (e.g. form), the tsi score
thus constitutes a noisy signal for the sub-skills of a player, i.e. for how close he is to reach
the next higher level in one of his skills.
A complete description of all characteristics is beyond the scope of this paper, but we employ
the full set of attributes as control variables in our empirical analysis. For the players in our
sample we have fairly clear predictions in which direction their eﬀect on the price, if any,
should go. All attributes not discussed are indeed of second-order importance to the value of
the players in our sample and go into the direction which we would expect from the design
and rules of the game.12
2.2.4 Sample Selection
A crucial feature of the game is that the players grow older over time. With increasing age,
the marginal return from training declines and at around age thirty they slowly begin to
deteriorate in their skills, such that they ﬁnally will have to be replaced. Therefore, each
week a new cohort of players enters the game. Every week, each manager can “draft” one
completely randomly created new player from a youth academy at a small ﬁxed cost. The
maximum level a skill can take for such a player is score 8 out of 20, but most commonly
the highest skill will lie below that.13 Like his whole attribute vector, also the player’s age
is randomly assigned and falls into the range between seventeen and twenty years. A player
might for example be, say, “18 years 20 days” old when he is drawn.
12A test for joint signiﬁcance of the control variables conﬁrms that they have some impact, but the
magnitudes of the individually signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are small.
13Score 6 for at least one of the skills is regarded as a minimum requirement by most managers to keep
the player. For lower scores, the market value is close to zero and these players are usually instantly ﬁred
after they were drafted.
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For our analysis, we concentrate on this speciﬁc subgroup of players for several reasons.
First, a large majority of the newly drafted players has at most one skill at which they are
reasonably good at and which determines their type. Second, young players comprehend
what we label a large “advancement potential”, since the eﬀect of training on skill improve-
ments is the larger, the younger a player is: All else equal a seventeen year old player will
need fewer units of training to advance to the next skill level than if he was eighteen and so
forth. In other words, the marginal training eﬀect is the largest at the age of seventeen and
is a decreasing function of age. As a consequence, only players up to the age of about twenty
are regarded as appropriate “trainees” for a proﬁtable training strategy and a way to raise
money in the game. For higher ages, the market value converges to a lower bound which
we label as a player’s “consumption value” within the considered skill-region.14 Finally, as
a newly “drafted” player often does not ﬁt into the chosen training strategy of his manager,
these players are heavily traded on the transfer market.
By the nature of a football simulation, most of the several thousand players oﬀered on
the transfer market are of some ﬁeld player type, like midﬁelder or forward. In HT, the
performance of ﬁeld players depends not only on one skill but rather on a combination
of several diﬀerent skills. Moreover, managers can assign individual tactical orders to ﬁeld
players and choose among various match tactics, both shifting the relative weights of speciﬁc
playing skills, and hence their impact on overall performance.15 As a consequence, the
various skills of a player may receive very diﬀerent weights in the individual evaluations
across managers, making it hard to estimate their market value. To the contrary, goalkeepers
are not aﬀected by the chosen tactics, they cannot be assigned any individual orders, and
keeping is by far the most important playing-skill. Hence, we naturally chose to focus on this
subgroup of players for our analysis. In our identiﬁcation strategy, this allows us to control
for and back out the eﬀect of the skill-component on the observed prices to the largest extent.
Summarizing, all players in the sample are aged between seventeen and twenty years and
display an ability-level between score 6 to 8 out of 20 in the skill keeping, which accounts for
the thickest market segment of players in this category. In addition, we restrict our sample
to players without injuries, holding the health status constant.
14See Section 2.4.1 for a detailed discussion of the market value of a player.
15For example, for a midﬁelder ordered to play “defensive” the defense skill becomes more important than
if aligned “normal”. Likewise, the tactic “pressing”, for instance, increases the weight of the passing-skill for
all ﬁeld players, while it is not important for, say, defenders when the standard tactic is played.
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2.3 Data Description
Our dataset consists of detailed information on 39,413 virtual goalkeepers that were traded
on HT ’s transfer market at any time of day within a consecutive collection period lasting
from May 01, 2008 to May 15, 2008. In particular, we collected the full attribute vector for
each single player along with details on the auction deadline, the ﬁnal price, and the managers
involved in the transaction.16 For reasons laid out above, we restrict our focus to the
subpopulation of players below age twenty-one, which yields 19,191 remaining observations.
In addition, we exclude 1,510 players with a keeping-skill higher than score 8 and 171
outliers.17 This leaves us with a ﬁnal sample of 17,510 players.
Figure 2.4: Distributions of Age and Sales
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Figure 2.4a shows the age distribution for the players in our sample, indicating a roughly
balanced distribution for days within each age-group. The distribution of sales per weekday
is depicted in Figure 2.4b. On Tuesdays and Wednesdays we observe spikes in the number
of sold players. Since new players can be “drafted” each Saturday after an weekly update
and often are immediately oﬀered for sale, the increased number of deadlines expiring on
these days is not surprising. To examine whether price is aﬀected by the auction end day,
we add a dummy for each weekday as regressors on price.18 We also control for the auction
end time by including the dummy peakhour to indicate whether a player was sold between
16Refer to Table 2.1 for an detailed overview of all variables in our sample.
17Outliers are classiﬁed as prices above the 99%-percentile for each age-skill-combination. None of the
results depends on their omission.
18For example, the eﬀect of Saturday is measured by the dummy sat, which is 1 if the auction ended
Saturdays, and 0 otherwise. Since it suﬃces to include six out of these dummies, we drop the dummy for
Friday. Hence, the resulting coeﬃcients are to be interpreted as relative diﬀerences with respect to Fridays.
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5:30 p.m. and 10 p.m. , where the highest numbers of simultaneous online users are reached
and most auctions expire.19
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A. Overview Panel B. Price for Age-Skill-Combinations
Variable Obs. Mean Min. Max. Skill Age Obs. Mean Min. Max.
price 17,510 159,393 1,000 1,500,000 6 17 1,713 101,433 3,000 340,000
years 17,510 19 17 20 18 1,956 45,469 3,001 125,000
days 17,510 55 0 111 19 2,765 37,353 1,000 108,000
totalage 17,510 245 3 447 20 2,661 34,699 2,000 100,000
total skill index 17,510 2,821 420 8,530
keeping 17,510 7 6 8 7 17 1,296 384,871 99,500 1,129,005
playmaking 17,510 1 1 4 18 1,315 184,749 35,000 400,000
scoring 17,510 1 1 5 19 2,006 150,489 60,000 350,000
passing 17,510 1 1 4 20 2,059 137,970 61,000 306,000
winger 17,510 1 1 5
defending 17,510 1 1 6 8 17 330 802,395 400,000 1,500,000
setpieces 17,510 2 1 11 18 474 572,709 225,500 1,062,000
stamina 17,510 5 1 9 19 545 510,959 337,000 874,995
leadership 17,510 4 1 7 20 390 487,770 235,000 800,001
wage 17,510 2,126 850 4,181
form 17,510 6 1 8
player experience 17,510 1 1 4
Panel C. Prices per Age-Group and Skilllevel
Variable Value Obs. Percent Mean Min. Max.
prices by age years 17 3,339 19.07 280,724 3,000 1,500,000
18 3,745 21.39 161,107 3,001 1,062,000
19 5,316 30.36 128,599 1,000 874,995
20 5,110 29.18 110,889 2,000 800,001
prices by skill-level keeping 6 9,095 51.94 50,391 1,000 340,000
7 6,676 38.13 198,876 35,000 1,129,005
8 1,739 9.93 577,894 225,500 1,500,000
Notes: The variable totalage ≡ 112 · (years − 17) + days displays a player’s precise age in day units. The minimum value
of totalage at 3 reﬂects age “17 years and 3 days” and the maximum value at 447 equals “20 years and 111 days”.
The summary statistics for our data are presented in Table 2.2. Panel A provides an overview
of the most important player attributes, where the variable totalage ≡ 112·(years−17)+days
is a normalized measure for the precise age of a player in day units, combining the information
contained in the two variables years and days. Note that it has its minimum at value 3, since
the youngest possible age a player can have is “17 years and 0 days” and each auction lasts
for three days. With exception of stamina and setpieces, which are useful secondary skills for
any type of player, the highest scores are attained in the keeping-skill, clearly classifying the
players in our sample as “keepers”. A correlation analysis of the main regressors on price
yields a strong positive coeﬃcient for keeping (ρ = 0.80) and tsi (ρ = 0.79).20 Conversely,
the age variables years (ρ = −0.31) and totalage (ρ = −0.30) have a signiﬁcant negative
correlation. Among the explanatory variables, by construction years and totalage evolve
19See Figure 2.12 in Appendix 2.7.2.
20See Table 2.11 in Appendix 2.7.2. For the sake of clarity, only the most important attributes are depicted.
Among the left-out attributes we ﬁnd no unexpected correlations.
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collinear at a degree of 0.96, while days has a correlation of 0.23. In addition, keeper and tsi
co-move at ρ = 0.87. While in general collinearity among the explanatory variables can be
problematic, our sample size is suﬃciently large to produce precise parameter estimates.21
Returning to Table 2.2, listing the players by years in Panel C shows that the age-groups
are roughly equally represented, with slightly less seventeen (19%) and eighteen (21%) year
old players. The large majority of players has a keeping score of 6 (52%), while score 8 only
accounts for 10% of the sample. In addition, Panel C also contains information on the price
pattern for each age-group and skill level separately. Hardly surprising, the highest prices
are paid for level-8 keepers and for the youngest players at the age of seventeen. Likewise,
Panel B contains the price distributions for each combination of skill-level and age-group,
yielding a ﬁrst impression of how the price pattern evolves. For instance, a level-6 keeper aged
seventeen on average yields e 101,433 HT -currency, while the mean prices for age-groups
eighteen (e 45,469), nineteen (e 37,353), and twenty (e 34,699) are substantially lower. At
a ﬁrst glance, this sharp decline could be the result of a non-linear but continuous relation
between price and totalage, which would be perfectly in line with our prediction that market
price ceteris paribus decreases continuously in age.
Figure 2.5: Price Pattern for Level-6 Keepers
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21Anticipating our results, all coeﬃcients for the collinear regressors indeed turn out to be highly signiﬁcant
if jointly included in the estimation model.
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However, a graphical inspection of the relation of price to the total age reveals intriguing
patterns. Foreshadowing our main ﬁndings, the price pattern for level-6 keepers in Figure
2.5 displays strong discontinuities where the players turn one year older, a ﬁnding which
methodologically neither a simple linear nor a non-linear model alone can explain. For level-7
and level-8 keepers qualitatively similar patterns arise,22 implying that many managers
systematically overpay for players on the verge to switch to the next higher age-group,
obviously ignoring the imminent value loss he will experience on his birthday.
Having re-conﬁrmed with the makers of the game that this “birthday eﬀect”, as we refer to
it, cannot be explained by anything in the underlying game algorithm, we take this ﬁnding
as a ﬁrst indication for ineﬃcient usage of information on the precise age of a player as
provided through the ﬁgure displayed in days.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
Given the richness of our data, we are able to analyze whether each player attribute is
eﬃciently utilized in the managers’ evaluations, i.e. whether it is correctly included or
disregarded according to its predicted relation to price as implied by the rules of the game.
By inspection, however, already the descriptive statistics suggest that this might not be the
case for the attribute days, which conveys valuable information on a player’s precise age.
Hence, the identiﬁcation of the relation between the diﬀerent age attributes and price is at
the core of our interest. Before we turn to an in-depth hedonic regression analysis, we brieﬂy
discuss the structural model our regression approach is based upon. In a further step we
control for potential pitfalls in our data, discuss alternative speciﬁcations, and test for the
robustness of our ﬁndings.
2.4.1 Estimation Model
In our identiﬁcation strategy, we theoretically disaggregate market value into two distinct
components. Above in Section 2.2.4 we already pointed out that the degree to which a player
proﬁts from training crucially depends on his age, a concept which we label as a player’s
22See Figure 2.13 in Appendix 2.7.2.
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“Advancement Potential Value” (APV ). Recall that the younger a player is, the larger is
his marginal beneﬁt from training and the faster he improves in his skills. Thus, by design
of the training algorithm, the APV should ceteris paribus steadily decline in the total age
of a player. The second component, which we denote as the player’s “Consumption Value”
(CV ), instead captures the extent to which he adds to his team’s strength if lined-up for
a match and is mainly driven by his skills. In combination, APV and CV account for a
players market value:
Market Value = Consumption Value + Advancement Potential Value
A keepers’ consumption value in HT is to the largest extent driven by his keeping-skill. While
other skills and attributes like stamina or form can be regarded as inﬂuential, importantly,
his current performance - and thus his CV - is completely independent of age. Hence, a
(simpliﬁed) speciﬁcation for the CV of the players in our sample is given by23
CV = α1+βkeep ·keeping+βstam ·stamina+...+βsetp ·setpieces+βform ·form+...+u1 (2.1)
In contrast, the advancement potential crucially depends on the age of a player. To put
more structure on the estimation model for APV , review the observed price pattern in
Figure 2.5. First, note that the observed discontinuities where the players turn one year
older apparently diﬀer in their relative size. To account for this possibility, we decompose
the variable years into dummies for each age-group (age17 - age20). For example, the eﬀect
of age-group eighteen is measured by age18 taking value 1 and 0 otherwise. Since all four
dummies are perfectly correlated, we need to include only three of them in our estimation
model. Hence, by excluding the dummy age17, the resulting coeﬃcients for the included
dummies will capture the relative price diﬀerences for each age-group with respect to age
seventeen. Second, the price pattern also shows that within each age-group the price-pattern
declines gradually in totalage, just as we would expect. Note further, that the slope of this
relation, i.e. the impact of a marginal day on price, remains roughly constant within an
individual age-group. Across age-groups, however, the slope itself decreases. Formally, this
corresponds to a piece-wise linear relationship between totalage and price being the true
23For the sake of clarity, we only include the most important attributes in this representation. In the
regression analysis, the full vector of attributes was included.
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underlying functional form in the population.24 To control for possible changes in the slope,
we interact the age-group dummies with days, thereby creating the variables days17-days20
which display the age in days conditional on belonging to the speciﬁed age-group and zero
otherwise. This allows us to identify the impact of a marginal day separately for each age-
group. If the true underlying relationship was linear, the coeﬃcients for the interaction terms
would be the same over all age-groups. As a ﬁnal step, recall that tsi is a noisy indicator
of how close a player is to the next higher skill-level. Thus, this attribute is likely to be
inﬂuential for the APV . Given these considerations, the estimation model for the APV can
be described as follows:
APV = α2 + βtsi · tsi + βage18 · age18 + βage19 · age19 + βage20 · age20
+ βday17 · days17 + βday18 · days18 + βday19 · days19 + βday20 · days20 + u2 (2.2)
In the empirical analysis we can only jointly estimate both value components, as reﬂected
in the variable price. However, if we restrict our analysis to close substitute players with
identical keeping-skill level, we are able to create partial homogeneity: By separating out
the impact of the most inﬂuential attribute keeping, within each subgroup the consumption
component of market value can be regarded as virtually constant. We are thus able to
identify and estimate the APV component, which is of main interest to us, since it reﬂects
the impact of age on price.25
Hypothesis 1 If the market value of a player declines continuously in totalage, the value
loss per year is fully captured through the aggregated marginal day-eﬀects within this timespan.
In the model framework, this is the case if and only if
(i) the coeﬃcient of age18 equals the value decline per day in age-group seventeen (βday17)
times the number of days per year, i.e
βage18 = 112 · βday17,
24Having consulted with the makers of the game, this speciﬁcation seems highly plausible and to be
consistent with the ought-to devolution of prices. All our results remain qualitatively robust if we instead
estimate a truly non-linear relationship. The regression results are available from the authors upon request.
25Since keeping is held constant, it cannot account for variation in price. Suppressing the inﬂuence of
independent variables by holding them constant is a standard way to ensure statistical control. This technique
allows us to infer whether an eﬀect is due to one particular independent variable and not to another.
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(ii) the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of age19 and age18 equals the value decline per
day in age-group eighteen (βday18) times the number of days per year, i.e
βage19 − βage18 = 112 · βday18, and
(iii) the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of age20 and age19 equals the value decline per
day in age-group nineteen (βday19) times the number of days per year, i.e
βage20 − βage19 = 112 · βday19.
For instance, consider a player who just turned nineteen. If market value declines steadily
in totalage, then ceteris paribus his value should be equal to that of a player aged “18
years 0 days” net of the continuous value loss an average player experiences over 112 days
within the age-group eighteen, respectively. This is implied by the testable predictions
regarding the relations between the coeﬃcients for the days-interaction terms and the age-
group dummies as stated in the above hypothesis. Figure 2.6 contains a graphical illustration
of the estimation model and the predictions from the hypothesis.
Figure 2.6: Structural Model and its Predictions
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Intuitively, once we account for the eﬀects on price of the ﬁner information contained in the
days of age, the noisier information as conveyed through the age-group (i.e. years) should be
redundant and have no further impact on price. This is the case if and only if the coeﬃcients
on the age-group dummies solely reﬂect the steady day-by-day decline in market value that
a player experiences within the previous age-groups.
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2.4.2 Multivariate Regression Results
To test our main hypothesis (H1) formally, we conduct a hedonic regression analysis with
the observed price as the dependent variable. For each keeping-level, we start out with a
standard OLS procedure including only the main attributes from our theoretical estimation
model presented above. In a second step, we incorporate a broad range of controls from
the set of possible regressors as shown in Table 2.1, including all remaining skills (except of
keeping) and all other player characteristics (e.g. wage, leadership, honesty,...). In addition,
we also control for market ﬂuctuations with regard to the daytime and weekday of the auction
deadline. The regression results are depicted in Table 2.3, where each column represents one
speciﬁcation.
Table 2.3: Determinants of Price (OLS)
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
I II III IV V VI
age18 -86,498.41∗∗∗ -88,096.64∗∗∗ -324,311.89∗∗∗ -325,926.07∗∗∗ -438,805.74∗∗∗ -455,444.61∗∗∗
(2,684.04) (2,575.52) (8,568.17) (8,155.27) (32,160.39) (30,830.867)
age19 -97,509.31∗∗∗ -100,614.80∗∗∗ -366,515.16∗∗∗ -368,241.79∗∗∗ -502,696.46∗∗∗ -524267.98∗∗∗
(2,599.52) (2,513.81) (8,189.75) (7,793.75) (31,098.47) (30,064.959)
age20 -98,471.32∗∗∗ -102,967.59∗∗∗ -381,842.46∗∗∗ -383,271.15∗∗∗ -548,159.48∗∗∗ -560,486.34∗∗∗
(2,597.10) (2,538.99) (8,172.21) (7,836.20) (30,979.14) (30008.344)
days17 -597.40∗∗∗ -624.86∗∗∗ -2,557.94∗∗∗ -2,614.91∗∗∗ -3,223.88∗∗∗ -3,128.98∗∗∗
(34.38) (33.11) (106.56) (101.89) (371.078) (362.42)
days18 -38.43∗∗∗ -58.32∗∗∗ -234.73∗∗∗ -255.88∗∗∗ -400.73∗∗∗ -215.21
(13.84) (13.09) (45.55) (42.59) (155.024) (158.30)
days19 9.83 4.40 -72.31∗∗ -22.16 -248.85∗∗ 12.92
(10.49) (10.01) (29.64) (29.62) (113.118) (120.29)
days20 -13.31 4.70 -33.17 -8.29 174.14 227.80∗
(10.24) (9.68) (26.97) (25.62) (112.273) (118.84)
tsi 23.36∗∗∗ 26.00∗∗∗ 45.58∗∗∗ 74.92∗∗∗ 58.51∗∗∗ 81.54∗∗∗
(0.68) (1.61) (1.64) (3.09) (3.253) (5.12)
Intercept 87,099.03∗∗∗ 56,549.64∗∗∗ 370,202.16∗∗∗ 308,490.39∗∗∗ 736,388.85∗∗∗ 554,600.70∗∗∗
(2,521.54) (5,547.66) (8,582.69) (13,734.94) (34,122.57) (44,567.45)
skills no yes no yes no yes
character no yes no yes no yes
daytime no yes no yes no yes
weekday no yes no yes no yes
R2 0.56 0.61 0.72 0.75 0.59 0.64
N 9,095 9,095 6,676 6,676 1,739 1,739
F 511.55 185.19 768.58 249.93 188.55 68.26
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**)
or 10%(*) level. “Skills” captures the playing abilities except of keeping (= constant for each subgroup). “Character”
contains all other player attributes except tsi. “Daytime” and “weekday” indicate whether dummies for daytime and day
of the week were included.
In any speciﬁcation, our estimation model predicts about 60% of the variability in the data,
indicating a considerable degree of explanatory power. We start the derivation of our results
with focus on column I in Table 2.3, which states the resulting coeﬃcients and standard
errors for the 9,095 level-6 keepers in our sample. Observe ﬁrst that tsi has a positive eﬀect
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on price with 99%-signiﬁcant t-statistics, just as we would expect. Second, the coeﬃcients for
the age-group dummies are of large magnitude and signiﬁcant on the highest level, indicating
that there is indeed a declining relationship between age and price. For example, the negative
coeﬃcient βage18 (βage19) indicates that the market value for a player aged “18 years 0 days”
(“19 years 0 days”) is on average about e 86,498 (e 97,509) less than that for a player aged
“17 years 0 days”. While improving the model ﬁt in terms of a higher R2, both the magnitude
and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients remain virtually unaltered if we include further control
regressors from the players’ attribute vector and the auction details (column II).
As pointed out above, if the market value declines continuously in age, this substantial
reduction will solely reﬂect the aggregated eﬀects of the value loss per day over the duration
of one year. In line with this argument, observe that the coeﬃcients for days17 and days18
indeed reveal a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of a marginal day on price within the age-groups
seventeen and eighteen. However, this is not the case for the age-groups nineteen and
twenty, immediately implying that from age nineteen onward the ﬁner information on the
age attribute as provided through the variable days has no signiﬁcant impact on the market
value of level-6 keepers.26 This contrasts sharply with Hypothesis 1 and points towards an
insuﬃcient utilization of the provided information.
To substantiate this ﬁnding, we now turn to a test of our above predictions. Observe that in
column II the aggregate day-by-day eﬀect on price within the age-group seventeen amounts
to 112·βday17 = 112·(−625) = −70, 000, which accounts only for 79.4% of the total reduction
in market value as indicated by the coeﬃcient βage18 = −88, 097 in the model. Irrespective
of the steady decline, on the day of his eighteenth birthday a player thus additionally loses
e 18,097 in market value. A Wald-Test conﬁrms that this slump in value is highly signiﬁcant
(p-value: 0.000). Counterfactual to a fully continuous decline, the price pattern exhibits a
substantial discontinuity at this point. Similarly, the total reduction of market value between
ages “18 years 0 days” and “19 years 0 days” is given by βage19 − βage18 = −12, 518, while
the steady day-by-day decline only amounts to 112 · βday18 = −6, 496, or 52% of the former.
The remaining 48% (−6, 022) establish another statistically signiﬁcant discontinuity on the
nineteenth birthday of a level-6 keeper (p-value: 0.000). Finally, also the third prediction
26In principle the APV -component could be close to zero already at that age-level. If that was the case,
the observed prices would merely reﬂect the CV -part of market value and we ought to observe approximately
similar prices for both age-groups, since their consumption values are independent of age. Yet, the prices in
age-group twenty are signiﬁcantly lower than that for players aged nineteen.
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is not fulﬁlled, since the impact of days19 is insigniﬁcant and hence the diﬀerence βage20 −
βage19 = −2, 353 identiﬁes a third discontinuity located at the point where a player turns
twenty (p-value: 0.002). Thus, the regression analysis validates the apparent discontinuities
observed in the price pattern.
Table 2.4: The Birthday Eﬀect - Size of Discontinuities
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
Birthday I II III IV V VI
18 -19634∗∗∗ -18097∗∗∗ -37816∗∗∗ -33046∗∗∗ -77718∗∗∗ -104997∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.23)
19 -6755∗∗∗ -6022∗∗∗ -15883∗∗∗ -13644∗∗∗ -18979 -68823∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.48) (0.38) (0.32) (0.30)
20 -962∗∗ -2353∗∗∗ -7264∗∗∗ -15029∗∗∗ -17592∗ -36218∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.39)
Notes: The table depicts the absolute magnitude of the discontinuities and their relative share
of the total value decline in parentheses. If the day-by-day decline within an age-group was
insigniﬁcant, the shown value reﬂects the total decline relative to the previous age-group (100%).
Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
Moreover, the results we are able to demonstrate in our data prove to be highly robust if
we instead analyze level-7 and level-8 keepers, either with or without controls. Table 2.4
provides an overview of the respective discontinuities for each regression approach from Table
2.3. Figure 2.7 illustrates the ﬁt of our estimation model by plotting the predicted prices for
level-6 keepers (with controls) against the observed transaction prices.
Figure 2.7: Model Fit - Predictions and Observations for Level-6 Keepers
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Result 1 (Discontinuities in the Price Pattern): The price pattern does not evolve
continuously in the total age of a player but exhibits substantial and highly signiﬁcant dis-
continuities at the players’ birthdays. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be rejected.
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Once again, the total age of a player represents much ﬁner information on his age attribute
- and thus his advancement potential value - than it is the case for just the age-group. More
precisely, after taking into account the exact information on the total age including the days
- as we do in the model by including the interaction terms days17-days20 - the variables
age18-age20 (and years, respectively) should be redundant for the pricing considerations of a
manager as they bear no additional information. This contrasts sharply with the tremendous
additional impact of the age-group dummies that we ﬁnd in our data. With the moment a
player turns one year older, his value slumps down dramatically. For some age-groups the
loss on a single day, his birthday, accounts for more than half of the total loss during the
period of one year. This implies that the managers systematically overpay for players close
to their birthday. Corollary 1 thus establishes our ﬁrst main result.
Corollary 1 (Ineﬃcient Use of Information): Managers in HT base their evaluations
of virtual players on the noisier information contained in the variable years although they
are provided with much ﬁner information in the form of age in days. They do not or not
eﬃciently incorporate important information in their pricing considerations.
To illustrate the in-game economic impact of this ﬁnding, consider the following thought
experiment. With 40,000 trades per day and about 950,000 registered users, the average
manager buys about 5 players per season. Suppose an individual manager only buys
seventeen year old level-6 keepers with their birthdays close by. He could save up to ﬁve times
the value loss a level-6 keeper experiences on his eighteenth birthday, i.e. roughly e 90,000, if
he instead opted for players that just turned eighteen. With that amount he could aﬀord to
buy one additional average level-6 keeper from age-group seventeen (mean price e 101,433),
or even two additional players from age-group eighteen (mean price e 45,469), respectively.
2.4.3 Robustness of Results
Having laid out our main result, we now provide a series of robustness tests. First, we
present the results from alternative regression procedures addressing potential pitfalls in the
data. Subsequently, we analyze whether the eﬀects persist if we restrict to a subsample of
expert managers. In addition, we relax our above assumption of a constant keeping-level by
allowing for skill variations in a pooled regression approach.
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2.4.3.1 Alternative Regression Procedures
In deriving our results we naturally control for potential pitfalls like multicollinearity and
heteroscedasticity. As our sample size is suﬃciently large, we do not ﬁnd the ﬁrst to
be a problem. However, the large diﬀusion in the observed prices for seventeen year old
players raises suspicions of having non-constant variance in the error terms.27 In the above
regressions we thus account for possible correlations of the residuals across observations by
applying Huber-White-Sandwich-estimators to produce robust standard errors. An alterna-
tive remedy to heteroscedasticity is to perform a log-linear transformation of the dependent
variable, e.g. using the natural logarithm of price instead of the raw values in the regression
analysis. The resulting coeﬃcients are depicted in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Determinants of Price - Log-linear OLS
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
I II III IV V VI
age18 -1.0415∗∗∗ -1.0714∗∗∗ -0.9530∗∗∗ -0.9638∗∗∗ -0.5703∗∗∗ -0.5967∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0193) (0.0361) (0.0344)
age19 -1.3103∗∗∗ -1.3706∗∗∗ -1.1925∗∗∗ -1.2075∗∗∗ -0.6805∗∗∗ -0.7161∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0240) (0.0178) (0.0168) (0.0338) (0.0326)
age20 -1.3510∗∗∗ -1.4402∗∗∗ -1.2853∗∗∗ -1.2979∗∗∗ -0.7678∗∗∗ -0.7877∗∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0252) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0341) (0.0331)
days17 -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0061∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0063∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
days18 -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
days19 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0005∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
days20 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
tsi 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Intercept 10.8397∗∗∗ 10.0712∗∗∗ 12.4384∗∗∗ 12.0982∗∗∗ 13.3418∗∗∗ 13.0222∗∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0886) (0.0257) (0.0496) (0.0400) (0.0620)
skills no yes no yes no yes
character no yes no yes no yes
daytime no yes no yes no yes
weekday no yes no yes no yes
R2 0.48 0.56 0 .70 0.74 0.58 0.63
N 9,095 9,095 6,676 6,676 1,739 1,739
F 1,229.02 411.34 1,983.55 661.60 279.75 99.44
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
The regression results qualitatively mirror those from Table 2.3. As before, the models
yield reasonable levels of predictive power in terms of R2, and across all regressions the
quality indicator tsi has a signiﬁcant positive impact on price. We representatively focus
27These worries are conﬁrmed by both a Breusch-Pagan and a White test, both indicating
heteroscedasticity in the data.
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on the results for level-6 keepers presented in column II. All age-group dummies and the
variables days17 and days18 have negative coeﬃcients with 99%-signiﬁcant t-statistics. A
test of the predictions from Hypothesis 1 conﬁrms the existence of the “birthday eﬀect”. To
see this, note that the accumulated day-by-day decline in age-group seventeen is given by
112·βday17=-0.6832, explaining only about 64% of the total reduction in value between ages
“18 years 0 days” and “17 years 0 days” as given by the coeﬃcient of −1.0714 for age18. The
diﬀerence validates a discontinuity on a player’s eighteens birthday (p-value: 0.000), roughly
accounting for a loss of 36% in market value.28 Moreover, also the discontinuities upon
entering age-groups nineteen and twenty prove to be signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Observe
further that the ﬁt of the predictions from the regression underlying column II with the true
price pattern is very high, as graphically illustrated in Figure 2.8. An analysis for level-7
and level-8 keepers yields virtually identical results.
Figure 2.8: Model Fit - Log-linear OLS Predictions for Level-6 Keepers
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To control for the possibility of inﬂuential outliers, we also perform a regression approach
using an iteratively re-weighted least squares procedure for both absolute and log-transformed
prices. By this method, each observation is assigned a weight ω ∈ [0, 1], where higher weights
are given to better behaved observations and extremely deviant cases are excluded from the
analysis. All results from the standard OLS regressions fully carry over to this approach and
are shown in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 in Appendix 2.7.2.
28The exact percent diﬀerence is given by 100 · (eβage18−112·βday17 − 1) ≈ −32%, where e is Euler’s number
and the exponent is the additional reduction in value that is not explained by the continuous day-by-day
decline.
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2.4.3.2 Experience
We have demonstrated that managers substantially overpay for players on the verge to enter
the next higher age-group. Given the complexity of the game, one possible explanation
for this ﬁnding could be linked to the experience of managers. It may well be that it
is only the inexperienced users giving too less weight on the exact information on age,
thereby overlooking the imminent birthday and the accompanying drop in market value.To
test whether this is the case, we repeat our above analysis exclusively restricting to trades
involving managers qualifying as “experts”. The latter are identiﬁed according to a proxy
based on the division-level of each winning bidder’s team in our data.
Intuitively, every new manager starts out in the bottom division of a pyramid system, where
each division is subdivided into leagues of eight competing managers. While the top division
consists of only a single league, the second and third divisions already comprehend four and
sixteen leagues, respectively. Depending on the number of registered users, there can be up
to eleven divisions in a country, then with 4,096 leagues and up to 32,768 managers just in
the bottom division. We thus classify a manager as an expert if his team plays in a division
above a threshold-level that is deﬁned such that on average about 20% of the managers in
each country qualify as experts. For example, Germany is represented with ten divisions
with a total capacity for 84,648 teams. To qualify as an expert, a German manager needs
to play in division seven or higher, i.e. he must be among the best 19,112 or top 23% of all
teams. Since starting in division ten, a manager needs at least three complete seasons to
reach this threshold, which is a considerable time to gain experience.
The dummy expert takes value 1 if the winning bidder’s division met the respective expert-
threshold in his country and value 0 otherwise. 3,538 auctions, or about 20% of all transac-
tions in our data, involved experts according to this proxy.29 Table 2.6 presents the respective
regression results for this subgroup. First, note that both the magnitude and signiﬁcance
of most coeﬃcients remains virtually unchanged compared to those from Table 2.3. All
coeﬃcients of the age-group dummies are signiﬁcant at the highest level and resemble the
ones from the full sample remarkably closely. Also the impact of the interaction terms days17
and days18 on price are of similar order and qualitatively go into the right direction, though
29Since our proxy on average classiﬁes about 20% of the managers as experts, this share indicates a quite
balanced representation of experienced managers in the analyzed segment of the transfer market.
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βday18 is not always statistically signiﬁcant, which is most likely due to less precise estimates
obtained from a considerably lower number of observations.
Table 2.6: Determinants of Price - Expert Managers (OLS)
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
I II III IV V VI
age18 -85,446.95∗∗∗ -88,888.14∗∗∗ -325,942.80∗∗∗ -336,094.47∗∗∗ -486,899.09∗∗∗ -497,561.66∗∗∗
(5,146.70) (4,840.61) (11,989.62) (11,428.99) (47,408.33) (46,115.35)
age19 -96,192.23∗∗∗ -99,711.65∗∗∗ -371,658.35∗∗∗ -379,088.67∗∗∗ -547,177.09∗∗∗ -573,735.24∗∗∗
(4,890.20) (4,554.77) (11,811.68) (11,053.80) (47,199.97) (46,174.27)
age20 -92,262.77∗∗∗ -100,641.45∗∗∗ -379,658.00∗∗∗ -388,504.79∗∗∗ -598,629.31∗∗∗ -613,268.10∗∗∗
(4,957.16) (4,765.90) (11,692.57) (11,106.25) (47,421.47) (46,553.08)
days17 -526.99∗∗∗ -563.51∗∗∗ -2,595.46∗∗∗ -2,694.19∗∗∗ -3,725.46∗∗∗ -3,652.63∗∗∗
(62.77) (58.16) (141.19) (134.19) (561.11) (542.66)
days18 -45.74 -42.78 -293.14∗∗∗ -260.51∗∗∗ -348.24∗ -193.17
(44.30) (43.23) (86.16) (81.42) (202.15) (233.48)
days19 32.57 33.05 -133.99 -7.20 -300.62 0.59
(42.72) (38.47) (86.33) (82.35) (190.65) (209.33)
days20 -43.27 21.45 -130.57∗ -73.89 124.05 264.68
(39.39) (40.51) (75.28) (74.00) (197.67) (232.64)
tsi 37.16∗∗∗ 32.38∗∗∗ 66.66∗∗∗ 100.64∗∗∗ 56.59∗∗∗ 83.32∗∗∗
(2.23) (5.20) (4.04) (6.90) (5.43) (8.02)
Intercept 54,447.79∗∗∗ 14,064.85 305,168.96∗∗∗ 250,519.79∗∗∗ 791,009.13∗∗∗ 677,286.89∗∗∗
(5,645.09) (16,755.03) (14,935.24) (29,209.48) (53,837.89) (69,357.10)
skills no yes no yes no yes
character no yes no yes no yes
daytime no yes no yes no yes
weekday no yes no yes no yes
R2 0.59 0.66 0.74 0.78 0.61 0.67
N 1,156 1,156 1,670 1,670 712 712
F 125.95 44.59 344.69 116.64 82.46 32.17
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**)
or 10%(*) level.
Likewise, we ﬁnd strong evidence for signiﬁcant discontinuities in the price pattern if we test
the predictions from Hypothesis 1. For instance, in column II the market value of an average
level-6 keeper slumps down by βage18 − 112 · βday17 = −25, 720 on the day of his eighteenth
birthday, which accounts for 29% of the total reduction, or for 41% of the aggregated day-
by-day eﬀect. Across all columns, a Wald-test conﬁrms that the discontinuities between
seventeen and eighteen are highly signiﬁcant at p-values ≤ 0.00. Since days18 has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on price in column II, to validate the existence of a discontinuity on
the nineteenth birthday it would suﬃce to verify that the coeﬃcients of age18 and age19
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other (which they do at a p-value of 0.002). If we despite the
statistical insigniﬁcance account for the indicated day-by-day loss in age-group eighteen, i.e.
βday18 = −43, this still yields a signiﬁcant discontinuity of size −6, 008 or 56% of the total
decline (p-value: 0.090). For level-7 and level-8 keepers the results are qualitatively similar.
Though we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant birthday eﬀect for age-group twenty, which is also likely due to
the reduced number of observations, the analysis clearly indicates that also expert managers
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fail to fully incorporate the information contained in the variable days. In any case, we can
conclude that it is not lack of experience that drives our results.
Result 2 : The birthday eﬀect cannot be explained by a lack of experience.
2.4.3.3 Skill Variations
So far we backed out the impact of the most inﬂuential skill by comparing players with a
constant keeping-score. For a ﬁnal robustness check we relax this restriction by pooling all
observations and conduct regressions for the full sample. To control for the eﬀect of skill
variations on the market value of a player, we include the dummy variables keeper7 and
keeper8 taking value 1 to indicate level-7 and level-8 keepers, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
The regression approach yields the results shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Determinants of Price - Skill Variations (OLS)
I II
age18 -196,849.12∗∗∗ -199,496.02∗∗∗
(5,733.18) (5,599.87)
age19 -224,998.64∗∗∗ -229,919.40∗∗∗
(5,573.30) (5,447.43)
age20 -235,149.77∗∗∗ -240,662.03∗∗∗
(5,579.50) (5,483.80)
days17 -1,375.48∗∗∗ -1,489.60∗∗∗
(71.53) (68.92)
days18 -152.43∗∗∗ -230.37∗∗∗
(27.00) (26.42)
days19 -58.08∗∗∗ -68.94∗∗∗
(19.48) (19.31)
days20 -7.94 -2.90
(18.91) (18.14)
tsi 44.50∗∗∗ 72.02∗∗∗
(1.27) (2.32)
keeper7 89,272.31∗∗∗ 64,041.62∗∗∗
(1,679.74) (2,079.32)
keeper8 395,545.22∗∗∗ 320,797.67∗∗∗
(4,476.95) (5,984.13)
Intercept 157,449.48∗∗∗ 183,130.47∗∗∗
(5,485.62) (9,478.74)
skills no yes
character no yes
daytime no yes
weekday no yes
R2 0.86 0.87
N 17,510 17,510
F 4,926.05 1,710.14
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
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Consistent with the theoretical considerations, the keeping-score has a strong positive and
highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the market value. Relative to an average level-6 keeper, the
prices paid for level-7 and level-8 keepers are substantially higher. However, if we compare
the coeﬃcient for keeper7 to that for age18, we ﬁnd that the average price increase due
to an skill improvement from level 6 to level 7 in keeping is relatively smaller than the
average age-induced reduction between age “17 years 0 days” and age “18 years 0 days”. In
contrast, the coeﬃcient on keeper8 has by far the largest magnitude, which implies a non-
linear price-pattern across skill-levels. Among the age-regressors, all coeﬃcients are negative
with 99%-signiﬁcant t-statistics except for days20. This again conﬁrms the importance of age
for the market value of the players in our sample. Representatively focusing on column II,
a test whether the price pattern evolves continuously further conﬁrms the robustness of our
previous results. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant downward jumps of additional 19% (p-value: 0.0000),
18% (p-value: 0.0243), and 39% (p-value: 0.0852) relative to the aggregated day-by-day
decline at the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth birthday of a player, respectively. Hence,
even if we control for variation in the keeping-skill, the birthday eﬀect is highly persistent.
For the sake of clarity, we only state the most important variables in the above
regressions.30 In general, the transfer market adheres to standard economic ﬁndings: A
high supply of players on Tuesdays and Wednesdays leads to signiﬁcantly lower prices, while
on Saturdays and Sundays, where many managers are online simultaneously and imply a high
demand, competition is ﬁercer among the buyers and thus the winning bids are somewhat
higher. More importantly, however, it is worth pointing out that the average manager shows
a rather sophisticated bidding behavior, indicating that they actually try to thoroughly elicit
the value of a player they bid for. In no speciﬁcation any attribute that, according to the
rules of the game, is irrelevant to a keeper’s market value had a statistically signiﬁcant impact
on price. For instance, among others a keeper’s value is not aﬀected by, say, his playmaking
or scoring abilities, and consistent with this intuition all our regressions indicate that the
managers correctly exclude these from their pricing considerations. Similarly, throughout
all speciﬁcations we ﬁnd a small but signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence for the skills stamina and
defense, which are of second-order importance for keepers.
30A detailed overview of the regression results is available from the authors upon request.
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2.5 Possible Explanations for the Birthday Eﬀect
In light of a rather sophisticated understanding of the game as displayed with respect to
other attributes, the main ﬁnding we are able to document in our data seems even more
puzzling. If bidders are careful enough to check out numerous details of the attribute vector
of a player, why do they systematically pay too little attention to the valuable information
conveyed through the age in days? Though the managers do not disregard the impact of
precise age as indicated by the evidential continuous decline within the age-groups, they
fail to recognize the connection to subsequent or previous age-groups. Our intuition is that
the managers evaluate players relative to the average player from the same age-group, while
the more relevant and informative peer group consists of players of close-by totalage-levels,
irrespectively of the age-group the latter belong to.
To illustrate what we have in mind, consider a manager who has to evaluate a player with
given attributes aged “17 years 105 days”, i.e. one week before his eighteenth birthday. All
else equal, to elicit how much to bid for this player, he should look up and compare the
prices for players of a similar total age, say, roughly from two weeks younger (“17 years 91
days”) to two weeks older (“18 years 7 days”). To get this information the manager has to
screen a large number of players on the transfer market to ﬁnd enough falling into that age-
range. Importantly, recall from Figures 2.2 and 2.3 that a manager has to visit each oﬀered
player’s proﬁle to learn his precise age. To ﬁnd enough players in the relevant peer group thus
involves a time consuming and thus costly search. This implies that one possible explanation
for the birthday eﬀect lies within the design of the user interface of the search engine, which
is used by the managers to screen the market: It may be physical search costs that prevent
a manager from eﬃcient information aggregation. Before we address the impact of search
costs empirically, we brieﬂy outline a very simple theoretical approach relating costly search
to the evaluation of the virtual players. In addition, we also discuss other possible factors
that could explain the birthday eﬀect.
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2.5.1 Search Costs
2.5.1.1 A Simple Search Cost Dependent Evaluation Model
Consider a risk-neutral manager j who wants to evaluate a particular player i = (ki, yi, di, Xi),
where ki ∈ {6, 7, 8} denotes his keeping skill, yi ∈ {17, 18, 19, 20} his age-group, di ∈
{0, ..., 111} his days of age, and Xi all other attributes of the player, respectively. Normalize
by ai = 112 · (yi − 17) + di the total age in days. For given values of ki = k and Xi = X,
the manager j’s value estimate for player i in dependence of his age attribute is described
by the function Ej[vi] : (yi, di)→ R+.31 More speciﬁcally, let
Ej[vi] := (1− π(cj)) · vjy + π(cj) · vjai ,
where vjy is the value of an average keeper of age-group y to manager j, and v
j
ai
denotes
his precise value of player i. For simplicity, assume that vjy is commonly available free of
cost. His value estimate is a convex combination of the average value and his true value,
where the relative weight π(cj) is a function of his search costs cj. By screening the transfer
market for otherwise identical players within an age-range around ai, he can learn their
values and thus increase the weight π(·) on his true value for player i and thereby obtains
a more precise estimate.32 Generally, the intensity of this search will depend on how costly,
or time consuming, it is to ﬁnd appropriate players in the respective age interval. Formally,
assume that the convex weighting function π(cj) has the following properties:
lim
cj→∞
π(cj) = 0
lim
cj→0
π(cj) = 1
π′(cj) < 0 ∀ cj ∈ R+0 .
Note that in a second price auction he will bid exactly bj = Ej[vi]. We thus can distinguish
three scenarios. First, consider that the search costs are suﬃciently large such that π(cj) = 0.
Then manager j’s bid will reﬂect the average value vjy. Second, for a given cj suppose that
π(cj) < 1. If v
j
ai
> vjy, the manager bids too low and is less likely to win the auction, though
his true value for the player would be higher than his estimate. Conversely, if vjai < v
j
y, he
will bid above his true valuation for player i. While the former case is unproblematic, in the
31To simplify the notation we suppress k and X in the expressions.
32The underlying rationale may be best explained by assuming that for any cj , the manager solves an
optimal search problem, which determines the number of players he optimally screens. In turn, this implicitly
determines the extent to which he learns vjai .
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latter the manager with the least precise estimate will determine the ﬁnal price. Third, in
the absence of search costs, manager j will fully learn his precise value, i.e. π(0) = 1. These
cases are illustrated in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: Expected Valuation in Dependence of Search Costs
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For lower search cost c′j < cj, the estimates of any individual manager j should become more
accurate in the sense that they become closer to his precise value vjai since π(cj) < π(c
′
j). In
the following we test this prediction empirically, to analyze whether the birthday eﬀect can
be explained by search costs.
2.5.1.2 Broadband Access as a Proxy for search costs
To get a ﬁrst impression whether the birthday eﬀect can indeed be attributed to search costs,
as an initial coarse approach we construct a proxy for an individual buyer’s search cost by
matching the information on his country of origin with country-level data on high-speed
internet subscriber rates per 100 inhabitants.33 Intuitively, it is reasonable to assume that
the search cost for obtaining the information on the exact age of a player, i.e. the cost of
a single “click” to view the player’s proﬁle, are larger for managers with a slow internet
connection because it takes longer to load each page. To see whether higher search costs
exacerbate the birthday eﬀect, we test for diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients estimated
over the group with high search costs and those estimated over the group with low search
costs. Qualitatively consistent with our argument, for buyers from countries with mainly
slow internet connections, or likewise high search costs, we ﬁnd a tendency for an increased
magnitude of the discontinuities. However, these diﬀerences are statistically insigniﬁcant
which is not surprising given the coarse nature of our proxy.34
33The data is provided through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) at http://www.itu.int.
34See Appendix 2.7.1 and Table 2.14 in Appendix 2.7.2 for the details of this approach.
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2.5.1.3 Change of Game Design - A Natural Experiment
A subtle change in the design of HT ’s transfer market enables us to more directly address the
question whether search costs are at the core of our ﬁndings.35 In particular, recall from the
discussion of the transfer market in Section 2.2.2 that a search for desired players delivers an
overview of suitable oﬀers matching the selected search ﬁlter. This overview already contains
a preview on the players’ attributes, among others including the values for tsi and the full set
of skills. Yet, as shown in Figure 2.2 above, during our initial data acquisition with respect
to the age of the players only the age-group was displayed, i.e. the variable years. Thus,
the preview conveyed only partial information on the age attribute and consequentially a
manager was forced to inspect a player’s full proﬁle to also learn about the precise age, i.e.
the information on the days.
During November 2008, however, HT implemented a general design makeover, which also
included small, but for our purposes highly appealing changes of the transfer market. Partic-
ularly, as shown in Figure 2.10, in the revised design the search result overview now displays
the precise age in the preview for each player, i.e. both variables years and days. Intuitively,
this reduces the time and number of clicks necessary to compare diﬀerent players in the
appropriate peer group. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that this amounts to an exogenous
reduction of the search costs for buyers.
In addition, also the search engine of the transfer market was slightly altered. In the old
system, each search inquiry was restricted to one out of eight geographic zones at a time, but
unrestricted with respect to ﬁlters on the attributes of the players. Within the new design,
the zone restriction ceased to apply. While this change aﬀects all ages equally and thus has
no direct eﬀect on our results, it implies a reduction in the number of separate search rounds
necessary to screen the whole market supply for a particular type of player. At the same
time, the operators introduced a limit on the number of age-groups that can be collectively
searched at a time.36 Applied to the players in our sample, the managers can now screen
at most two consecutive age-groups together, i.e. players aged seventeen and eighteen, or
eighteen and nineteen, or nineteen and twenty. While it is still possible to limit the search
35In fact, the alluded changes may have partly resulted from our extensive discussions with the makers of
the game.
36According to the operators, this new restriction was implemented to prevent excessive server load from
search inquiries to the transfer market database after removing the zone constraint.
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Figure 2.10: Transfer Market Search Results - Revised Design
(Source: http://www.hattrick.org)
to one individual age-group at a time, the two-age-group setting is the preselected standard
ﬁlter when a manager enters the transfer market. Our intuition is that this ﬁlter restriction
potentially encourages a stronger focus on the relevant peer group, since it increases the
likelihood that the search result list states players from the next higher age group right next
to those from the lower one whose birthday is just imminent. Thus, if it is search costs that
drives our result, if anything, the birthday eﬀect should be mitigated by these changes.
With courtesy of the operators we obtained new data from the transfer market after the
revised design was implemented. The sample includes detailed information on 30,295 keepers
in the relevant skill- and age-groups that were sold during four consecutive weeks between
December 11, 2008 and January 10, 2009.37 The summary statistics of this dataset are very
37The original sample also included a total of 17,644 transactions that took place during a fortnight after
the launch of the revised design on November 26, 2008, i.e. until December 10, 2008. Though all our results
remain robust if we include these data, we exclude them from our analysis to account for a suﬃcient period
for the managers to adapt to the new situation.
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Figure 2.11: Price Pattern for Level-6 Keepers - Revised Design
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similar to our previous sample, as shown in Table 2.15 in Appendix 2.7.2. Analogously to
above, Figure 2.11 depicts the relation between total age and price for level-6 keepers from the
new sample. Compared to the pattern in Figure 2.5, the formerly accentuated discontinuity
between seventeen and eighteen appears to be less pronounced after the introduction of the
modiﬁed design. A similar picture arises for level-7 and level-8 keepers.38
To analyze the impact of the reduced search costs on the birthday eﬀect, we repeat the
regression approach from above for the post-change data and test whether the predictions
from Hypothesis 1 can be validated. The resulting coeﬃcients and standard deviations are
shown in Table 2.8.
Observe that all coeﬃcients that were signiﬁcant prior to the changes are also signiﬁ-
cant in the revised design. For a test whether the discontinuities are persistent, again
representatively focus on the full controls-setting for level-6 keepers in column II. Note that
the coeﬃcients for the age-group dummies are of considerably smaller magnitude than in
the original sample, while the intercept is of similar size. Upon entering age-group eighteen,
a player now loses a total of βage18 = −76, 722 in market value relative to a player aged
“17 years and 0 days”. Since a marginal day in age-group seventeen decreases the price on
average by βday17 = −649, the aggregated day-by-day value loss during this year amounts to
−72, 688, and thus explains 94.7% of the total reduction. Though the unexplained remainder
38See Figure 2.14 in Appendix 2.7.2.
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Table 2.8: Determinants of Price - Revised Design (OLS)
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
I II III IV V VI
age18 -74,979.374∗∗∗ -76,722.152∗∗∗ -247,552.356∗∗∗ -253,063.479∗∗∗ -344,138.917∗∗∗ -373,922.005∗∗∗
(1,967.193) (1,891.953) (4,919.512) (4,580.694) (21,135.743) (20,840.090)
age19 -95,377.525∗∗∗ -99,023.446∗∗∗ -292,993.359∗∗∗ -299,006.821∗∗∗ -360,970.922∗∗∗ -405,873.747∗∗∗
(1,878.451) (1,822.472) (4,665.350) (4,315.521) (20,730.110) (20,263.676)
age20 -91,044.546∗∗∗ -95,773.387∗∗∗ -281,258.992∗∗∗ -286,345.114∗∗∗ -305,034.576∗∗∗ -345,697.233∗∗∗
(1,913.692) (1,859.194) (4,654.779) (4,317.355) (20,615.772) (20,362.150)
days17 -619.094∗∗∗ -648.835∗∗∗ -2,149.751∗∗∗ -2,230.041∗∗∗ -3,059.448∗∗∗ -3,146.720∗∗∗
(25.501) (24.364) (63.980) (59.669) (242.495) (239.688)
days18 -32.728∗∗∗ -51.571∗∗∗ -148.830∗∗∗ -150.428∗∗∗ -345.155∗∗∗ -223.779∗
(10.808) (10.081) (35.694) (32.978) (119.026) (118.265)
days19 -4.102 -12.197∗ -13.270 0.351 -316.720∗∗∗ -51.186
(6.808) (6.540) (24.389) (22.355) (107.828) (99.160)
days20 5.301 1.360 -7.664 -26.162 -132.374 30.672
(8.833) (7.986) (23.729) (21.219) (110.512) (97.709)
tsi 19.451∗∗∗ 26.708∗∗∗ 42.352∗∗∗ 64.126∗∗∗ 55.661∗∗∗ 71.473∗∗∗
(0.519) (1.474) (1.245) (2.358) (2.566) (4.189)
Intercept 77,854.031∗∗∗ 55,915.107∗∗∗ 271,900.444 147,524.418∗∗∗ 569,769.264∗∗∗ 332,985.430∗∗∗
(1,933.198) (4,856.758) (5,858.930)∗∗∗ (10,393.075) (23,164.350) (31,986.616)
skills no yes no yes no yes
character no yes no yes no yes
daytime no yes no yes no yes
weekday no yes no yes no yes
R2 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.68 0.34 0.46
N 14,873 14,873 11,942 11,942 3,480 3,480
F 910.06 307.87 1050.61 353.10 152.49 66.17
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**)
or 10%(*) level.
of −4, 034 still identiﬁes a highly signiﬁcant discontinuity at the eighteenth birthday (p-value:
0.0062), its magnitude has substantially decreased from 20.6% of the total decline before the
change to 5.3% in the revised design. Even more intriguing, for level-7 and level-8 keepers
(columns IV and VI) the prediction βage18 = 112 · βday17 cannot be rejected at p-values of
0.4195 and 0.1076, respectively. More precisely, the formerly strong discontinuities have
vanished for these keeping-levels. These ﬁndings clearly indicate that the changes in the
game design and the implied reduction in search costs eﬀectively reduce the birthday eﬀect
at the eighteenth birthday considerably.
A qualitatively similar result arises where a player turns twenty.39 However, we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant reduction in the discontinuity at the nineteenth birthday. If a player turns
nineteen, he still experiences a strong and signiﬁcant drop in value. Though surprising,
this ﬁnding is in line with the newly introduced search restriction regarding the age-groups.
Intuitively, if a manager enters the transfer market and conducts a combined search for
39In fact, in some speciﬁcations the direction of the birthday eﬀect is even reversed if a player enters age-
group twenty, i.e. we ﬁnd a small increase of market value. While this does not conﬂict with our argument,
this is surprising and most likely linked to the newly introduced age-group restriction in the search ﬁlter.
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seventeen and eighteen year old players, it is likely that his next search inquiry does not
again include age-group eighteen, but rather age-groups nineteen and twenty. Thus, the
connection between the age-groups eighteen and nineteen is potentially not established as
strongly as that between seventeen and eighteen, which would explain the ﬁnding that the
discontinuity at the nineteenth birthday persists.
To further validate the impact of the reduction in search costs, we estimate a fully interacted
model for both the pre- and post-design change data, where we indicate the post-change
observations by the dummy variable post taking value 1 and 0 otherwise.40 With this
approach, we are able to test directly whether the estimates for the two samples are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. In the following, coeﬃcients for the standard variables
reﬂect the eﬀect for the initial sample, while those for variables headed by a Δ-sign capture
the relative diﬀerence for the post-design change sample. Hypothesis 2 states the predicted
signs of these diﬀerences, given that it is indeed search costs that drive the birthday eﬀect.
Hypothesis 2 If the discontinuities are the outcome of a costly search procedure, an exoge-
nous reduction in the search costs will lead to
(i) a lower total decline in market value across two age-groups, i.e.
Δβage18 > 0, Δβage19 > 0, and Δβage20 > 0, and
(ii) an equal or increasing impact of a marginal day within an age-group, i.e.
Δβday17 ≤ 0, Δβday18 ≤ 0, Δβday19 ≤ 0, and Δβday20 ≤ 0.
Table 2.9 depicts the results from the pooled regression. First, observe that all Δ-coeﬃcients
for the age-group dummies have a positive sign and are highly signiﬁcant with exception of
βage19 for level-6 keepers. Evidentially, and consistent with our prediction, the total decline
in market value has decreased after the design change.
Regarding the second prediction from Hypothesis 2, the evidence is mixed. Almost all of the
Δ-coeﬃcients for the variables days17-days20 turn out to be insigniﬁcant, indicating that
the impact of a marginal day has not changed. Moreover, the fact that most have a negative
sign implies a trend towards an increased impact of the precise age. However, for level-7
40See Appendix 2.7.1 for a detailed description of this approach.
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Table 2.9: Comparison - Diﬀerence in Eﬀects Post Design Change
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
age18 -88,096.64∗∗∗ -325,926.07∗∗∗ -455,444.61∗∗∗
(2,574.46) (8,149.90) (30,737.96)
Δ age18 after 11,374.49∗∗∗ 72,862.59∗∗∗ 81,522.60∗∗
(3,195.17) (9,349.82) (37,154.24)
age19 -100,614.80∗∗∗ -368,241.79∗∗∗ -524,267.98∗∗∗
(2,512.78) (7,788.61) (29,974.36)
Δ age19 after 1,591.35 69,234.97∗∗∗ 118,394.23∗∗∗
(3,104.37) (8,905.05) (36,198.25)
age20 -102,967.59∗∗∗ -383,271.15∗∗∗ -560,486.34∗∗∗
(2,537.94) (7,831.03) (29,917.91)
Δ age20 after 7,194.20∗∗ 96,926.03∗∗∗ 214,789.11∗∗∗
(3,146.35) (8,943.06) (36,206.98)
days17 -624.86∗∗∗ -2,614.91∗∗∗ -3,128.98∗∗∗
(33.10) (101.82) (361.33)
Δ days17 after -23.98 384.87∗∗∗ -17.74
(41.10) (118.03) (433.80)
days18 -58.32∗∗∗ -255.88∗∗∗ -215.21
(13.08) (42.56) (157.82)
Δ days18 after 6.75 105.45∗ -8.57
(16.52) (53.85) (197.33)
days19 4.40 -22.16 12.92
(10.01) (29.60) (119.93)
Δ days19 after -16.60 22.51 -64.11
(11.96) (37.10) (155.71)
days20 4.70 -8.29 227.80∗
(9.68) (25.60) (118.48)
Δ days20 after -3.34 -17.87 -197.13
(12.55) (33.26) (153.67)
tsi 26.00∗∗∗ 74.92∗∗∗ 81.54∗∗∗
(1.61) (3.09) (5.10)
Δ tsi after 0.71 -10.80∗∗∗ -10.07
(2.18) (3.89) (6.60)
Intercept 56,549.64∗∗∗ 308,490.39∗∗∗ 554,600.70∗∗∗
(5,545.37) (13,725.89) (44,433.14)
Δ Intercept after -8,890.82 -188,817.70∗∗∗ -276,287.70∗∗∗
(8,273.94) (19,630.85) (59,723.19)
skills yes yes yes
character yes yes yes
daytime yes yes yes
weekday yes yes yes
R2 0.60 0.71 0.54
N 23,968 18,618 5,219
F 281.95 310.84 69.68
Notes: The coeﬃcients before the change (only age-group in preview) are represented by the
standard variables. The Δ-coeﬃcients capture the relative diﬀerence in the impact of a variable
after the change in the game design (full age in preview). The coeﬃcients diﬀer across the two
groups, if the latter are signiﬁcant. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks
denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
keepers we ﬁnd that the impact of days17 and days18 is signiﬁcantly smaller after the design
change. Yet, our ﬁndings clearly indicate that the birthday eﬀect is mitigated though not
fully explained by the reduction in search costs.
Result 3 Search costs aﬀect the intensity of the birthday eﬀect but cannot solely explain its
existence.
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2.5.2 Other Explanations - Heuristic Decision Making
In general, numerous other factors can aﬀect how individuals go about making decisions.
Among others, often some “rule of thumb” or heuristic is employed to simplify the procedure.
Likewise, sometimes the way the diﬀerent options are “framed” may lead individuals to act
diﬀerently than they might otherwise. In this speciﬁc setting, among the set of attributes,
age is the only one that explicitly consists of two dimensions, years and days. Thus, the
managers may be lead astray by using some kind of representativeness heuristic, or base-rate
fallacy, by taking the age in years as an overly informative indicator for the precise age, while
neglecting the actual distribution of the variable days. Once they enter the proﬁle page of
a player, however, they are automatically presented with the exact age and should update
the information received earlier accordingly.
Another possibility is that the managers apply some form of a sequential choice heuristic
or rational shortlist method (see e.g. Manzini and Mariotti, 2006 and Zwick et al., 2003).
Within such a strategy, “inferior” alternatives are sequentially eliminated in successive steps
by an application of a set of criteria, until only a small set of alternatives is left from which
the decision maker chooses. Translated to the situation on HT ’s transfer market, consider
a manager who is looking for a keeper-trainee. In a ﬁrst step, he chooses a distinct level
for the keeping-skill and eliminates all players that do not fulﬁll this criterion. Then he
decides for, say, the age-group the player should belong to, and accordingly reduces the set
of alternatives by elimination of all players displaying a diﬀerent value for years, and so
forth. Given this decision making procedure, it is a natural consequence that the managers
compare players to the respective average within the same age-group, thereby neglecting the
connection to the players from the subsequent age levels.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
We employ a hedonic regression approach to examine empirically to what extent managers
playing the online game Hattrick incorporate available information when bidding in auc-
tions for virtual players reﬂecting complex goods of multiple attribute dimensions. Using
detailed ﬁeld data from the game’s internal transfer market, we ﬁnd strong evidence that
Bidding for Complex Goods 47
individuals ineﬃciently utilize substantial parts of valuable information, even if it is readily
provided. Though the precise age of a player is clearly stated, the pattern of winning bids
exhibits distinct discontinuities where the players grow one year older. As a consequence,
the managers systematically overpay for players close to their birthday. This ﬁnding proves
highly robust across all estimation approaches and if we control for experience. By exploiting
a change in the game design, we analyze whether this “birthday eﬀect” can be explained
by classic search costs. We ﬁnd evidence that a reduction in search costs mitigates the
intensity of the documented frictions, but cannot solely explain them. We conclude that the
managers disproportionately cling to the ﬁgure displayed in the variable years, while in turn
under-weighing the information embodied in the days of age. Important information is not
eﬃciently incorporated within their bidding considerations.
One implication that arises from this evidence is linked to the ﬁeld of shrouded attributes
and obfuscation. The basic idea in this literature is that parts of crucial information are
strategically clouded or held back from consumers to hamper their individual evaluation
of the product.41 In contrast, our ﬁndings suggest that even if the full attribute vector of
such a good is openly accessible, customers may simply not incorporate essential parts of
it in their pricing decisions. Yet, Ellison & Ellison (2005) argue that obfuscation can take
forms “as simple as making product descriptions complicated [...] so that consumers have
to examine the attributes and prices of a large number of products to know what is being
oﬀered” (cf. p.3). The large number of similar players oﬀered simultaneously on the transfer
market and the numerous details available for each player may itself act as an “implicit
obfuscation device”, triggering heuristic decision making on behalf of the bidders. Even
though, the neglect of profoundly important information and the magnitude of the resulting
discontinuities we observe in our data remain stunning. Intuitively, excess availability of
information may in fact hinder eﬃcient information aggregation as much as does the lack of
information. Our ﬁndings thus suggest that a consumer-friendly market designer or regulator
should ensure that emphasis is placed on the most relevant information rather than to enforce
mere information disclosure.
41Gabaix & Laibson (2006) show that it can be optimal for ﬁrms to cloud prices for add-on products
given that at least some customers act myopic. Ellison (2005) provides evidence that primary products
(e.g. printers) are often under-priced and heavily advertised to attract customers, while proﬁts are actually
generated through overpriced add-on goods (e.g. cartridges). Hotz & Xiao (2007) show that sellers can have
an disincentive to disclose all relevant information on multi-attribute goods if facing heterogeneous buyers.
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If even negligibly small costs such as a few “clicks” in the internet browser can suﬃce to
aﬀect individual bidding behavior considerably, our ﬁndings also bear important implications
for the optimal design of internet auction markets. Due to a rapidly growing number of real
estates, cars, and other complex goods being sold in internet auctions, people are increas-
ingly confronted with the task to evaluate such goods by accounting for their constituent
characteristics. In light of the large stakes these consumer decisions involve, obviously we
would expect much more careful considerations given to the evaluation procedure. Yet, we
cannot preclude that buyers of such goods are subject to a similar behavior as the managers
in HT. While in ﬁnancial markets arbitrageurs would eventually correct for systematic mis-
pricing, in auction markets it is exactly those people who make the biggest mistakes that
determine the ﬁnal price. Hence, to avoid prices being systematically above fundamentals
and ineﬃcient allocations, from a social planner’s perspective careful considerations should
be given to the design of the market platform and the way in which relevant information on
a complex good is presented to prospective buyers.
Several extensions to this research suggest themselves. When documenting systematic biases
like the birthday eﬀect, a natural next step is to ask whether these are strategically exploited
by rational subjects in the market. Assuming the sellers take the demand side behavior as
given, there are at least two eﬀects we would expect to observe if the biased bidding behavior
of the buyers was exploited: First, there should be a spike in the number of sale oﬀers for
players that are close to turn one year older. Second, there should be a sharp drop in
askprices close before a player has his birthday. Intuitively, the higher the askprice, the
higher is the risk that the player remains unsold. To avoid the value loss that realizes when
a player turns one year older, the selling manager should rationally set a lower minimum
bid, thereby increasing the probability of a successful sale. To analyze the supply side of the
transfer market, in Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2009a), Chapter 3 of this thesis, we exploit a
diﬀerent sample from HT, where we have access to details also on failed auctions and the
respective reserve prices that were set. Among others, we ﬁnd a clustering of sale oﬀers before
the switch-points in these data and the median askprice is indeed substantially smaller in
close proximity to the birthdays. In general, the reserve price pattern is qualitatively shaped
remarkably similar to the sales price pattern.
Bidding for Complex Goods 49
Even though we have strong reasons to believe that the managers have serious incentives
when engaging on the game’s transfer market, an obvious caveat with this data is the fact
that all transactions are carried out in terms of virtual currency. Therefore, it would be
interesting to analyze whether similar biases as the birthday eﬀect can be veriﬁed within
real markets involving real monetary stakes. For instance, cars closely resemble the virtual
players in our data in several respects. They are traded in large numbers on specialized online
market platforms an their value can be decomposed into their constituent characteristics.
Most importantly, and similar to the virtual players, the age of a car is commonly displayed
through two dimensions, the year and month of construction or initial registration. Though
buying a car constitutes a major purchase for most households and thus should be subject to
profound pricing considerations, similar to the managers in HT people may systematically
underrate the information on the precise age, i.e. the month of ﬁrst registration in this case.
In that case, we would expect to observe congeneric discontinuities in the price pattern for
used cars where the year of ﬁrst registration changes. In Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2009c),
which constitutes Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we therefore examine a large sample of
used car oﬀers from a leading online marketplace to test for the external validity of the
birthday eﬀect. Though these data do not originate from an auction environment and
naturally contain considerably more noise, the basic situation is comparable to that of the
managers on HT ’s transfer market: People are presented with a lot of details on each item
and they have to estimate their valuation. We are able to document statistically signiﬁcant
discontinuities of considerable magnitude in the pattern of stated prices where the year of
ﬁrst registration changes. This indicates that an evaluation bias like the birthday eﬀect can
have real economic consequences.
Games like HT where people strategically interact not only attract increasing numbers
of users, but also provide suﬃcient control to serve as novel platform for economic and
psychological research. We are convinced that the vast amount of data generated by
thousands of highly motivated online gamers provides a fruitful source for valuable insights
and can contribute to the analysis of human decision making.42
42To our knowledge there are two other studies using data from HT. Ajalin et al. (2004) address the issue
of betting on virtual gambles, and Trautmann and Traxler (2009) analyze whether reserve prices act as a
psychological reference point for the ﬁnal price.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Comparing Estimates Across Samples
In Section 2.5 we have analyzed two situations, where we compare the estimates obtained
from two separate samples. For both the broadband proxy approach and the before-after
comparison with respect to the design change, we applied a combined regression approach
to test for relative diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients obtained for two diﬀerent groups, which is
presented in the following.
Consider a pooled sample containing the data for two diﬀerent groups i ∈ [1, 2]. Denote the
dependent variable by y and the regressors by x1 and x2. To test for diﬀerences between the
coeﬃcients across the two groups, we estimate the following model:
y = α1 + β1 · x1 + γ1 · x2 + α˜1 · g2 + β˜1 · x1 · g2 + γ˜1 · x2 · g2 + u,
where the dummy g2 = 1 for an entry from group 2 and g2 = 0 otherwise. By this deﬁnition,
the estimation model for a member of group 1 (g2 = 0) is given by
y = α1 + β1 · x1 + γ1 · x2 + u.
Respectively, for a member of group 2 (g2 = 1) we get
y = (α1 + α˜1) + (β1 + β˜1) · x1 + (γ1 + γ˜1) · x2 + u.
Thus, the above model is equivalent to estimating the separate models
y = α1 + β1 · x1 + γ1 · x2 + u
y = α2 + β2 · x1 + γ2 · x2 + u
for groups 1 and 2, respectively, where
α2 ≡ α1 + α˜1,
β2 ≡ β1 + β˜1,
γ2 ≡ γ1 + γ˜1.
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To use the notation from above, deﬁne Δα ≡ α1 · g2, Δx1 ≡ x1 · g2, and Δx2 ≡ x2 · g2.
The coeﬃcient for, say, Δx1 is thus given by β˜1 = (β2 − β1), i.e. the diﬀerence between
the estimates of the impact of x1 on y across the two groups. Thus, we can use a standard
Wald-test to verify whether β˜1 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Suppose that was the
case, then the impact of x1 on y signiﬁcantly diﬀers across the two groups. In particular,
suppose that β1 > 0 and β˜1 < 0. This immediately implies that β1 > β2, i.e. the impact
of x1 is signiﬁcantly lower for group 2 than for group 1. To sum up, this way we are able
to formally test for variations in the impact of individual explanatory variables across two
diﬀerent groups in the sample population.
2.7.2 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.10: Denomination of Skill Levels
Skill Label Integer Score Skill Label Integer Score
non-existent 0 brilliant 11
disastrous 1 magniﬁcent 12
wretched 2 world class 13
poor 3 supernatural 14
weak 4 titanic 15
inadequate 5 extra-terrestrial 16
passable 6 mythical 17
solid 7 magical 18
excellent 8 utopian 19
formidable 9 divine 20
outstanding 10
Table 2.11: Correlations
price years days totalage keeper tsi
price 1.00
years -0.31 1.00
days -0.02 -0.03 1.00
totalage -0.30 0.96 0.23 1.00
keeper 0.81 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 1.00
tsi 0.79 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.87 1.00
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Table 2.12: Determinants of Price - Outlier Robust Regressions
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
I II III IV V VI
age18 -72,309.93∗∗∗ -72,381.80∗∗∗ -279,930.14∗∗∗ -282,889.71∗∗∗ -407,490.65∗∗∗ -423,325.36∗∗∗
(1,367.20) (1,253.00) (3,997.42) (3,791.25) (19,124.15) (18,277.88)
age19 -83,149.83∗∗∗ -84,445.47∗∗∗ -322,001.26∗∗∗ -324,930.55∗∗∗ -472,199.34∗∗∗ -492,512.83∗∗∗
(1,246.24) (1,149.38) (3,630.25) (3,464.38) (18,485.81) (17,694.24)
age20 -84,301.64∗∗∗ -86,675.94∗∗∗ -337,007.38∗∗∗ -339,369.15∗∗∗ -516,575.15∗∗∗ -528,124.89∗∗∗
(1,276.17) (1,194.12) (3,612.00) (3,485.17) (19,113.05) (18,265.72)
days17 -459.66∗∗∗ -475.63∗∗∗ -2,051.63∗∗∗ -2,119.59∗∗∗ -2,922.17∗∗∗ -2,840.45∗∗∗
(15.17) (13.95) (42.61) (41.18) (212.52) (210.03)
days18 -38.64∗∗∗ -55.78∗∗∗ -235.38∗∗∗ -255.17∗∗∗ -428.58∗∗∗ -246.14∗
(14.48) (13.32) (44.13) (41.82) (139.27) (142.406)
days19 8.72 5.05 -69.18∗ -24.40 -249.29∗ 0.52
(12.29) (11.40) (36.87) (34.93) (131.19) (132.747)
days20 -10.98 4.23 -29.28 -10.41 166.11 223.24
(12.79) (11.72) (35.93) (33.90) (154.79) (150.79)
tsi 19.93∗∗∗ 22.27∗∗∗ 39.11∗∗∗ 63.84∗∗∗ 57.78∗∗∗ 81.60∗∗∗
(0.50) (1.23) (1.16) (2.02) (2.78) (4.34)
Intercept 79,326.41∗∗∗ 47,632.88∗∗∗ 345,900.60∗∗∗ 282,793.02∗∗∗ 707,873.92∗∗∗ 533,250.45∗∗∗
(1,436.90) (4,071.88) (5,024.90) (9,935.37) (21,862.41) (34,979.61)
skills no yes no yes no yes
character no yes no yes no yes
daytime no yes no yes no yes
weekday no yes no yes no yes
R2 0.58 0.64 0.76 0.79 0.61 0.66
N 9,095 9,095 6,676 6,676 1,739 1,739
F 1,591.18 542.05 2,694.68 850.73 339.68 111.48
Notes: RREG controls for inﬂuential outliers by computing point-speciﬁc weights for the contribution of each
observation to the ﬁnal regression. Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance
at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
Table 2.13: Determinants of Log-Price - Outlier Robust Regressions
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
I II III IV V VI
age18 -1.0392∗∗∗ -1.0668∗∗∗ -0.9519∗∗∗ -0.9621∗∗∗ -0.5631∗∗∗ -0.5657∗∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0265) (0.0194) (0.0184) (0.0321) (0.0309)
age19 -1.3026∗∗∗ -1.3561∗∗∗ -1.1930∗∗∗ -1.2074∗∗∗ -0.6768∗∗∗ -0.6946∗∗∗
(0.0266) (0.0242) (0.0176) (0.0168) (0.0310) (0.0300)
age20 -1.3470∗∗∗ -1.4288∗∗∗ -1.2868∗∗∗ -1.3013∗∗∗ -0.7614∗∗∗ -0.7581∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0252) (0.0175) (0.0169) (0.0321) (0.0309)
days17 -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
days18 -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
days19 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0005∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
days20 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
tsi 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000)
Intercept 10.8465∗∗∗ 10.1063∗∗∗ 12.4344∗∗∗ 12.1021∗∗∗ 13.3347∗∗∗ 13.0276∗∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0860) (0.0244) (0.0483) (0.0367) (0.0592)
skills no yes no yes no yes
character no yes no yes no yes
daytime no yes no yes no yes
weekday no yes no yes no yes
R2 0.49 0.58 0.71 0.74 0.58 0.63
N 9,095 9,095 6,676 6,676 1,739 1,739
F 1,095.69 418.37 1,997.47 640.98 303.89 98.65
Notes: RREG controls for inﬂuential outliers by computing point-speciﬁc weights for the contribution of each
observation to the ﬁnal regression. Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance
at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
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Table 2.14: Comparison High vs. Low Search Costs (Broadband-Proxy)
Keeper = 6 Keeper = 7 Keeper = 8
age18 -85,473.20∗∗∗ -319,050.98∗∗∗ -453,782.55∗∗∗
(4,770.67) (14,635.30) (48,305.47)
Δ age18 highcost -3,569.14 -26,256.48 -70,984.12
(6,422.98) (20,315.50) (77,840.79)
age19 -100,015.27∗∗∗ -365,225.79∗∗∗ -528,140.34∗∗∗
(4,558.15) (13,744.82) (46,017.13)
Δ age19 highcost -1,734.76 -11,342.45 -79,247.54
(6,214.69) (19,352.37) (75,938.59)
age20 -102,519.90∗∗∗ -380,350.72∗∗∗ -556,667.51∗∗∗
(4,574.76) (13,837.10) (45,857.79)
Δ age20 highcost -451.10 -11,703.69 -88,817.39
(6,280.25) (19,460.05) (75,589.80)
days17 -615.43∗∗∗ -2,690.00∗∗∗ -3,102.64∗∗∗
(60.09) (177.97) (535.54)
Δ days17 highcost 10.67 64.87 -685.09
(83.22) (252.69) (933.67)
days18 -104.19∗∗∗ -388.76∗∗∗ -473.11∗
(27.14) (81.59) (286.63)
Δ days18 highcost 41.38 268.06∗∗ 344.93
(34.98) (105.47) (386.38)
days19 -2.98 -50.71 11.40
(20.25) (53.31) (195.15)
Δ days19 highcost 29.24 17.45 286.62
(27.66) (74.97) (320.33)
days20 4.77 -28.41 174.89
(18.61) (45.61) (191.40)
Δ days20 highcost 0.83 16.40 90.78
(25.99) (66.42) (297.77)
tsi 25.21∗∗∗ 82.92∗∗∗ 84.99∗∗∗
(3.54) (5.68) (7.92)
Δ tsi highcost -1.23 -6.85 -15.01
(4.48) (8.17) (13.37)
Intercept 53,367.05∗∗∗ 305,848.47∗∗∗ 563,108.60∗∗∗
(12,010.04) (23,358.77) (67,588.23)
Δ Intercept highcost -5,013.68 13,485.71 163,019.58
(15,239.19) (35,034.76) (111,455.35)
skills yes yes yes
character yes yes yes
daytime yes yes yes
weekday yes yes yes
R2 0.61 0.75 0.66
N 5,567 4,387 1,205
F 59.34 84.38 25.90
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
Explanation: The proxy prx sc ∈ [0, 1] ranks each country relative to the high-speed internet
subscriber rate of Denmark, which has the highest number of broadband users (36 percent) among the
countries represented in Hattrick. Values close to 1 indicate countries with low search costs. The
regression compares the coeﬃcients estimated over the group with high search costs (prx sc < 0.40)
to the coeﬃcients estimated over the group with low search costs (prx sc > 0.61), both accounting for
roughly one third of the total sample. The result for low search costs are represented by the standard
variables, while the Δ-coeﬃcients capture the relative diﬀerence in the estimates for the high search
cost group. Note that all Δ-coeﬃcients for the age-group dummies are negative, while all coeﬃcients
for Δdays17-Δdays20 except one have a positive sign. If anything, this trend point towards a more
pronounced birthday eﬀect, since the managers with high search costs seem to give even less weight
to the exact age.
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Table 2.15: Summary Statistics - Revised Design
Panel A. Overview Panel B. Price for Age-Skill-Combinations
Variable Obs. Mean Min. Max. Skill Age Obs. Mean Min. Max.
price 30,295 149,843 1,000 1,500,000 6 17 2,934 85,358 4,000 306,000
years 30,295 19 17 20 18 3,376 40,226 1,000 140,000
days 30,295 55 0 111 19 4,225 20,999 1,000 94,000
totalage 30,295 238 3 447 20 4,338 26,365 1,000 120,000
total skill index 30,295 2,900 450 8,530
keeping 30,295 7 6 8 7 17 2,871 314,378 79,000 1,000,000
playmaking 30,295 1 1 4 18 2,493 158,222 32,000 450,000
scoring 30,295 1 1 4 19 3,089 119,046 24,000 349,000
passing 30,295 1 1 6 20 3,489 131,277 36,000 375,000
winger 30,295 1 1 5
defending 30,295 1 1 6 8 17 702 637,780 298,000 1,500,000
setpieces 30,295 2 1 20 18 926 489,328 230,000 1,016,000
stamina 30,295 5 1 9 19 970 470,337 207,000 950,000
leadership 30,295 4 1 7 20 882 533,230 206,000 1,020,000
wage 30,295 2,159 790 4,210
form 30,295 6 1 8
player experience 30,295 1 1 5
Panel C. Prices per Agegroup and Skilllevel
Variable Value Obs. Percent Mean Min. Max.
prices by age years 17 6,507 21.48 246,003 4,000 1,500,000
18 6,795 22.43 144,719 1,000 1,016,000
19 8,284 27.34 110,174 1,000 950,000
20 8,709 28.75 119,728 1,000 1,020,000
prices by skill-level keeping 6 14,873 49.09 39,625 1,000 306,000
7 11,942 39.42 177,758 24,000 1,000,000
8 3,480 11.49 525,108 206,000 1,500,000
Figure 2.12: Distribution of Sales per Hour of Day
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Notes: During a typical day, the time of the auction deadlines is
approximately similarly distributed as the number of simultaneously
logged-on users. During the early morning hours CET we observe
the lowest traﬃc with roughly 7,000 online users at its minimum,
while during the peak-periods between 5:30 p.m. and 10 p.m. levels
up to 75,000 simultaneous online users are reached.
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Figure 2.13: Price Pattern for Level-7 and Level-8 Keepers (Original Sample)
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(a) Price Pattern for Level-7 Keepers
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Figure 2.14: Price Pattern for Level-7 and Level-8 Keepers (Post-Change Sample)
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Chapter 3
Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices
in Hattrick Auctions
3.1 Introduction
In a situation where buyers’ willingness to pay is private information or the identity of the
highest value buyer is unknown, an auction, instead of posting or negotiating a price, can
be an eﬃcient allocation mechanism. Hence, auctions have been used in a wide array of
ﬁelds like art sale, real estate, or the allocation of spectrum rights. With the ascent of
the internet, auctions have exceedingly gained popularity on platforms such as eBay.com,
amazon.com, or eBid.com. Alone eBay.com is present in 39 markets and in 2007 approxi-
mately 84 million active users worldwide sold items on eBay trading platforms for nearly
$60 billion, i.e. eBay.com users worldwide trade more than $1,900 worth of goods on the
site every second.1 The rise of internet auctions led to an enhanced availability of large data
sets. Based on these, numerous empirical studies have addressed positive questions (“Is
observed bidding consistent with Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE)?”, “Is there evidence of
buyer risk aversion?”) and normative issues (recovering the value distribution, identifying
the optimal auction, then simulating the eﬀects of design changes).
From various empirical, e.g. Lucking-Reiley (2000), or theoretical, e.g. Myerson (1981), Riley
and Samuleson (1981), or Bulow and Roberts (1989), studies it is obvious that reserve
prices (public minimum bids) are an important strategic design element in most auction
environments.2 Using a hand-collected data set of 6,258 auctions of virtual football players
1Source: http://news.ebay.com/about.cfm
2Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) extend the analysis to non-standard reference point dependent
preferences and show whether and how reserve prices perceived as reference points aﬀect bidding behavior.
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traded in English auctions on hattrick.org we are able to address both positive as well
as normative issues. We analyze how reserve prices are set and where they deviate from
theoretically predicted patterns but we also perform the counterfactual exercise and show
how much expected revenue is actually missed by setting suboptimal reserve prices.
The online game Hattrick (HT ) is the world’s largest online football manager game with
almost one million participants. Every day about 40,000 virtual players are traded on the
HT transfer market. By design, these trades take place in a highly controlled environment
including a standardized duration for each auction, a ﬁxed mode of how players on sale are
presented, and no risk of default. Sellers are however free to choose a non-negative reserve
price. Unlike many other online auction platforms, in HT there is no relation between
the minimum bid and the transaction fees a seller is charged, which could bias individuals
in their choice of a reserve price. Moreover, when HT players are on the market, all
relevant information concerning their quality becomes publicly available. That is, there is no
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers and hence no scope for a winner’s curse3
and reserve prices contain no quality signal. Thus, for the bidders the auction takes place
in an independent private value (IPV) context where individual valuations are determined
by idiosyncratic shocks to a common and publicly observable value. In the next section we
describe the HT auction market in detail and explain how success in the game crucially
depends on proﬁtably trading virtual players.
From the classic contributions in auction theory, e.g. Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuleson
(1981), we know that the optimal reserve price in an independent private value environment
is a continuous function of the hazard rate of the distribution of valuations of buyers and
does not depend on the number of potential bidders.4 In the reserve price patterns in
our data, we ﬁnd both evidence for very sophisticated and boundedly rational behavior of
sellers. We show that reserve prices are predicted, qualitatively and quantitatively, by the
same observable characteristics that predict sales prices.
3The winner’s curse refers to the fact that the bidder with the highest estimate of quality is likely to
hold a too positive view of the true but unobservable quality (common value), which then forms the basis
of private valuations of the product.
4Levin and Smith (1994) and Levin and Smith (1996) analyze alternative models with endogenous (and
costly) entry decisions prior to the bidding stage. In their setting, the number of bidders and the optimal
reserve price actually covary, implying that under IPV small or no reserve prices are optimal as this attracts
more bidders. Conversely, they argue that a positive reserve price is useful in reducing the number of bidders
in a common value auction, since the winner’s curse is the worse the more bidders are participating. However,
in our HT environment costs of entry (bid preparation, information gathering) are negligible and hence we
treat the number of bidders as exogenously given.
Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices 58
In particular, we ﬁnd that reserve prices exhibit the “birthday eﬀect” that has been doc-
umented for sales prices in the previous chapter. A player’s value in the game decreases,
ceteris paribus, continuously with his age measured in days as it becomes harder and harder
to improve his skills by training. In Chapter 2 we show a very strong drop in sales prices
just on a player’s birthday, indicating that buyers in HT give too much weight to the age
of a player measured in years as opposed to his age measured in days, though the latter
is also plainly visible to all buyers free of cost as can be seen in Figure 3.1. Our analysis
clearly shows that the birthday eﬀect is also present with respect to reserve prices. Further
examination of the data indicates that the presence of the birthday eﬀect is not (only) due to
the fact that sellers fall prey to the same information under-usage as the buyers, but because
at least a substantial fraction of sellers tries to strategically exploit this bias of the demand
side. We ﬁnd a clustering of sale oﬀers just before players’ birthdays, indicating that sellers
rationally want to sell players before they drop in value on their birthday. Furthermore, a
sharp drop of median reserve prices immediately before the birthday indicates that sellers
anticipate the immanent drop in market value. Hence, they want to make sure that the
player is actually sold where a (too) high reserve price might endanger this.
We run hedonic regressions with the sales price and with the reserve price as dependent
variables and identical sets of explanatory variables. As stated above, all of them have
qualitatively similar eﬀects – with one notable exception: we have a good proxy whether a
player on the transfer market had been acquired by the seller previously or whether he was
promoted (basically for free) from the seller’s own youth team. We ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus,
sellers set signiﬁcantly higher reserve prices (by about 23% of the mean) for players they have
bought as compared to players they promoted internally. In contrast to that, sales prices
are signiﬁcantly lower (17% of the unconditional mean price) for previously traded players
unconditional on a successful sale. In Section 3.3 we discuss in detail why the negative eﬀect
we observe in sales price patterns is what we would expect from rational actors. The positive
reserve price premium we ﬁnd for previously traded players is more in line with the sunk cost
fallacy, for example due to loss aversion with respect to the previous selling price, leading
to an entitlement eﬀect.
Finally, we ﬁnd that reserve prices are too clustered as to be compatible with fully rational
behavior. In particular, the reserve price pattern spikes dramatically at multiples of e 50,000,
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and also suggests a lower scale clustering at multiples of e 5,000. Moreover, a large fraction
of the sellers (18%) sets a reserve price of zero. We interpret this as evidence for sellers
using a round number heuristic in setting reserve prices, thereby making ineﬃcient use of
the reserve price instrument. However, we are able to do more. From observing the sales
prices, in the English auction resembling the second highest bidder’s valuation, we are able
to estimate the underlying distributions of valuations, F (v), calculate the optimal reserve
prices given F (v), and calculate the share of expected revenue lost at the actual levels as
compared to the situation with optimal reserve prices.
Internet auction data have been widely used. Lucking-Reiley (2000) presents data from a
comprehensive study of 142 diﬀerent internet auction sites and describes the transaction
volumes, the types of auction mechanisms used, the types of goods auctioned, and the
business models employed at the various sites. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) go deeper in
their analysis and show that in their sample of coin auctions on eBay.com, reserve prices
are set below the book value of their coins. In contrast, we ﬁnd that while many reserve
prices are set very low (or even at zero), a substantial fraction is set very high. As we do,
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) estimate the value distribution F (v) from the observed bids and
use it to evaluate the eﬀect of alternative reserve prices. However, they do not solve for the
optimal reserve price as a benchmark as they cannot rule out common value elements in
their data.
The evidence on whether or not reserve prices are revenue enhancing is somewhat mixed.
Ariely and Simonson (2003), Kamins et al. (2004), and Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) show in
ﬁeld experiments that selling prices increase in the reserve price. Reiley (2006) documents
evidence from a ﬁeld experiment on ebay that reserve prices reduce the number of bidders, the
probability of an actual sale, and the unconditional expected revenue. However, the expected
revenue conditional on a sale in fact increases. On the contrary, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)
and Hoppe and Sadrieh (2007) ﬁnd in their ﬁeld study and ﬁeld experiment respectively
no positive eﬀects of reserve prices on selling prices. Finally, Simonsohn et al. (2008) take
a diﬀerent tack. They document that eBay bidders prefer auctions with more bids, hence
sellers have an incentive to set low reserve prices.
Of particular interest to us is the study by Trautmann and Traxler (2009), which also uses
data from auctions of players in HT. Their focus is to separate two potential channels how
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reserve prices might aﬀect selling prices: A reference point or anchoring eﬀect as suggested
in Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) and a standard rent appropriation eﬀect that stems
from reserve prices forcing the winning bidder to pay more than the second highest bidders
valuation. Trautmann and Traxler (2009) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of reserve prices but they
ﬁnd no evidence that any of these higher prices stem from a reference point eﬀect but rather
can be accounted for by rent appropriation.
The sunk cost fallacy, sometimes referred to as “irrational escalation of commitment”, has
been studied by psychologists for decades, e.g. Staw (1976), Arkes and Blumer (1985), or Baz-
erman (1986). In most recent discussions in economics, it has been related to prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), speciﬁcally to a reference point and loss aversion. In many
contexts, the presence of a sunk cost fallacy implies entitlements. There is ample evidence
for the entitlement eﬀect and the resulting Willingness-to-Pay/Willingness-to-Accept gap in
controlled experiments5, though recent work by Plott and Zeiler (2005; 2007) is critical with
respect to the validity of the endowment and entitlement eﬀects outside the lab. Our study
indicates a strong and persistent entitlement eﬀect in a very competitive natural setting. All
our results are robust if we control for the experience of the sellers in our sample.
Genesove and Mayer (2001) analyze seller behavior in the Boston residential real estate
market using proprietary panel data. Sellers whose condominium’s expected selling price
falls below the original purchase price due to an aggregate market downturn tend to set
asking prices well above the expected price level. They argue that this unwillingness to
accept market prices for property in the down part of the market cycle could stem from
loss aversion on behalf of the sellers. However, in our sample there are no losses caused by
business cycle swings, since all data was collected within only a fortnight. The setting studied
in Genesove and Mayer (2001) involves bargaining, where the ﬁnal price can fall below the
initial asking price of the seller, which in addition not necessarily reﬂects his reserve price. It
is also reasonable to assume that the evaluation of a condominium may involve substantial
search costs, whereas all relevant information on HT ’s virtual players is readily available,
highly standardized, and thus easily comparable. Hence, while we observe similar behavior
of sellers, the motivations behind it may diﬀer considerably.
5For references see e.g. Thaler (1980), Knetsch (1989), Hanemann (1991), Shogren et al. (1994), Casey
(1995), or Carmon and Ariely (2000).
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Clustering of stock prices at integers, i.e. that limit sell orders and also prices tend to
be rounded to whole numbers rather than displaying fractions, has been documented by
Niederhoﬀer (1965), Harris (1991), and Sonnemans (2006), who also provides an overview
of related studies on price clustering in stock markets, discussing possible explanations.
Benartzi and Thaler (2007) show that a round number heuristic seems to be important in
determining savings choices, too.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the structure of the
data and the relevant details of HT. Section 3.3 presents our empirical analysis and results.
In Section 3.4 we estimate the share of expected revenue lost relative to the optimum and
Section 3.5 concludes. An Appendix collects additional Tables and Figures.
3.2 Data Description
3.2.1 Institutional Background about Hattrick
Hattrick, founded in 1997, is a browser-based free online football manager game with
almost one million registered users, henceforth referred to as “managers”.6 The basic concept
of the game is to manage your own virtual football club, which consists of virtual players that
are represented by a multi-dimensional vector of attributes. A team plays at least one weekly
game in a national league system against teams coached by other managers. In HT, a season,
or an in-game year, lasts for 112 real-time days. The outcome of matches is determined by
random simulation on the basis of the chosen strategies of the opponents, skills of the virtual
players and other factors that determine the probabilities to win. The tasks for a manager to
lead his team to success are numerous, ranging from decisions on match tactics and line-ups,
over hiring team staﬀ like doctors and co-trainers, over “drafting” a new player from the
team’s youth squad and either selling, keeping, or ﬁring him as needed, to monitoring the
team’s training program. Many managers complete all of these tasks almost on a daily basis.
The sportive aspect is but one of the supporting pillars of the game. Maintaining a virtual
club requires the managers also to develop a solid ﬁnancing scheme. The most important
source of (in-game) revenue for a manager is successfully trading players on the HT transfer
6We refer to human users as “managers”, while using the term “player” to address virtual football players.
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market. Most managers follow a “train and trade”-strategy which ﬁrst ensures the improve-
ment of quality of their own virtual players by choosing a training scheme and then proﬁtably
selling them to other managers. Since the proceeds from player sales are the major source
of income in HT, the transfer market provides strong incentives for the participants in this
open-ended manager game.
3.2.2 Goods: The Virtual Players
A virtual player consists of about thirty dimensions. Figure 3.1 depicts the typical proﬁle
interface for a player, including the set of his attributes and the corresponding auction details.
The most important attributes are the eight abilities displayed in the lower middle of the
proﬁle which we denote as his “skills”.7 While stamina and set-pieces are general skills, the
remaining six - playmaking, winger, scoring, keeping, passing, and defending - determine a
player’s suitability to play in certain positions in the line-up. For instance, a player with his
best skill being keeping is rationally classiﬁed as goalie. In the terminology of the game, skill
levels are denoted as adjectives. To simplify the notation, we use integer values to address
them, e.g. “passable” corresponds to score 6 of 20.
Figure 3.1: Virtual Player Proﬁle
Notes: Next to the player attributes, on the lower right all information regarding the auction
details are displayed. The seller of this keeper set him on the transfer market during the evening on
February 01, 2008 (i.e. exactly 72 hours before the deadline displayed) at a reserve price of e 25,000.
(Source: www.hattrick.org)
7Table 2.10 in Chapter 2 shows the detailed ranking of all skill levels, which can also be found in the
game’s manual. To all other attributes, we will refer to as “characteristics”. For a classiﬁcation of the values
each attribute can take, refer to Table 3.1.
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From the set of player attributes, only these eight skills can be actively improved by training.
However, it takes several weeks for an individual player to increase by a full skill level and
only a single skill can be trained at a time. Hence, managers have to specialize in training
only one speciﬁc skill, say keeping. As soon as such a keeper-trainee surpasses the threshold
for a skill-up in this skill, the manager can proﬁtably sell him to another manager and assign
the free training slot to a new (and younger) trainee, which he can either acquire on the
transfer market or promote directly from his own youth team.8 The proceeds from the sales
are in turn used to ﬁnance the club.
The value of a player crucially depends on two main factors, his current skill levels and his
age. The ﬁrst determine the strength a player adds to a team if he is currently lined-up
in a certain position for a match, which is independent of a player’s age. For the purpose
of this paper, we refer to this component as his “Consumption Value” (CV). For instance,
a keepers’ CV is almost exclusively driven by the goalkeeping-skill. However, the second
main channel of inﬂuence for the value of (young) players arises due to the fact that age is
a key determinant for training eﬀectiveness. In HT, the marginal skill-improvement from
training declines with the age of a player. The younger a player, the more he beneﬁts
ceteris paribus from training and the faster he advances to a higher skill level, which in turn
increases his CV. As a consequence, a viable training strategy necessarily requires rather
young players, since they have the highest innate potential for further skill development, or
“Advancement Potential Value” (APV) as we label it. Importantly, the marginal eﬀect of
training is otherwise homogeneous for all virtual players, i.e. there exists nothing like a talent-
attribute capturing the potential for skill-improvements. It does to some extent depend on
the ability of the club’s trainer, and the training intensity chosen by the manager, where the
latter two give rise to variation in private valuations.
Ceteris paribus, a player who is just a few days younger than another should not be worth
much more, since the diﬀerence in their APV is minimal. This holds true irrespectively of
whether one already turned a year older while the other’s birthday lies just ahead. Yet, in the
dataset analyzed in Chapter 2 we ﬁnd that the observed sales price pattern exhibits strong
discontinuities at the birthdays of the virtual players, which we refer to as the “birthday
8Each manager can promote one player from the youth team each week, whose attributes are determined
randomly with a high probability of low skill levels. Age is also randomly assigned on the interval 17 to 19
years. All descriptions of the game are based on the set of rules and institutions that were in place during
the collection period of our data set.
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eﬀect”. The buyers overreact to the informational content of the age-group indicator years,
while disregarding the ﬁner information on a player’s age attribute as conveyed through the
days, even though the precise age of a player is explicitly stated in the form “X years and
Y days” on his proﬁle page (see Figure 3.1). Naturally, this raises the question of whether
the reserve prices set by the sellers pick up the birthday eﬀect, or whether sellers react
strategically to the documented buyers’ behavior. Along with the individual values they can
take in the game, Table 3.1 provides an overview of the player attributes and other variables
we employ for our analysis.9
Table 3.1: List of Variables
Variable Description Range
Player attributes years Age in years (1 HT -year ≡ 112 real-time days) 17+
days Age in days (1 HT -day ≡ 1 real-time day) {0,..,111}
totalage Precise age of a player in day units (normalized) {0,..,335}
days17-days20 Interaction term of days and age-group dummies {0,..,111}
form Current form of player {0,..,8}
total skill index Noisy indicator of overall quality of player N+
wage Salary (exogenous; in virtual Euro) N+
keeper Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
playmaking Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
winger Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
scoring Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
passing Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
defense Playing skill, position speciﬁc {0,..,20}
setpieces Playing skill for all player types {0,..,20}
stamina Playing skill for all player types {0,..,20}
gentleness High value if agreeable (ascending order) {0,..,20}
aggression Low value if player aggressive (descending order) {0,..,20}
honesty High value if honest (ascending order) {0,..,20}
plrexp Experience of player {0,..,20}
ldrshp Leadership qualities of player {0,..,7}
Auction Data askprice Reservation price set by the seller N+
price Auction end price paid by winning bidder N+
dtime Time of deadline hh.mm.ss
dday Day of deadline dd.mm.yy
sellerxp Proxy for seller experience by relative country ranking [0 − 1]
Dummy variables age17 - age19 Dummy for age-group {0,1}
(1=yes, 0=no) peakhour Did auction end during peak hour (5:30 p.m. - 10:00 p.m.) {0,1}
mon - sun On which weekday did the auction end? {0,1}
acquired Proxy for previous sale (player countryID = seller countryID) {0,1}
d ask Was the reserve price diﬀerent from zero? {0,1}
d sold Was the player successfully sold? {0,1}
Among the remaining characteristics, a player’s total skill index (tsi), which represents a
noisy measure for his overall abilities, is the one most likely to have a (positive) inﬂuence on
market value. To see this, note that HT calculates the skill-levels as real numbers including
hidden decimal places, the so-called “sub-skills”, while the player proﬁle only displays the
adjective reﬂecting the current integer value for each skill. With each training a player
receives, the trained skill increases by a marginal increment (which is declining in age), and
9In the following, we use italics to denote the variables from our sample.
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so does the tsi. While also correlated to other attributes (e.g. form), the tsi score thus
constitutes a noisy signal for the sub-skills of a player, i.e. for how close he is to reach the
next higher level in one of his skills. Though a complete description of all characteristics
is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that for our empirical estimation we
control for the full vector of attributes.
3.2.3 Transactions: The Transfer Market
With an average of about 40,000 players oﬀered for sale each single day, the transfer market in
HT has a remarkable trading volume.10 The selling mechanism implemented on the transfer
market is an English ascending open bid auction. To sell a player, managers can specify a
non-negative reserve price and submit an irreversible sell order by clicking a button. Each
auction ends exactly 72 hours from submission, but the deadline is automatically extended
by 3 minutes if a bid is placed within 3 minutes to the deadline. This continues until all
bidders but one retire.11 Importantly, all relevant information concerning a players quality
- that is the full attribute vector - becomes publicly available once a player is oﬀered on
the transfer market. Hence, at the time of sale there is no information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers and, for that matter, the econometrician.
Since all players on sale are displayed in the same standardized way as shown in Figure 3.1,
the sellers have no possibility to aﬀect the way how an individual player is presented to
potential buyers. Except for the timing of the sell order, which determines the auction
deadline, this leaves a seller with a single dimension of choice: The reserve price. Thus, it
is reasonable to argue that careful considerations should be given to the utilization of this
remaining instrument of potential inﬂuence on the auction outcome.
The transfer market provides a search tool, which allows the managers to ﬁlter for various
player attributes like age-group, current bid, and up to four playing skills at desired levels.
The inquiry returns a list of oﬀered players matching the selected ﬁlter, where an abstract
of their main characteristics is displayed (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2).
10Source: http://www.databased.at/HT/htpe
11Given the reserve price is set below the second highest bidder’s valuation, the transfer price will equal
the second-highest bid plus one discrete increment, i.e. the format is strategically equivalent to a sealed-bid-
second-price auction. For reference on the eﬀects of the employed ending rule on bidding behavior see e.g.
Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Ariely et al. (2005).
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To submit a bid for a player, a prospective buyer manager must enter his proﬁle. Each bid
must at least be equal to the reserve price or above the current highest bid, respectively.
Placed bids are binding and irreversible. After the auction ends, the player is automatically
transferred to the winning manager’s team and the seller receives the winning bid net of
some small fee.12 If a player received no bid, the auction fails and he stays with the seller.
3.2.4 Sample Selection and Data Description
Our main interest in this paper is to study the determinants and eﬀects of reserve prices. For
this purpose, we collected all publicly available information on 6,258 virtual players oﬀered
for sale on the HT transfer market between November 18, 2007 and December 02, 2007.13
The sample considers the speciﬁc subgroup of keepers aged between seventeen - the youngest
age possible in the game - and nineteen years, all with an identical keeping-skill of score 6
out of 20, i.e. “level-6 keepers”. The age criterion is motivated by the facts that (i) the APV
is most important at young ages and (ii) young players are heavily traded. Regarding the
focus on keepers, note that the values of ﬁeld player types depend not only a combination of
several skills but also on a other factors, e.g. the chosen match tactics. In eﬀect, individual
skills can receive quite diﬀerent weights in the evaluations across managers, making it hard
to measure the impact of a speciﬁc attribute on the price, or, as in our case, the reserve
price. In contrast to that, for keepers by far the most inﬂuential skill unambiguously is the
keeping-skill, which determines their value to the largest extent. By holding the keeping-
skill constant at a score of 6, which accounts for the thickest market segment of players in
this category, we eﬀectively suppress the impact of variations in the skill-dependent CV on
the observed reserve prices. We are thus able to identify inﬂuential factors for the players’
APVs in the sample, which crucially depend on their age, or more precisely, their precise
age including the days.14
Next to all relevant player and auction characteristics, we also collected information on
the sellers. For a subsample of 2,411 auctions we are able to construct a proxy for seller
12These transaction costs are negligibly small and do not aﬀect any of our results.
13From an initial sample of 6,460 players in the relevant skill- and age-group, we excluded 4 players that
play for their respective home country’s national team, 66 players with reserve prices identiﬁed as outliers
by Grubbs’ test (Grubbs, 1969) and 132 players that were injured at the time of the auction.
14The motivation for these selection criteria follows the lines of Chapter 2. Though many variables appear
in both datasets, the present sample diﬀers in some respects. In particular, for this study we additionally
collected records of the reserve prices and more details on the individual sellers.
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experience (sellerxp ∈ (0, 1]), where we use the information on how a manager ranks relative
to all other managers within a given country. We argue that a higher ranking within a
country is a good indicator for being more experienced as it can only be achieved by playing
the game for a long period of time and/or being very successful quickly, which should to a
large degree be correlated with having routine playing the game.
Furthermore, we use the information whether a player plays abroad or not, indicated by
a 20% bonus on his wage,15 as a proxy whether he had been previously traded (acquired
= 1), or whether he is a “fresh” player from the seller’s own youth team (acquried = 0).
Fresh players never receive this 20% playing-abroad bonus on their wages, as e.g. German
teams always produce fresh German players. As in roughly 85% of all trades buyer and seller
are not from the same country, our potential mistake from missing trades within a country
is small and this 20% bonus is a good proxy to discriminate between fresh and previously
traded players.
Figure 3.2: Distributions of Age and Sales
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Figure 3.2a depicts the age distribution for the players in our sample, indicating a roughly
balanced distribution for days within each age-group. The distribution of sales per weekday
is shown in Figure 3.2b. On Tuesdays and Wednesdays we observe spikes in the number
of sold players. The reason for this is that new players can be “drafted” each Saturday
after an weekly update and often are immediately oﬀered for sale, which explains the
number of deadlines expiring on Tuesdays and Wednesdays being accordingly higher. In
our regressions, we use dummies (mon-sun) to control for possible eﬀects of the auction end
15Note that a player’s wage is exogenously ﬁxed by HT and cannot be inﬂuenced by the managers.
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day and additionally also include a dummy (peakhour) to indicate whether a player was sold
between 5:30 p.m. and 10 p.m., where the highest numbers of simultaneous online users are
reached and most auctions expire.16
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of the most important variables in our sample. As
shown in Panel A, the mean reserve price (askprice) in our sample was e 77,537, but levels
as high as e 579,000 were reached.17 Note that the ﬁnal prices fall into a comparable range,
indicating that by and large the reserve prices were not set beside the point. Since the age
of a player is displayed in the form “X years and Y days” on his proﬁle-page, the variable
years deﬁnes his age-group and days discloses information on his precise age, or equivalently,
the distance to his next birthday. The constructed measure totalage ∈ [3, 335] displays the
total age of a player in day units and thus combines the information contained in both age
variables, where we normalize totalage ≡ 112·(years −17) + days, using the fact that a year
in HT is normalized to 112 days.18
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A. Panel B.
Variable Mean Min Max Variable Value Frequency Percent
askprice 77,537 0 579,000 age distribution (years = 17) 1,886 30.14
pricea 81,459 0 634,000 (years = 18) 1,935 30.92
years 18 17 19 (years = 19) 2,437 38.94
days 59 0 111
totalageb 181 3 335 fresh players (acquired = 0) 4,253 67.96
total skill index 1,994 650 3,240 purchased players (acquired = 1) 2,005 32.04
wage 1,884 770 2,676
form 6 1 8 reserve price (askprice > 0) 5,108 81.62
stamina 3 1 9 no reserve price (askprice = 0) 1,150 18.38
passing 1 1 4
playmaking 1 1 3 successful trades (price > 0) 4,743 75.79
scoring 1 1 3 players unsold (price = 0) 1,515 24.21
winger 1 1 4
setpieces 2 1 7 sold at reserve price (price=askprice) 756 15.94
defense 1 1 4 sold above reserve price (price>askprice) 3,987 84.06
a. A Price of zero indicates a failed auction. The minimum price among all successful trades was e 19,000.
b. The variable totalage = 112 · (years− 17) + days displays a players precise age in day units. The minimum value of
totalage at 3 reﬂects age “17 years and 3 days” and the maximum value at 335 equals “19 years and 111 days”.
Panel B provides some frequency statistics of our data. Note that all age-groups are roughly
equally represented, with a slight majority of players aged nineteen. According to our
wage-bonus proxy (indicated by the dummy acquired), in 32% of all auctions the sellers
oﬀered players they previously bought themselves on the market. 68% of the times, a player
16See Figure 3.9 in Appendix 3.6.
17All monetary values are denoted in units of virtual HT -Euros.
18Note that since each auction lasts for 3 days, totalage has its minimum at 3, or “17 years 3 days”. The
maximum value of totalage at 335 reﬂects the age “19 years 111 days”.
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promoted from the own youth squad of the seller, i.e. a “fresh” player, was auctioned oﬀ. For
5,108 players in our sample the seller ﬁxed a strictly positive reserve price. Surprisingly, this
fact already establishes that more than 18% of the sellers did not make use of the possibility
to set a reserve price.19 Of all players, 4,743 were sold and in 756 cases the trade took place
at a price equal to the minimum bid (single bidder case).
3.3 Analysis and Results
In light of the “birthday eﬀect” on the demand side of HT ’s transfer market, which is
illustrated in Figure 3.3b analogously to Chapter 2 for the present sample, it seems a natural
point to start our analysis of the driving forces in the formation of reserve prices by examining
their relation to a player’s age.
Figure 3.3: Relation of Reserve Prices and Sales Prices to Total Age
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(b) Pattern of Sales Prices
Notes: The dashed lines at 112 and 224 mark the points where the players turn eighteen and nineteen, respectively.
Intuitively, the variable totalage captures all available information on the players’ age
attribute. As we argue above, and as implied by the nature of the game’s training algorithm,
the value of a player should ceteris paribus decline continuously as totalage increases. It
seems plausible to reckon that this fact should also be reﬂected in the reserve prices.
However, Figure 3.3a already reveals that the relation between reserve price and total age
is not smooth but exhibits large discontinuities where the players enter the next higher
19In line with Simonsohn et al. (2008), it is possible that these managers may want to maximize entry and
the number of bidders in the auction by not screening out any low-value bidders. As we will show in Section
3.4, however, from perspective of expected auction revenue they forego potential proﬁts.
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age-group, indicating that the birthday eﬀect also persists for reserve prices. Since most
managers in HT alternate between both roles, it does not seem too surprising to ﬁnd similar
behavioral patterns for buyers and sellers. At a ﬁrst glance, it stands to reason that also the
sellers ineﬃciently utilize the ﬁner information on the age attribute as conveyed through the
days of age. Another possibility is that the bias on the demand side actually triggers the
observed choice of reserve prices, and what we observe is the result of at least some sellers
following strategic considerations and trying to exploit the biased bidding behavior.
Even more intriguing, reserve prices appear to react even less sensitively to the precise age of
players than the sales prices. The pattern depicted in Figure 3.3a reveals substantial clusters
at 0 and at multiples of e 50,000. As we discuss in more detail below, this indicates that
reserve prices are too clustered as to be compatible with fully rational behavior, where the
optimal reserve price is continuous function of the hazard rate of the distribution of buyers’
valuations (see e.g. Krishna, 2002). If that was the case, at any age the reserve prices should
be similarly dispersed as the ﬁnal sales prices (see Figure 3.3b).
In the following, we analyze these indications in more detail. After a brief discussion of the
estimation model, we present the results from a hedonic regression analysis that allows us
to identify the determinants of the reserve price from the set of attributes and the auction
details in our data. In addition, we also examine possible interactions between the observed
demand and supply side behavior.
3.3.1 Estimation Model and Predictions
If a seller wants to maximize his expected revenue, his choice for the reserve price for a player
rationally requires him to form an estimate of the expected bidders valuations. Since both
parties, buyers and sellers, share the same information set on the players’ attributes when
pursuing their evaluation task, our intuition is that similar to the bidders’ valuations, also
the reserve price is a function of the various player attributes.
To put more structure on the estimation model, consider Figure 3.3a again. Note that
the observed discontinuities where the players turn one year older apparently diﬀer in their
relative size. To account for this possibility, we decompose the variable years into dummies
for each age-group, which we label age17, age18, and age19. For example, the eﬀect of age-
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group eighteen is measured by age18 taking value 1 and 0 otherwise. Since these dummies
are perfectly correlated, we need to include only two of them in our estimation model. As
we drop age17 from the regression, the resulting coeﬃcients for the included dummies are
to be interpreted as the diﬀerence in values upon entering an age-group relative to the price
of a player aged “17 years 0 days”. Moreover, we account for the impact of a marginal
day of age separately for each age-group by interacting the age-group dummies with days,
which yields the variables days17, days 18, and days19 ∈ [0, 111]. They display the days of
age conditional on belonging to the speciﬁed age-group and zero otherwise. Formally, this
corresponds to a piece-wise linear relationship between totalage and askprice.20 All other
regressors are assumed to enter linearly into the regression model, which is thus given by
askprice = α + βage18 · age18 + βage19 · age19 +
+ βday17 · days17 + βday18 · days18 + βday19 · days19 +
+ βtsi · tsi + βacquired · acquired + δX+ u, (3.1)
where X represents the vector of all other attributes and auction details. With this speciﬁca-
tion, we are able to identify and measure the average magnitude of potential discontinuities
in the reserve price pattern at the players’ birthdays. Intuitively, the coeﬃcients for the
age-groups (βage18 and βage19) reﬂect the total value diﬀerence across two subsequent age-
groups, while the 112 times the respective impact of a marginal day (βday17, βday18, or βday19,
respectively) accounts for the aggregated value decline within an age-group. Only if both
measures imply the same average decline, the reserve prices evolve continuously in totalage.
Formally, this corresponds to testable predictions stated in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 If the reserve price pattern exhibits the birthday eﬀect, then
(i) the coeﬃcient for age18 is larger than the aggregated value decline per day in age-group
seventeen, i.e
|βage18| > 112 · |βday17|,
(ii) the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of age19 and age18 is larger than the aggregated
value decline per day in age-group eighteen, i.e
|βage19 − βage18| > 112 · |βday18|.
20This speciﬁcation is adopted analogously from our analysis for the demand side of the transfer market.
For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 2.
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The model speciﬁcation (3.1) also includes the dummy acquired to control for possible
diﬀerences between fresh players and those that have been traded previously. One might
be tempted to argue that this should have no eﬀect on the buyers’ valuations and therefore
should play no role for the sellers’ considerations with respect to the reserve price.
However, whether or not a player was sold before conveys a subtle piece of potentially
valuable information. To see this, recall from the discussion of tsi in Section 3.2 that the
skill-levels contain hidden decimal places, while the proﬁle page only shows the adjective
corresponding to the integer value for each skill. For example, consider a freshly promoted
player (acquired = 0 ) from a manager’s youth squad, who displays a keeping score of 6.
Since skills are completely randomly assigned, his precise skill can take any value within the
real interval [6, 7]. If we suppose that his sub-skill is uniformly distributed on this interval,
a rational buyer would have a prior of 6.5 for the expected keeping-skill level.
In contrast to that, if a level-6 keeper was traded previously (acquired = 1 ), there is a positive
probability that he was trained in keeping and just reached the lower threshold of 6.00 to
display a score of 6. Recalling the “train-and-trade” strategy the majority of managers
pursues, from perspective of the seller this would be the rational time to oﬀer the player for
sale. According to Bayes rule, a rational prospective buyer should adjust his prior of the
expected skill-level, and thus his value estimate for such a player, downwards accordingly.21
Since an optimal reserve price depends on the distribution of the bidder’s valuations, if
anything, this implies that the reserve prices should not be larger for purchased players
relative to fresh ones.
Hypothesis 2 If the sellers correctly anticipate the considerations of the buyers with respect
to a previous sale, the reserve prices for purchased players should not be larger than those
for fresh players, i.e.
βacquired ≤ 0.
21Since at present about 10% of the HT population trains keeping, the expected skill for level-6 keeper
accordingly reduces to 0.1 · 6.0 + 0.9 · 6.5 = 6.45 < 6.5
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3.3.2 Results
To test the validity of the above hypotheses, we start out with a series of hedonic OLS
regressions with the reserve price as the dependent variable, where we only consider obser-
vations where the managers set a reserve price diﬀerent from zero.22 We either include only
the main variables of interest or the full set of controls. In addition, we run a separate
regression for experienced managers to see whether they behave diﬀerently than the average
manager, where we classify a seller as an expert, if his team is ranked among the top 20%
in his country (sellerxp < 0.2).23 Moreover, to identify whether the reserve prices follow a
similar pattern as the bidders valuations, we additionally run two regressions for the ﬁnal
sales price as the dependent variable, where the ﬁrst contains all successful trades and the
second only those, where the reserve price was set to zero. Table 3.3 presents the results.
Table 3.3: Determinants of Reserve Price and Final Price (OLS)
Reserve Price (Dep.Var.: askprice) Sales Price (Dep.Var.: price> 0)
I II III IV V
(Experts) (askprice = 0)
days17 -155.3∗∗ -166.94∗∗ -188.39 -1117.71∗∗∗ -1201.36∗∗∗
(70.62) (70.13) (179.36) (65.82) (151.61)
days18 -101.61∗∗∗ -99.53∗∗∗ -161.14 -166.95∗∗∗ -133.75∗∗∗
(37.67) (37.36) (104.12) (25.19) (41.51)
days19 -37.68 -33.89 -114.01 -30.38 -6.47
(27.48) (27.70) (84.85) (19.14) (31.16)
age18 -103154.72∗∗∗ -105770.16∗∗∗ -107809.34∗∗∗ -175188.98∗∗∗ -174963.87∗∗∗
(5648.10) (5650.93) (15232.99) (5114.74) (11906.80)
age19 -127305.85∗∗∗ -129555.76∗∗∗ -134111.3∗∗∗ -205895.9∗∗∗ -203476.81∗∗∗
(5342.31) (5466.74) (14944.07) (5064.23) (12023.98)
tsi 31.91∗∗∗ 28.41∗∗∗ 15.59 70.6∗∗∗ 62.83∗∗∗
(2.29) (4.73) (16.37) (3.93) (6.68)
acquired 26590.64∗∗∗ 17617.9∗∗∗ 23255.22∗∗ 1549.44 -7125.8
(1924.51) (2940.95) (10404.38) (2168.67) (4530.93)
Intercept 107024.18∗∗∗ 98755.29∗∗∗ 105784.1∗∗ 122811.82∗∗∗ 146496.82∗∗∗
(6537.69) (14783.43) (42967.33) (12407.64) (19927.25)
skills no yes yes yes yes
character no yes yes yes yes
daytime no yes yes yes yes
weekday no yes yes yes yes
R2 0.47 0.48 0.56 0.74 0.74
N 5108 5108 567 4743 1149
F 453.10 120.72 29.15 244.52 48.03
Notes: Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**)
or 10%(*) level. “Skills” captures the playing abilities except of keeping (= constant). “Character” contains all other player
attributes except tsi. “Daytime” and “weekday” indicate whether dummies for daytime and day of the week were included.
22All results remain qualitatively robust if we instead run a Tobit regression accounting for our sample
being left-censored at zero. Moreover, the same holds true if we consider log-linearized reserve records and
control for inﬂuential outliers using a robust regression procedure. For the sake of brevity, here we omit the
regression tables but they are available from the authors upon request.
23Using sellerxp < 0.2 leaves us with a bit less than 30% of the observations from the subsample where
we were able to construct the experience dummy.
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The birthday-eﬀect. In any reserve price regression (columns I-III), the age of a player
has an highly signiﬁcant negative impact on the level of the minimum bid set by the sellers.
Representatively focus on the full-control speciﬁcation in column II. The coeﬃcient of age18
indicates that the average reserve price for a player who just turned eighteen is substantially
lower (by e 105,770) than that for a player aged “17 years 0 days” at 99%-signiﬁcant t-
statistics, which is not too surprising given the game’s training algorithm. However, holding
all other variables constant, a marginal day within the age-group seventeen just accounts
for a decline of e 167 in the average reserve price. Aggregated over the whole year (112
days), this gradual day-by-day decline explains only 18% (e 18,704) of the total value loss
measured on the eighteenth birthday of a player. More precisely, the remaining 82% of
the total decline establish an enormous discontinuity in the reserve price pattern where a
player turn eighteen, i.e. |βage18|  112 · |βdays17|. A Wald-test shows that this diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant on the highest level (p-value: 0.000). Similarly, also at the nineteenth birthday of
a player we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant discontinuity of 53% of the total decline between the age-groups
eighteen and nineteen, and thus |βage19 − βage18|  112 · |βdays18|.
In the regression for experienced sellers (column III), observe that the impact of a marginal
day is qualitatively similar but no longer signiﬁcant, which may be due to the reduced number
of observations (N=567). Note that this implies that the reserve prices do not adjust to age
within but only across age-groups, making our result even stronger. If we account for the
aggregate day eﬀects despite their insigniﬁcance, we ﬁnd a discontinuity of 80% and 31% at
the eighteenth and nineteenth birthday, respectively. The results from the regression analysis
are thus consistent with the prediction from Hypothesis 1 that reserve price pattern picks
up the birthday eﬀect, which establishes our ﬁrst result.
Result 1 (The birthday eﬀect): Similar to the sales prices, the reserve price pattern
does not evolve continuously in the total age of a player. Instead, it picks up the birthday
eﬀect in form of substantial and highly signiﬁcant discontinuities at the players’ birthdays.
Reserve price and bidder valuation. Observe further that adding the full set of controls
to the regression (column II) only slightly improves the predictive power of the estimation
model relative to column I, implying that the age variables, tsi, and acquired are indeed the
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most inﬂuential factors for the choice of the reserve price.24 Moreover, except for acquired,
all coeﬃcients in the reserve price regressions qualitatively mirror those for the sales prices
in columns IV and V.25 This is in line with the prediction that sellers take into account the
bidders’ valuations when forming their reserve price.
To distinguish whether the supply side reacts to the demand side behavior or whether the
causality is reversed, in column V we only consider the sales prices from auctions where
the seller set no reserve price (askprice = 0). If the birthday eﬀect persists also for this
subsample, we can rule out that the latter originates from the supply side of the transfer
market. As it turns out, this is indeed the case. We ﬁnd clear evidence for a birthday eﬀect
in the sales prices in column V, amounting to highly signiﬁcant discontinuities of 23% and
47% of the total decline at the eighteenth and nineteenth birthday, respectively.26 Since
the bidding pattern is thus qualitatively unaltered in absence of a positive reserve price, this
implies that the sellers take into account the expected bidders’ valuations when making their
reserve price choice, yielding our second result.
Result 2 (Reserve prices relate to bidder valuations): The reserve prices are shaped
remarkably similar to the ﬁnal prices and share the same subset of inﬂuential player
attributes. The ﬁnding of a birthday eﬀect for the supply side is consistent with the sellers
relating their choice of the reserve price to the bidders’ valuations.
Reserve price and auction outcome. Before we go on with our analysis of seller
behavior, it proves useful to brieﬂy consider the predicted eﬀects of a reserve price on the
ﬁnal price on a more general level. Relative to a zero minimum bid, one of the most basic
general predictions is that higher reserve prices should reduce the likelihood of a successful
sale, because low-value bidders will cease to participate (Reiley, 2006). Since all but one
of the 24% failed auctions in our sample exhibited a strictly positive minimum bid, this
prediction is clearly met.27 A non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) ranksum
24While each group of controls turns out to be jointly signiﬁcant, all eﬀects of individually signiﬁcant
control variables are of secondary order and do not conﬂict with any of our results. To ease the exposition,
we therefore omit a detailed discussion. The full regression tables can be requested from the authors.
25Note however that the relevant coeﬃcients in the price regressions are quantitatively much larger as in
those for the reserve price and the latter does not react as nuancedly to the precise age. As we will discuss
below, this likely due to the strong clustering of the reserve prices.
26The discontinuities for the full sample of non-zero sales prices can be readily calculated from column IV
in Table 3.3 and are given by 29% (βage18−112·βday17βage18 ) and 39% (
βage19−βage18−112·βday18
βage19−βage18 ), respectively.
27Since the sample was hand-collected, this one observation may be due to a data-entry error.
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test conﬁrms that the askprices for unsold players are signiﬁcantly higher than those for
successful trades (p-value: 0.000). We also ﬁnd that the expected ﬁnal price unconditional
on a successful sale is lower if the reserve price is above zero (p-value: 0.000).
Evidence for sophisticated seller behavior. Conditional on a successful sale, however,
the expected price is larger for positive askprices (p-value: 0.000). Intuitively, if the seller
manages to set a reserve price between the highest bidder’s and the second highest bidder’s
valuation, the auction price is mechanically higher than if there was no minimum bid and
the seller successfully reaps some of the winner’s surplus.28 Since in 15.9% of the successful
trades there was only a single bidder and the winning bid equaled the reserve price (Panel
B of Table 3.2), we take it that the sellers in these 756 auctions were successful in their
attempt to appropriate some of the highest bidder’s surplus.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Sold and Unsold Players and Median Reserve Prices
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(b) Mean Reserve Price by Age
Notes: The dashed lines at 112 and 224 mark the points where the players turn eighteen and nineteen, respectively.
A natural next step is to ask whether at least some sellers react strategically in anticipation
of the biased bidding behavior on the demand side of the transfer market. We would expect
that sellers who are aware of the “birthday eﬀect” should rationally try to sell players that are
close to turn one year older, thereby avoiding to bear the accompanying value loss themselves.
Consistent with this intuition, the distribution for sold and unsold players shown in Figure
3.4a clearly indicates an increased number of sale oﬀers shortly before players turn eighteen.
At about 90 days of total age, both the total number of oﬀers and the number of failed
28See also Trautmann and Traxler (2008), who distinguish between this mechanical eﬀect of “surplus
appropriation” and a potential psychological channel of inﬂuence of the reserve price on the ﬁnal price, as
suggested in Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007).
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auctions increase substantially, while the number of sales (and also the selling price pattern)
remains largely constant. At the same time, the median askprice exhibits a local peak at
exactly the same age level (Figure 3.4b). Though considerably less pronounced, we observe
an similar increase around three weeks before the nineteenth and also the twentieth birthday.
Our intuition is that the sellers set rather high reserve prices at that stage in the hope to
ﬁnd a buyer who is not aware of the birthday eﬀect and is thus willing to pay the asked
price. Clearly, the downside of this strategy is that the probability for a successful sale
is considerably reduced. This would also explain the higher number of failed auctions we
observe. In even closer proximity to a player’s birthday, however, a seller should rationally
change his strategy and try to maximize the probability for a successful sale by charging a
rather low minimum bid.
Figure 3.5: Reserve Prices in Close Proximity to Discontinuity Point
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Notes: The ﬁgure includes 756 (883) observations of players 3 weeks before and after their eighteenth (nineteenth) birthday.
Figure 3.5 plots the reserve prices closely before and after the eighteenth (nineteenth)
birthday of the players in our sample. Consistent with our intuition, observe that the
median reserve price for seventeen year old players begins to decline at 110 days of total age
and drops to zero at 112, while it moves upwards again immediately after the birthday. A
similar eﬀect exists for the nineteenth birthday, though the drop is not as emphasized and
takes place a few days before the birthday.29 Though merely inferred by inspection, we take
these observations as an indication that at least some sellers behave strategically.
29However, note that the absolute impact of the birthday eﬀect is considerably lower at age nineteen,
which might explain the reduced reaction of the sellers at this point.
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Result 3 (Strategic seller behavior): At least some sellers show quite sophisticated
strategic considerations in their choice of the reserve price, as indicated by an increased
number of sale oﬀers and low minimum bids in close proximity to the birthdays. Moreover,
a substantial fraction of sellers manages to extract additional rents from the winning bidder
by setting a reserve price above the second highest bidder’s valuation.
The impact of a previous sale. Next, we consider the impact of a previous sale of a
player on the reserve price. Returning to Table 3.3, we ﬁnd strong evidence that sellers set
signiﬁcantly higher minimum bids for players they acquired on the market (acquired = 1)
relative to fresh players from their own youth squads (acquired = 0). Throughout all reserve
price speciﬁcations (columns I-III), contrasting with Hypothesis 2 the coeﬃcient βacquired is
large and signiﬁcant on the highest level, implying a strong positive correlation of acquired
with askprice. Holding all other variables constant, the average reserve price for purchased
players in column II exceeds that for fresh players by an amount of e 17,618, or 23% of
the mean reserve price. To illustrate the economic signiﬁcance of this eﬀect, note that the
statistically weighted average impact of tsi, which we obtain by multiplying its coeﬃcient
(βtsi = 28.4) times one standard deviation of the average tsi -score (σtsi = 428), only amounts
to e 12,155, i.e. about two-thirds of the coeﬃcient for the dummy acquired.
In contrast to that, the regression for price conditional on sale in (column IV) yields an
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for acquired, all else equal implying that the buyers’ valuations do not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer whether or not a seller was traded before. Furthermore, in the speciﬁcation
for auction prices with a zero reserve price (column V), the coeﬃcient for acquired is large
and has a negative sign, i.e. qualitatively the eﬀect goes into the opposite direction for
buyers. Though not statistically signiﬁcant, this points towards the latter on average having
a higher willingness to pay for fresh players, which is consistent with our above reasoning
that a previous sale rationally translates into a lower expected (sub-) skill-level.30
An immediate implication of these results is that auctions for purchased players are ceteris
paribus more likely to fail. Among the players that were bought (acquired = 1), the share of
failed auctions was 32.6%, which is substantially higher than that for fresh players at 20.3%.
30Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.6 shows the results from an additional Tobit regression, where we include also
the failed auctions with a zero sales price, i.e. with the sales price unconditional on entry as the dependent
variable. In this approach, acquired has a highly signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient (βtobitacquired = −13, 579) which
accounts for roughly 17% of the unconditional mean price. Unconditional on a successful sale, the average
sales price is thus considerably lower for purchased players.
Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices 79
A Pearson’s chi-square test conﬁrms that there is a statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between acquired and the frequency of players remaining unsold (p-value: 0.000). Moreover,
if a player was previously traded, we ﬁnd that in only 9.9% of the cases the reserve price
was set to zero. Among fresh players with 22.4% this share is more than twice as large. To
further substantiate this ﬁnding, we estimate the likelihood for a positive reserve price in a
series of Logit regressions on the dummy d ask, which takes the values 1 or 0 depending on
whether or not there was a positive minimum bid. The results are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Likelihood of Non-Zero Reserve Price
Logit I Logit II Logit III
expert sellers
Dep.Var.: d ask Odds Rt. Marg. Efct. Odds Rt. Marg. Efct. Odds Rt. Marg. Efct.
days17 1.0032 0.0005 1.0029 0.0004 0.9969 -0.0005
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0059)
days18 0.9980 -0.0003 0.9976 -0.0003 0.9991 -0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0047)
days19 0.9983 -0.0002 0.9980 -0.0003 0.9978 -0.0004
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0044)
age18 0.8622 -0.0211 0.8516 -0.0223 0.4291 -0.1368
(0.1726) (0.1727) (0.2232)
age19 0.7563 -0.0397 0.7673 -0.0368 0.4271 -0.1376
(0.1434) (0.1495) (0.2231)
tsi 0.9999∗ 0.0000 0.9998 0.0000 1.0007 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006)
acquired 2.4449∗∗∗ 0.1270 1.8536∗∗∗ 0.0857 4.7540∗∗∗ 0.2521
(0.2101) (0.227) (2.2669)
skills no yes yes
character no yes yes
daytime no yes yes
weekday no yes yes
LR Chi 212.93 306.42 95.04
N 6258 6258 748
Notes: The Logit procedure estimates the impact of the independent variables on the probability to observe “d ask
= 1” relative to “d ask = 0”. For each speciﬁcation, the left (right) column states the odds ratio (marginal eﬀect) for
the respective regressor variable. Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance
at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Sellers are classiﬁed as experts if sellerxp<0.2.
The ﬁrst two columns (Logit I) show the odds ratios (exponentiated coeﬃcients) and the
corresponding marginal eﬀects (instantaneous change) in the probability when only the main
variables are used as regressors. Note that acquired is the only variable which has an highly
signiﬁcant impact. For a purchased player, the odds for a strictly positive reserve price
(versus a zero reserve price) increases by a highly signiﬁcant factor of 2.4 as compared to a
player that was internally promoted from a seller’s own youth squad. In terms of the marginal
eﬀect, a non-zero reserve price is 12.7% more likely for previously acquired players.31 If we
employ the full vector of player attributes and auction details as controls (Logit II), all
31The marginal change equals the partial derivative of the predicted probability with respect to the
respective regressor variable.
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results remain qualitatively robust. In line with our previous results, the same holds true in
the separate regression for expert sellers (Logit III). If anything, the eﬀect seems to be even
more pronounced for experts.
Hence, if a player was bought rather than promoted internally by the seller, not only the level
of the reserve price is higher on average, but also the likelihood that it is set diﬀerent from
zero at all. Stated diﬀerently, even though the managers interact in a highly competitive
market environment, our ﬁndings indicate that the sellers in HT exhibit some form of an
entitlement eﬀect with respect to players that they acquired on the market, but not for those
promoted from their own youth squad.
Result 4 (Entitlement eﬀect for acquired players): Relative to internally promoted
players, the average seller in HT demands a positive reserve price premium for players they
previously acquired on the market (βacquired > 0). Hypothesis 2 can thus be rejected.
This ﬁnding suggests that the sellers of purchased players fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy
and loss aversion. For instance, a seller might be tempted to regard his own acquisition cost
as a benchmark for the reserve price he sets and thus charges at least the same amount,
or feels even entitled to demand an additional premium. Yet, this cost is sunk and should
rationally not aﬀect his choice. Moreover, since his valuation was the highest in the previous
auction, this might be too high a threshold, if a player hasn’t signiﬁcantly increased in quality
in the meantime. In contrast, for internally promoted players there is no such benchmark,
which would explain the diﬀerence in reserve prices that we observe.
Reserve price clustering. While we ﬁnd ﬁnal and reserve prices to respond very
diﬀerently if a player has been traded previously, we already pointed out that the impact
of all other inﬂuential variables is qualitatively similar for both. However, all coeﬃcients
for the age variables and also for tsi are quantitatively much larger in the price regressions
than in those for the reserve price. For instance, in column IV of Table 3.3, holding all
other variables constant, a marginal day in age-group seventeen reduces the sales price on
average by e 1,118, while the analogous eﬀect for the reserve price is only e 167, or 15% of
the former. Intuitively, the minimum bids react substantially less sensitively to the precise
age. A possible explanation for this pattern arises from the fact that the reserve prices are
remarkably clustered around focal points at multiples of e 50,000, as indicated in Figure 3.3a
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above. This intuition is further strengthened by an inspection of the frequency distribution
of (non-zero) reserve prices in our sample as depicted in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Distribution of Reserve Prices and their Fourth-to-last Digits
First, consider the four histograms on the left of Figure 3.6 which depicts the frequency
distribution of (non-zero) reserve prices for the full sample and for each age-group separately.
Though they naturally exhibit some variation, we ﬁnd that reserve prices are substantially
clustered at multiples of e 50,000. The distribution for the full sample exhibits several
distinct spikes ranging from e 50,000 to e 300,000. A similar pattern arises on the individual
age-group levels, where the eﬀect is most accentuated for seventeen year old players. In
particular, their reserve prices are most frequently set to the (round) values of e 100,000,
e 150,000, and e 200,000. The patterns for ages eighteen and nineteen also exhibit strong
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focal points at e 50,000 and at some of its multiples, though less pronounced due to the
age-induced decline in the players’ values.
Second, we also ﬁnd evidence for considerable lower scale clustering. On the right of Figure
3.6 we plot the frequency distribution of the fourth-to-last digit (the “thousands”-digit) of
the reserve prices. For example, if the reserve price is given by e 67,000 the digit takes value
“7”. Accordingly, the spikes at the values of 0, 5, and 9 indicate that a majority of reserve
prices were set at multiples of e 5,000, or just below the next full ten-thousand.
Result 5 (Clustering at round numbers): The distribution of reserve prices exhibits
substantial clusters at multiples of e 50,000, and also on a lower scale at multiples of e 5,000.
According to Sonnemans (2006), such (large scale) round number-clustering could be caused
by boundedly rational sellers, who form mental target prices, which then serve as a “good
enough”-solution in their view instead of considering the precise distribution of bidders’
valuations. In line with this intuition, and also with the ﬁndings documented in Benartzi
and Thaler (2008) for the determination of savings choices, we interpret the strong clustering
in the reserve price pattern as evidence for sellers using a round number heuristic, or
rule-of-thumb, when making their choice for a reserve price to considerably simplify their
decision making.
Moreover, recall that a large fraction of the sellers (18%) sets a reserve price of zero. Both the
strong clustering and frequent absence of a positive minimum bid stand in marked contrast
to the theoretical predictions for the optimal reserve price in an IPV context. This suggests
that many sellers do not eﬃciently utilize the reserve price as an instrument to maximize
their expected revenue. Intuitively, an eﬃcient strategy to appropriate a share of the winning
bidder’s rent would require a seller to form very ﬁne-tuned estimates of the expected (second)
highest-order statistic derived from the distribution of valuations rather than to employ a
simplifying rule-of-thumb. Moreover, due to the large scale clustering a substantial fraction
of reserve prices will be set considerably below and above the optimal level. In the latter
case, a more than optimal number of auctions will fail resulting in an ineﬃcient allocation.
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3.4 Suboptimal Reserve Price and Foregone Revenue
In this section we quantify the economic consequences of suboptimal reserve prices by
providing estimates of how much expected revenue is eﬀectively lost as compared to the
situation with optimal reserve prices. In doing so, we account for the eﬀect of age on the
players’ values, and thus on the level of the optimal reserve price, by subdividing our sample
into weekly intervals of precise age, yielding a total of 48 “cohorts”. Each age-group consists
of 16 cohorts, where the intervals are deﬁned such that they only contain players from the
same age-group.32 Abstracting from the small variation of the precise age, we assume that
the values for the players within cohort j are realizations from the same underlying value
distribution function, Fj(v). Under this assumption, the optimal reserve price, r
∗
j , is the
same for all players belonging to cohort j.
In the following, we start with a brief description of our approach to determine the optimal
reserve price.33 In particular, we ﬁrst use the information on the observed sales prices in
our data to identify a non-parametric estimate for the valuation primitive of each cohort.
By using a Maximum Likelihood method (MLE) to obtain a parametric distribution best
describing these point estimates, we then determine the optimal reserve prices and the
maximum expected revenues. Subsequently, we present the results from comparing the
expected revenues at the actual reserve prices to the corresponding optimal benchmark.
3.4.1 Estimation of the Optimal Reserve Price
As a ﬁrst step to estimate the optimal reserve price it proves useful to re-consider the seller’s
problem in general. In particular, the expected revenue of a seller who sets a reserve price
of r for an object for sale is given by
Π(r) = v0F (r)
N + rN(1− F (r))F (r)N−1 +
v∫
r
u(1− F (u))(N − 1)F (r)N−2f(u)du, (3.2)
32For example, cohort 16 includes all players in the interval totalage ∈ [105, 111] (i.e. “17 years 105 days”
to ”17 years 111 days”), while cohort 17 contains those with totalage ∈ [112, 118] (i.e. “18 years 0 days” to
“18 years 6 days”). Hence, the birthday eﬀect will take place across but not within the cohorts.
33For the sake of brevity, we omit the details of the calculus, which was performed with Matlab. The
corresponding m-ﬁles can be requested from the authors. All proofs for the validity of the applied approach
are available in standard textbooks, e.g. Paarsch and Hong (2006) and Krishna (2002).
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where 0 ≤ v0 ≤ r is the reservation value of the seller and N the number of potential bidders.
Under the independent private value (IPV) assumptions, the bidders’ individual valuations
are i.i.d. draws from the increasing distribution function F (v), the “valuation primitive”,
which has support [0, v] and admits a continuous density function f(v) ≡ F ′(v) (see e.g.
Krishna, 2002). The ﬁrst term on the RHS of (3.2) thus captures the expected utility from
the event that none of the N potential buyers realizes a valuation above r and the seller gets
v0, which occurs with probability F (r)
N . The second term reﬂects the event where all but one
bidder have a lower valuation than r, which occurs with probability N(1− Fj(r))Fj(r)N−1.
In that case, the winning bid equals r and the seller successfully manages to reap some
of the winner’s surplus. Finally, the third term states the expected sales price conditional
on more than one bidder having a valuation of at least r. The choice for the reserve price
thus involves a trade oﬀ between a higher probability that the auction fails and realizing
additional gains from a sales price above the second-highest bidder’s valuation.
As a general result under IPV, for any arbitrary value distribution function F (v), the optimal
reserve price r∗ that maximizes (3.2) is independent of the number of potential bidders and
given by
r∗ = v0 +
1
μ(r∗)
, (3.3)
where μ(v) ≡ 1−F (v)
f(v)
is the hazard rate of F (v) (see Riley and Samuleson, 1981). Thus, the
optimal reserve price r∗ will always lie above v0 and depends on the valuation primitive of
the bidders, which is unknown the econometrician.34
However, F (v) is non-parametrically identiﬁed from the winning bids, i.e. the observed sales
prices (Athey and Haile, 2002). Depending on the auction format, the latter describe the
empirical distribution of the ith order statistic from an i.i.d. sample of size N from the
valuation primitive F (v). Since the auction format in HT is strategically equivalent to
a sealed-bid-second-price auction, the winning bid equals the second-highest bid plus one
discrete increment, whenever the reserve price was set below the second highest bidder’s
valuation.35
34In Chapter 2 we argue that the managers do not necessarily know their true valuation, v. Instead, they
base their bids on the expected valuation for a player, E(v), which results from their individual evaluation
of his attributes. Strictly speaking, the optimal reserve price thus depends on the primitive of the expected
valuations, F [E(v)]. To simplify the notation, we continue to use the term F (v).
35In a sealed-bid second price auction, the equilibrium bidding strategy is to place a bid equal to one’s
own valuation, vi, while in the English ascending open bid auction a bidder will repeatedly increase his bid
until the current price reaches vi and exit thereafter.
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Denote by wjk the observed sales price of auction k = 1, ..., Kj in cohort j. Hence, the
Kj sales prices observed for cohort j describe an empirical distribution function Fˆj(wjk),
36
which is equivalent to the distribution of the second-highest order statistic of the valuation
primitive, i.e. the distribution of the second-highest valuations F(2)j(v,Njk):
Fˆj(wjk) ≡ F(2)j(v;Njk) = Njk · Fj(v)Njk−1 − (Njk − 1) · Fj(v)Njk , (3.4)
where Njk is the number of potential bidders in auction k in cohort j. Though the reserve
price is independent of Njk, it hence enters the distribution of the second-highest order
statistic, which in the following is used to identify the valuation primitive Fj(v). However,
we have no information on how many potential bidders will view a particular player. At
this point, we therefore need to make a simplifying assumption on the value of Njk used to
obtain the estimate of Fj(v).
Assumption 1 (Potential number of bidders): The number of potential bidders is
exogenously ﬁxed and identical for all auctions in the sample: Njk = N ∀ j, k.
In addition, we borrow on the dataset of 17,510 HT -auctions from the study of the demand
side in Chapter 2 to determine appropriate values for N to be used in the estimation.
Conveniently, these data contain information on the number of bids placed in each auction.37
We argue that this is a reasonable proxy for the potential number of bidders viewing an
individual player on the transfer market. In particular, we obtain the point estimates of
Fj(v) for N = 7, which is equal to the median number of bids in these data.
38
By substituting N = 7 and the values for Fˆj(wjk) into (3.4), we are able to obtain point
estimates of the valuation primitive for each of the 48 cohorts by numerically solving for the
roots with respect to Fj(v). As the results are qualitatively similar for all j, Figure 3.7 shows
the results from this approach for a representative cohort in the middle of each age-group.
36Given a vector of length T , an empirical distribution function is a cumulative probability distribution
function that concentrates a probability of 1/T at each of the T elements in the vector.
37For a graphical illustration of the distribution of the number of bids see Figure 3.10 in Appendix 3.6.
38To account for the eﬀect of the number of potential bidders we repeated the estimation for N = 13
(mean number of bids), N = 2 (25th-percentile), and N = 18 (75th-percentile). For a discussion of the
results see Section 3.4.2 below. All tables are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution Functions of First- and Second-Highest Order Statistic and ML-Estimator
The ﬁgure depicts the empirical distribution Fˆj(wjk) of the winning bids and the correspon-
ding point estimates of the valuation primitive Fj(v) for cohorts j = {9, 25, 41}. For every j,
Fˆj(wjk) resembles the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a normal distribution, and
Fj(v) is approximately exponentially distributed. Assuming the valuation primitive indeed
follows an exponential distribution, we have that
Fj(v)
MLE−→ F˜j(v;λj) = 1− e−λjv ∀ v ∈ R+0 (3.5)
where λj is the Maximum-Likelihood estimator (MLE) for the rate parameter of the expo-
nential distribution F˜j(v;λj) best describing Fj(v), which is also depicted in Figure 3.7.
39
Having derived an estimator for the underlying valuation primitive Fj(v) for the players
in cohort j, we are able to determine the corresponding optimal reserve price r∗j up to a
constant, i.e. the reservation value v0 of the seller. However, v0 is not observed and thus
unknown. Therefore, the estimation results for the optimal reserve prices additionally rely
on the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 2 (Reservation Values): The reservation value v0 is constant across all
sellers and given by the consumption value (CV ) of the players in the sample.
In particular, the fact that a player is oﬀered for sale implicitly signals that his current
owner does not consider him as a suitable trainee for his current training-strategy. Given
this rationale, our belief is that it is plausible to assume that the value he attaches to the
player is likely to reﬂect the latter’s CV. As a proxy for the CV of the players in our sample,
39Given the exponential formulation and k observations in cohort j, the log-likelihood function used to
estimate λj depends on the density of the second-highest-order statistic, f˜(2)j(v, λj), and is given by
(λj) =
∑
k
ln(f˜(2)j(v, λj)) =
∑
k
[
ln
(
N(N − 1))+ ln(1− F˜j(v, λj))+ (N − 2)ln(F˜j(v, λj))+ ln(f˜j(v, λj))].
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we take about 80% of the average sales price (e 48,921) observed for the oldest players, i.e.
cohort 48, yielding an assumed value of v0 = 40, 000 for the reservation value of the sellers.
40
Table 3.5 shows the resulting estimates of the optimal reserve price for each cohort, which
are obtained by substituting v0 and F˜j(v;λj) into (3.3). In addition, we state the number of
observed winning bids, on which the identiﬁcation of F˜j(v;λj) is based. Except for cohorts
j = 1 and j = 2, the youngest players in the sample, all estimates are based on more than 70
observations, plausibly yielding considerably precise descriptions of the underlying valuation
primitives.
Table 3.5: Optimal and Actual Reserve Prices by Cohort
Age 17 Age 18 Age 19
j Kj r
∗
j r
med
j r
mean
j j Kj r
∗
j r
med
j r
mean
j j Kj r
∗
j r
med
j r
mean
j
1 23 241,112 150,000 135,000 17 73 109,036 61,250 68,395 33 124 82,590 40,000 45,727
2 26 229,899 150,000 151,845 18 92 96,575 55,000 66,860 34 131 80,877 40,000 39,464
3 73 198,265 150,000 154,250 19 84 96,970 60,000 60,121 35 122 77,021 35,000 39,257
4 102 189,391 150,000 150,026 20 99 92,687 50,000 50,188 36 119 80,142 39,500 38,888
5 90 178,115 150,000 146,889 21 93 96,593 50,000 50,333 37 105 77,077 35,000 38,167
6 76 177,689 150,000 152,053 22 91 92,133 50,000 60,841 38 100 78,665 35,000 36,332
7 102 171,840 150,000 138,127 23 102 91,521 50,000 52,082 39 112 81,601 39,000 34,705
8 108 165,431 150,000 141,765 24 109 101,381 50,000 62,222 40 110 79,073 37,500 37,782
9 91 161,678 150,000 145,988 25 89 90,902 50,000 52,565 41 137 82,155 39,001 39,956
10 105 158,699 150,000 145,404 26 95 93,371 50,000 55,163 42 120 78,161 35,000 43,281
11 80 152,832 150,000 145,500 27 77 88,999 50,000 54,450 43 113 79,655 40,000 38,767
12 87 153,830 175,000 162,195 28 73 88,684 50,000 53,206 44 132 76,097 37,500 39,126
13 87 148,599 150,000 159,118 29 83 91,992 52,500 58,544 45 146 78,623 35,000 41,171
14 84 151,867 150,000 157,731 30 105 88,497 50,000 47,912 46 139 78,166 35,000 34,869
15 87 147,818 150,000 145,702 31 106 88,257 50,000 56,641 47 109 76,930 40,000 37,731
16 87 133,922 139,001 130,970 32 101 85,944 49,000 50,404 48 137 78,602 35,000 37,961
As we would expect, an inspection of the stated values for r∗j shows a clear tendency of
the level of the optimal reserve price to decline as age increases. Note that the estimates
for Fj(v), from which the respective values for r
∗
j are calculated, are solely based on the
observed sales prices in cohort j, which may be subject to considerable variation. Considering
this fact, it is not surprising that the decline is not strictly monotonic across all cohorts.
Importantly, however, observe that the estimated optimal reserve price exceeds the median
(rmedj ) and mean (r
mean
j ) of the observed minimum bids for almost all cohorts, and often
quite substantially.
40While the age-dependent APV will be very small for players at the end of age-group nineteen, in Chapter
2 we still ﬁnd evidence for a small birthday eﬀect at the age of twenty. Therefore, we adjust our estimate
of the CV downward to the value of e 40,000. All results remain robust, if we instead employ the average
sales price of the oldest players in age-group nineteen as a proxy for v0.
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3.4.2 Expected Revenue at Optimal and Actual Reserve Prices
In Section 3.3 we have shown that a substantial fraction of sellers sets either no reserve price
or uses a round-number heuristic to simplify their decision making. For example, note that
22 (17%) of the 130 sellers in cohort j = 9 set a reserve price of zero, 17 (13%) opted for a
value of e 150,000, 11 (8%) chose e 200,000, and the values of e 100,000 and e 250,000 were
each observed in 6 (5%) auctions, all together accounting for about half of the sellers. The
patterns for the other cohorts are quite similar. Therefore, we are particularly interested
how the expected revenues for these sellers compare to the estimated optimum.
Given the approximated valuation primitive F˜j(v;λj), analogously to (3.2) the expected
revenue at a reserve price of rj for a player from cohort j is given by
Π˜(rj) = v0F˜j(r)
N + rN(1− F˜j(r))F˜j(r)N−1 +
v∫
rj
u(1− F˜j(u))(N − 1)F˜j(u)N−2f˜j(u)du, (3.6)
where we denote F˜j(v) ≡ F˜j(v;λj) to simplify the notation. For the values of N and v0
assumed above, the maximum expected revenue for each cohort is given by substituting
r∗j into (3.6), where we additionally employ the 99th-percentile of the observed sales price
in each cohort as a proxy for v. Similarly, we are able to determine the expected revenue
for any reserve price observed in our sample. By comparing the resulting outcomes to the
respective optimum, we are thus able to determine the shares of expected revenue lost due
to deviations from the optimal reserve price.
Table 3.6 states results for age-group seventeen at several preeminent points of the actual
reserve price pattern, including zero and the main cluster points as indicated in Figure 3.6.41
To simplify the notation, we refer to a cluster point by Cx, where x indicates its respective
magnitude.
At a ﬁrst glance, the deviations from the optimum appear to be small. The expected revenues
at the mean and median of the actual reserve prices (columns II and III) are remarkably close
to Π˜(r∗j ). If we consider the sellers who abstain from setting a positive reserve price (column
IV), we ﬁnd that they only lose a share of about 2% relative to the optimum. Moreover,
also the deviations at the cluster points C50 and C100 (columns V and VI) are of similar
41The corresponding results for age-groups eighteen and nineteen are qualitatively similar as shown in
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 in Appendix 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Expected Revenues for Age-Group 17 (Cohorts 1-16)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Coh. Obs. Π˜(r∗j ) Π˜(r
mean
j ) Π˜(r
med
j ) Π˜(0) Π˜(C50) Π˜(C100) Π˜(C200) Π˜(C250)
1 24 263,433 260,425 260,858 259,570 259,575 259,791 262,635 263,383
(-1.1%) (-1.0%) (-1.5%) (-1.5%) (-1.4%) (-0.3%) (-0.0%)
2 29 264,041 261,800 261,734 260,208 260,215 260,488 263,552 263,747
(-0.8%) (-0.9%) (-1.5%) (-1.4%) (-1.3%) (-0.2%) (-0.1%)
3 89 236,296 235,121 234,937 232,506 232,523 233,071 236,293 233,470
(-0.5%) (-0.6%) (-1.6%) (-1.6%) (-1.4%) (-0.0%) (-1.2%)
4 127 225,672 224,625 224,623 221,878 221,900 222,573 225,563 221,372
(-0.5%) (-0.5%) (-1.7%) (-1.7%) (-1.4%) (-0.0%) (-1.9%)
5 104 213,323 212,543 212,673 209,507 209,539 210,419 212,779 206,451
(-0.4%) (-0.3%) (-1.8%) (-1.8%) (-1.4%) (-0.3%) (-3.2%)
6 97 197,134 196,581 196,499 193,318 193,350 194,239 196,565 190,148
(-0.3%) (-0.3%) (-1.9%) (-1.9%) (-1.5%) (-0.3%) (-3.5%)
7 131 207,082 206,140 206,643 203,246 203,286 204,309 206,095 198,386
(-0.5%) (-0.2%) (-1.9%) (-1.8%) (-1.3%) (-0.5%) (-4.2%)
8 139 194,449 193,908 194,203 190,583 190,634 191,829 192,816 183,568
(-0.3%) (-0.1%) (-2.0%) (-2.0%) (-1.3%) (-0.8%) (-5.6%)
9 130 195,223 194,958 195,072 191,336 191,394 192,704 193,105 182,905
(-0.1%) (-0.1%) (-2.0%) (-2.0%) (-1.3%) (-1.1%) (-6.3%)
10 142 186,261 186,061 186,173 182,354 182,420 183,828 183,696 172,719
(-0.1%) (-0.0%) (-2.1%) (-2.1%) (-1.3%) (-1.4%) (-7.3%)
11 134 172,300 172,232 172,290 168,347 168,430 170,054 168,669 156,131
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.3%) (-2.2%) (-1.3%) (-2.1%) (-9.4%)
12 155 181,025 180,928 180,363 177,081 177,160 178,746 177,593 165,323
(-0.1%) (-0.4%) (-2.2%) (-2.1%) (-1.3%) (-1.9%) (-8.7%)
13 164 170,543 170,377 170,540 166,549 166,648 168,448 165,977 152,311
(-0.1%) (-0.0%) (-2.3%) (-2.3%) (-1.2%) (-2.7%) (-10.%)
14 147 177,945 177,897 177,940 173,983 174,069 175,732 174,113 161,318
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.2%) (-2.2%) (-1.2%) (-2.2%) (-9.3%)
15 140 172,311 172,304 172,304 168,308 168,410 170,245 167,555 153,684
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.3%) (-2.3%) (-1.2%) (-2.8%) (-10.%)
16 131 149,788 149,774 149,743 145,594 145,781 148,326 140,746 123,583
(-0.0%) (-0.0%) (-2.8%) (-2.7%) (-1.0%) (-6.0%) (-17.%)
Notes: Deviations from the maximum expected revenue are stated in parentheses. Since largely identical to the respective
median reserve price (see Table 3.5), the results for cluster point C150 are omitted from the presentation.
magnitude. Returning to Table 3.5, note that all of these values are located considerably
below r∗j for j ∈ {1, ..., 16}. As a consequence, at these levels the reserve price is likely to
be non-binding in the sense that the odds for at least two of the assumed N = 7 potential
bidders realizing a higher valuation are reasonably large. Intuitively, these sellers forego the
chance to gain additional rents from setting a reserve price that lies above the expected
second-highest bidder’s valuation. The auction outcome is thus eﬀectively determined by
the degree of competition among the potential bidders.
A higher number of potential bidders implies a larger number of i.i.d. draws from the
valuation primitive. Since this ceteris paribus increases the probability for the realization of
high valuations, competition is more intense for higher N . Consistently, in the estimation
for N = 13 and N = 18 the shares of expected revenue lost relative to the optimum are of
even smaller magnitude than for N = 7. Conversely, for N = 2 potential bidders also the
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expected revenues at zero, C50, and C100 dramatically deviate from the optimum, since the
compensating impact of bidder competition is substantially reduced. Since HT ’s transfer
market is highly competitive, our intuition is that the assumption of at least N = 7 potential
bidders is indeed justiﬁed and that the ﬁnding of a relatively small loss in expected revenue
due to a suboptimally low reserve price adequately describes the actual situation.
As soon as the minimum bid exceeds the optimal reserve price, however, the shares of
foregone expected revenue increase substantially. Intuitively, an exaggerated minimum bid
induces an ineﬃciently high probability that the auction fails, which causes the expected
revenues for the seller to decline. For instance, the optimal reserve price in cohort j = 9 is
given by r∗9 = 161, 678. Yet, 15% of the sellers charged an reserve price equal to or above
C250, thereby accruing a loss of more than 6.3% relative to the optimum. Moreover, the
more the chosen minimum bid exceeds r∗j , the larger is the share of expected revenue lost.
In cohort j = 16, in 10% of the 131 auctions the seller demanded a starting price of C250 or
higher, thereby reducing his expected revenue by more than 17% relative to the optimum.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the respective deviations for all 16 cohorts in age-group seventeen.42
Clearly, the shares of expected revenue lost at minimum bids at levels of C200 and C250
are ampliﬁed for older players in the age-group, since the respective optimal reserve prices
decline as age increases and thus are exceedingly outvalued. Consistent with the above
argument that bidder competition triggers a compensating eﬀect, for reserve prices below
r∗j , i.e. rj ∈ {0, C50, C100}, the measured deviations remain relatively constant.
Figure 3.8: Share of Expected Revenue Lost (Age-Group 17)
0
10
%
15
%
5%
De
via
tio
n 
fro
m
 O
pt
im
um
 (P
er
ce
nt
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Cohort
Optimum at (r=r*)
Deviation at (r=0)
Deviation at (r=C50)
Deviation at (r=C100)
Deviation at (r=C200)
Deviation at (r=C250)
42For an analogous illustration for age-groups eighteen and nineteen see Figure 3.11 in Appendix 3.6.
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Result 6 (Loss of expected revenue): The impact of a suboptimal reserve price depends
on the direction of the deviation from its optimal level. Downward deviations, i.e. setting a
non-binding reserve price, are partially countervailed by the fact that competition among the
potential bidders is suﬃciently intense. In contrast, upward deviations can cause substantial
reductions in expected revenue.
Summarizing, though suboptimal from a theoretical perspective, the large number of zero
reserve prices and cluster points we observe in our data not necessarily trigger severe de-
viations from the optimum. As long as the reserve price is set below its optimal level,
the competitive environment of the transfer market suﬃces to guarantee an almost optimal
expected revenue for the seller, though he will not succeed to additionally extract some of
the winning bidder’s surplus. In contrast, a large fraction of sellers loses a substantial share
of expected revenue by setting a reserve price too high, thereby increasing the probability
that the player remains unsold.
3.5 Conclusion
We examine empirically how managers playing the online game Hattrick set reserve prices
in auctions for virtual players. Using detailed ﬁeld data on 6,258 auctions from HT ’s transfer
market, we ﬁnd that chosen reserve prices exhibit both, very sophisticated and suboptimal
behavior by the sellers. Reserve prices pick up the birthday eﬀect of the demand side
documented in Chapter 2 and are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the resulting sales price
pattern. All our results are robust if we additionally control for the experience of sellers, the
auction-end-day, and time-of-day eﬀects.
Intriguingly, even though HT ’s transfer market is highly competitive, we ﬁnd evidence for
a sunk cost fallacy and a resulting entitlement eﬀect in form of a large positive premium on
the reserve price when a player has been acquired previously.
While many sellers act strategically and try to reap some of the buyers’ surplus, some fail
in this endeavor as they set reserve prices suboptimally. We have established that reserve
prices are too clustered (around e 50,000 steps) to be consistent with fully rational behavior
and we document what share of expected revenues is foregone by this. We thus conclude
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that many HT managers simplify their decision making by adopting heuristic pricing rules
that are suboptimal from a fully rational point of view.
If, as in our data, the entitlement and clustering eﬀects are persistent and quantitatively
relevant, the option of choosing a reserve price might be an impediment to market eﬃciency
as sellers set too high reserve prices resulting in too little trade. In such situations a social
planner might want to avoid using a reserve price in the design of an auction format to
prevent this potential distortion.
On the upside, our ﬁndings suggest that simple microeconomic theory gives us a lot of mileage
in explaining market behavior in complex environments. We document that (the majority
of) sellers very ﬁnely adjust their behavior to demand patterns and try to strategically
exploit potential arbitrage possibilities. Moreover, we are able to show that the adoption of
heuristic pricing rules by the sellers does not aﬀect the expected revenue from an auction
dramatically, as long as the chosen reserve price lies below the optimal level and competition
among the bidders is suﬃciently intense.
Clearly, more research on the behavior of sellers under diﬀerent auction formats is needed to
improve our understanding of the determinants and eﬀects of reserve prices and to evaluate
the eﬃciency of diﬀerent market designs. Much of the existing evidence derives from ﬁeld
data or ﬁeld experiments. Hence, it might be worthwhile to conduct controlled laboratory
experiments with focus on the supply side of auction markets. They allow for a systematic
variation of the design features that might possibly drive the behavioral patterns observed
in the ﬁeld, while at the same time resolving many factors of uncertainty like the lack of
knowledge of the underlying valuation primitive. Alternatively, as a way of bridging the
gap between the lab and the ﬁeld, virtual economies like HT may also serve as platforms to
conduct controlled economic and social experiments. Although considerably more complex
than most laboratory experiments, and despite the missing monetary incentives, the ﬁndings
presented in this and other studies (see e.g. Trautmann and Traxler, 2009, Castronova, 2008,
and Nicklisch and Salz, 2008) suggest that they provide a market framework which adheres
to standard economic constraints while still providing a considerable degree of control.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.7: Determinants of Price Unconditional on Sale (Tobit)
Dep.Var.: price Coeﬀ. Std. Dev
days17 -1609.81∗∗∗ 64.72
days18 -138.30∗∗ 56.70
days19 -10.70 49.68
age18 -173269.62∗∗∗ 5834.23
age19 -196106.93∗∗∗ 5644.17
tsi 88.22∗∗∗ 4.75
acquired -13578.76∗∗∗ 3203.95
Intercept 79122.68∗∗∗ 16476.41
skills yes
character yes
daytime yes
weekday yes
LR Chi(28) 2587.09
N (1515 left-cens. at 0) 6258
Notes: The TOBIT procedure also includes failed auctions with a sales price
of zero (left-censored). Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks
denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
Table 3.8: Expected Revenues for Age-Group 18 (Cohorts 17-32)
I II III IV V VI VII
Coh. Obs. Π˜(r∗j ) Π˜(r
mean
j ) Π˜(r
med
j ) Π˜(0) Π˜(C50) Π˜(C100) Π˜(C150)
17 102 113,912 111,070 110,433 109,007 109,656 113,710 109,149
(-2.5%) (-3.1%) (-4.3%) (-3.7%) (-0.2%) (-4.2%)
18 125 94,990 92,663 91,217 89,365 90,691 94,950 85,867
(-2.5%) (-4.0%) (-5.9%) (-4.5%) (-0.0%) (-9.6%)
19 111 94,375 91,187 91,173 88,780 90,075 94,344 85,405
(-3.4%) (-3.4%) (-5.9%) (-4.6%) (-0.0%) (-9.5%)
20 116 88,289 84,047 84,025 82,346 84,025 88,089 77,669
(-4.8%) (-4.8%) (-6.7%) (-4.8%) (-0.2%) (-12.%)
21 119 94,140 89,874 89,841 88,517 89,841 94,101 85,025
(-4.5%) (-4.6%) (-6.0%) (-4.6%) (-0.0%) (-9.7%)
22 123 87,899 85,079 83,643 81,905 83,643 87,664 77,068
(-3.2%) (-4.8%) (-6.8%) (-4.8%) (-0.3%) (-12.%)
23 125 86,968 82,985 82,722 80,918 82,722 86,692 75,909
(-4.6%) (-4.9%) (-7.0%) (-4.9%) (-0.3%) (-12.%)
24 141 99,835 96,692 95,533 94,534 95,533 99,830 92,529
(-3.1%) (-4.3%) (-5.3%) (-4.3%) (-0.0%) (-7.3%)
25 115 85,880 81,979 81,645 79,771 81,645 85,559 74,592
(-4.5%) (-4.9%) (-7.1%) (-4.9%) (-0.4%) (-13.%)
26 117 89,884 86,234 85,611 84,001 85,611 89,722 79,524
(-4.1%) (-4.8%) (-6.5%) (-4.8%) (-0.2%) (-11.%)
27 104 81,142 77,587 76,950 74,838 76,950 80,653 69,175
(-4.4%) (-5.2%) (-7.8%) (-5.2%) (-0.6%) (-14.%)
28 105 82,464 78,741 78,280 76,126 78,280 81,944 70,390
(-4.5%) (-5.1%) (-7.7%) (-5.1%) (-0.6%) (-14.%)
29 124 86,198 83,066 82,254 80,191 81,944 85,954 75,314
(-3.6%) (-4.6%) (-7.0%) (-4.9%) (-0.3%) (-12.%)
30 136 81,068 76,603 76,890 74,710 76,890 80,529 68,930
(-5.5%) (-5.2%) (-7.8%) (-5.2%) (-0.7%) (-15.%)
31 139 82,104 78,925 77,932 75,719 77,932 81,539 69,886
(-3.9%) (-5.1%) (-7.8%) (-5.1%) (-0.7%) (-14.%)
32 131 74,430 70,400 70,180 67,772 70,336 73,587 61,488
(-5.4%) (-5.7%) (-8.9%) (-5.5%) (-1.1%) (-17.%)
Notes: Deviations from the maximum expected revenue are stated in parentheses.
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Table 3.9: Expected Revenues for Age-Group 19 (Cohorts 33-48)
I II III IV V VI
Coh. Obs. Π˜(r∗j ) Π˜(r
mean
j ) Π˜(r
med
j ) Π˜(0) Π˜(C50) Π˜(C100)
33 160 73,387 68,706 67,818 66,271 69,454 72,032
(-6.4%) (-7.6%) (-9.7%) (-5.4%) (-1.8%)
34 165 72,115 66,423 66,506 64,729 68,289 70,451
(-7.9%) (-7.8%) (-10.%) (-5.3%) (-2.3%)
35 151 64,982 59,187 58,430 56,885 61,477 62,535
(-8.9%) (-10.%) (-12.%) (-5.4%) (-3.8%)
36 144 69,869 64,070 64,167 62,360 66,096 68,065
(-8.3%) (-8.2%) (-10.%) (-5.4%) (-2.6%)
37 127 64,422 58,422 57,873 56,337 60,911 61,987
(-9.3%) (-10.%) (-12.%) (-5.4%) (-3.8%)
38 118 68,667 62,415 62,218 60,893 65,011 66,566
(-9.1%) (-9.4%) (-11.%) (-5.3%) (-3.1%)
39 138 71,575 65,288 65,836 64,306 67,702 70,045
(-8.8%) (-8.0%) (-10.%) (-5.4%) (-2.1%)
40 139 68,075 62,068 62,023 60,377 64,386 66,058
(-8.8%) (-8.9%) (-11.%) (-5.4%) (-3.0%)
41 175 73,928 68,342 68,208 66,746 70,021 72,498
(-7.6%) (-7.7%) (-9.7%) (-5.3%) (-1.9%)
42 152 66,852 61,839 60,371 58,983 63,240 64,647
(-7.5%) (-9.7%) (-11.%) (-5.4%) (-3.3%)
43 138 70,707 64,875 65,077 63,113 66,971 68,806
(-8.2%) (-8.0%) (-10.%) (-5.3%) (-2.7%)
44 165 64,965 59,139 58,816 56,673 61,554 62,321
(-9.0%) (-9.5%) (-12.%) (-5.3%) (-4.1%)
45 186 68,156 62,728 61,705 60,374 64,504 66,046
(-8.0%) (-9.5%) (-11.%) (-5.4%) (-3.1%)
46 169 64,349 57,849 57,868 56,480 60,736 62,144
(-10.%) (-10.%) (-12.%) (-5.6%) (-3.4%)
47 137 63,836 57,752 58,187 55,721 60,340 61,370
(-9.5%) (-8.9%) (-12.%) (-5.5%) (-3.9%)
48 171 68,474 62,479 62,021 60,688 64,823 66,360
(-8.8%) (-9.4%) (-11.%) (-5.3%) (-3.1%)
Notes: Deviations from the maximum expected revenue are stated in parentheses.
Figure 3.9: Distribution of Auction End-Times
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approximately similarly distributed as the number of simultaneously
logged-on users. During the early morning hours CET we observe
the lowest traﬃc with roughly 7,000 online users at its minimum,
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of the Number of Bids
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Notes: The graph depicts the distribution of the number of bids observed in the
sample of 17,510 Hattrick-auctions that was used in Chapter 2. This information
is employed as a proxy for the number of bidders in the estimation of the valuation
primitive.
Figure 3.11: Share of Expected Revenue Lost for Age-Groups 18 and 19
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Chapter 4
The Evaluation of Complex Goods - Evidence
From Online Car Sales
4.1 Introduction
Modern consumer goods are often complex in nature in the sense that they consist of a
multitude of characteristics that collectively account for their market value. With increasing
frequency people are challenged to evaluate goods like cars, mobile phones, or personal
computers on the basis of their various constituting attributes. For instance, the value
of a laptop depends on the processor speed, the capacity of the hard-drive, the graphics
engine, and a lot of other features, which all have to be individually accounted for as they
determine its overall quality. While economic theory suggests that a rational agent should
incorporate all relevant pieces of information into his considerations and exclude any that
are non-informative, in the past such an evaluation task was often made diﬃcult by the
lack of accessible sources to gather the necessary information. With the rise of the internet,
however, today a plethora of valuable information is often just a few clicks away. A large
number of online platforms specialized on speciﬁc complex goods, e.g. used cars, makes it
possible to easily cross-compare similar oﬀers for close substitute objects. Therefore, we are
especially interested in the behavior of individuals when they have to perform this task: Do
people eﬃciently identify and incorporate all of the pertinent elements, or are some valuable
pieces of information not reﬂected in their individual evaluation of the good?
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Based on detailed ﬁeld data on used car oﬀers from mobile.de, one of Europe’s largest online
vehicle marketplaces, we address this question empirically. We conduct a hedonic regression
analysis to identify which of the cars’ features signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the stated sales prices
and if their impact stands in accordance to the relation we would rationally expect. For
instance, since the odometer reading conveys an imperfect signal for the abrasion of engine
and chassis components, the mileage should be negatively correlated with a car’s value,
while the existence of extras, e.g. a sun-roof or an automatic gearbox should have a positive
impact on the sales price. By this approach, we are able to examine the extent to which
individual evaluations of used cars eﬃciently reﬂect all relevant and openly accessible pieces
of information.
Despite the fact that many eﬀects are consistent with our predictions, our data shows that
people are systematically inattentive to a crucial piece of valuable information, even if it is
readily provided. In particular, though both the precise month and year of ﬁrst registration
(FR) are publicly and prominently stated for each car, we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences
of sizeable magnitude for the impact of a marginal month on the sales price depending
on whether a car was registered in the previous or in the same year. All else equal, the
price diﬀerential between two cars, where one was ﬁrst registered in January and the other
in December of the previous year, is dramatically larger than that between two cars ﬁrst
registered in any two subsequent months of the same year, respectively. Stated diﬀerently,
we ﬁnd an ampliﬁed adjustment in the prices for otherwise identical cars to be located across
diﬀerent registration years, or “vintages”, where the impact of a marginal month of age is
up to four times larger relative to that within the same vintage. As a consequence, the
observed price pattern evolves non-continuously and exhibits distinct discontinuities where
the registration year changes. Our intuition is that individuals over-react to the ﬁgure
displayed in the registration year, i.e. the “vintage”, while they are inattentive to the ﬁner
information as conveyed through the month of ﬁrst registration. In other words, a car
systematically loses in value simply for the fact that it displays a diﬀerent digit in the count
of its registration year compared to another that is factually just one month younger. This
result remains robust across all four diﬀerent makes and models we analyze and also across
various speciﬁcations and additional controls.
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Our ﬁndings strongly complement the results of Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2009b), as
presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Similarly to the approach taken in this paper,
there we examine to what extent individual bidding behavior reﬂects valuable information
that is readily provided by analyzing auction prices paid for virtual football players in the
online game Hattrick (HT ). Importantly, these players closely resemble complex goods as
they are completely described by a multi-dimensional vector of attributes that collectively
determine their value. While the underlying game algorithm strongly suggests a continuous
relation between the age of a player and his value, akin to the eﬀect of the registration year
on the price of a used car, we ﬁnd evidence for a large systematic drop in sales prices just on a
player’s birthday, a phenomenon which we therefore label the “birthday eﬀect”. Intuitively,
this indicates that buyers in HT give too much weight to the age of a player measured in
years as opposed to his age measured in days, though the latter is also plainly visible to all
buyers free of cost.
Although the market environment in the game provides considerable incentives for the users
when engaging on the transfer market, all transactions in HT are carried out in terms of
virtual money. In this study, we therefore test for the external validity of the “birthday
eﬀect” documented in the virtual HT -economy by analyzing to what extent information is
eﬃciently used in a market that involves large real monetary stakes on part of the trading
parties, i.e. the purchase and sale of used cars.
Other than HT, our present sample of used cars does not originate from an auction market,
and the economic environment of mobile.de is considerably less controlled than the highly
structured transfer market of HT. In addition, rather than on actual sales prices, our analysis
is based on the asking prices stated by the individual sellers, which may be subject to
negotiation once an interested buyer has been found. However, we have strong reasons to
believe that the posted price is a sensible proxy for the ﬁnal price in this market. First,
mobile.de oﬀers the seller an option to declare the stated price either as “ﬁxed” or as
“negotiable”, and a substantial fraction of the sellers opts for the former rather than the
latter. Second, with several thousand oﬀers for each model series the market for used cars
is highly competitive. Moreover, the cars within each of our subsamples can be regarded as
close substitutes. Under the presumption, that the stated sales price reﬂects the willingness
to accept of the respective seller, according to Hanemann (1991) and Shogren et al. (1994)
The Evaluation of Complex Goods 99
in such an environment an endowment eﬀect, i.e. a divergence of willingness to pay and
willingness to accept, is unlikely to persist.1 Hence, it stands to reason that the stated
prices are considerably close to the ﬁnal prices. Finally, since advertising a car is costly, it
seems plausible that the sellers exert considerable eﬀort to elicit a reasonable price, at which
prospective buyers are indeed willing to buy.2 For simplicity, in the following we use the
term “price” to refer to the stated prices in our data.
Under these premises, the basic situation on mobile.de is comparable to that of the buyers
in HT : People are presented with many details of a complex good and have to form their
valuation for it. Moreover, the virtual players in the game closely resemble the used cars in
our present data in several respects. First, both are traded in large numbers on specialized
internet market platforms. Second, they constitute complex goods that can be decomposed
into their constituent characteristics, for each of which we can obtain estimates of the
contributory value using a hedonic regression approach. Third, in both cases we are able
to create subsamples of close substitutes by focusing on a particular model series or player
type, respectively. Fourth, similar to the registration date of used cars, the age of a virtual
player is displayed through two dimensions, the year and days of age. Finally, and most
importantly, analogously to the virtual players, ceteris paribus a car can be rationally
expected to depreciate continuously in value as its age increases.
But there is also an important diﬀerence: Buying a car constitutes a major purchase for
most households and thus should be subject to profound pricing considerations. Yet, similar
to the buyers in HT, we ﬁnd that people systematically underrate the information on the
precise age, i.e. the month of ﬁrst registration, though explicitly provided. Thus, given
the large monetary stakes involved, the fact that we observe congeneric discontinuities in
the price pattern for used cars not only substantiates the external validity of the “birthday
eﬀect”, but also shows that such an evaluation bias can have real economic consequences.
Inattentiveness and limited attention have also been documented for other purchase decisions
in other markets. For instance, Lee and Malmendier (2007) analyze individual bidding
behavior in auctions on eBay and ﬁnd that people tend to anchor on an irrelevant outside
1Moreover, the services of mobile.de are widely used by professional car dealers who purchase cars for
resale rather than use, where according to Kahneman et al. (1991) the endowment eﬀect does not apply. As
it turns out, the majority of oﬀers in our sample is indeed made by commercial rather than private sellers.
2In line with this argument, in Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2009a) (see Chapter 3) we document that the
sellers’ reserve prices in HT -auctions are similarly determined as the sales prices, i.e. from an evaluation of
the individual attributes. Our intuition is that the same also applies to a non-auction context.
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retail price for a board game, if the seller chose to state that price in the description of the
product details. At the same time, many of the winning bids exceed a more relevant outside
option, the so called “buy-it-now” price, which is an ex-ante ﬁxed strike price set by the seller
as an alternative to the auction process. Analyzing stock market data, Gilbert et al. (2008)
provide evidence that investors with limited attention have an incentive to focus on summary
statistics rather than individual pieces of information. They analyze the market response to
the U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI), a macroeconomic release that is purely a summary
statistic, and show that the LEI announcement has an impact on aggregate stock returns,
return volatility, and trading volume. We add to these ﬁndings by demonstrating that
inattentiveness eﬀects pertain for complex goods and large stake purchase decisions, even
though the concerned piece of information is provided at arm’s length within the relevant
market environment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the structure of
the data and the relevant details of the sample selection. Section 4.3 presents the details of
our empirical estimation and the results from the hedonic regression analysis. In addition,
we provide a series of robustness checks of our ﬁndings and brieﬂy discuss the results from an
alternative estimation aproach. Section 4.4 concludes and an Appendix collects additional
Tables and Figures.
4.2 Data Description
4.2.1 Institutional Background
For the purpose of this study, we collected detailed information on more than 80,000 cars
oﬀered during July and August 2009 on the online vehicle market platform mobile.de.
Founded in 1996, mobile.de takes the role of an intermediator between supply and demand
within a two-sided market. The company itself is not involved at any stage in the purchase
or sale of a vehicle and a successful sale does not invoke any ﬁnal value fees to mobile.de. It
provides both a platform for sellers to place advertisements for new and used cars at a small
cost and a free comprehensive search tool for prospective buyers to screen among the mass
of on average about 1.3 million oﬀers. According to the company’s own statement, prospec-
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tive buyers “can limit search results by setting individual preferences and like this obtain
customized oﬀers with just a few clicks”, providing them “[...]with an overview of the market
and information about prices”.3 Hence, the same is true for a seller who wants to evaluate
his car before placing a sales advertisement.
Figure 4.1: mobile.de - Start Page with Simple Search Form
(Source: http://www.mobile.de)
Figure 4.1 shows the interface a user is presented with upon entering mobile.de’s website. It
displays a simple search form, which among other things allows to ﬁlter for makes, models,
and a number of other basic details. A detailed search form, which can be directly reached
by clicking the link to the lower left, provides a large additional set of ﬁlter options. Note
however, that the drop down selector for the date of ﬁrst registration only allows to ﬁlter for
the vintage, i.e. the FR-year. Neither in the simple nor the expanded form it is possible to
adjust the search inquiry for the precise month of the ﬁrst registration (FR).
Figure 4.2: mobile.de - Search Results
(Source: http://www.mobile.de)
3Source: http://cms.mobile.de/en/company/portrait mobile.html
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The search returns a list of all vehicles matching the chosen ﬁlters. Per default they are
sorted by price, where an abstract of their main features is displayed as shown in Figure 4.2.
This preview explicitly states the precise date of ﬁrst registration (e.g. “FR 01/2000”) and
additionally provides valuable information on the price, mileage, color, and power of the car,
to name only a few. It is also possible to remember a speciﬁc car for later access (“Park
vehicle”), which allows the user to directly compare the latter to other remembered cars.
A typical proﬁle page of an oﬀered car, which is accessed from the search results list by
clicking on the model name at the top of the respective entry, is depicted in Figure 4.3.
So far, the described environment is virtually identical to the one analyzed in Englmaier
and Schmo¨ller (2009b). Unlike in HT, however, the process of buying is not carried out on
mobile.de directly, but rather a prospective buyer is merely provided with the contact details
of the respective seller. Moreover, the product descriptions are composed by the individual
sellers and not fully standardized as in HT ’s transfer market.
Figure 4.3: mobile.de - Vehicle Proﬁle
(Source: http://www.mobile.de)
For each car, a seller has to specify a preselected set of features and attributes, where
most of the respective values are chosen from a drop down menu during the preparation
of the advertisement. Conveniently, this data is thus standardized and ensures a suﬃcient
degree of comparability across individual observations. Naturally, we therefore focus on
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these standard attributes in our data, which in addition to the stated price and the date of
FR include various extras and also some information on the sellers (see Table 4.2).4
Having described the environment our data stems from, we next turn to a detailed discussion
of our sample selection criteria.
4.2.2 Sample selection
Our data includes details on the most widespread car models from four leading German
makes, all ranked among the top seven of Germany’s vehicle population according to the
Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA).5 More speciﬁcally, we collected information on 29,097 Volk-
swagen (VW) Golf (KBA-rank 1), 14,693 Opel Astra (KBA-rank 2), 25,582 BMW 3 (KBA-
rank 4), and 17,901 Audi A4 (KBA-rank 7), all advertised as accident-free and with their
FR-dates between 01/2000 and 12/2008.6 We focus on this subsample for two main reasons.
First, a high stock is a good indicator for a considerable volume of used car oﬀers for a speciﬁc
model, which ensures a suﬃciently large number of observations. Second, we consider models
from diﬀerent makes to achieve a broad diversiﬁcation within our identiﬁcation strategy.7
Since the introduction of a new series within a particular car model aﬀects the sales prices
substantially, we can only retrieve meaningful estimates of the inﬂuential attributes if we
accurately control for potential model revisions. Clearly, this requires detailed knowledge
of the exact dates of the respective market launches. Conveniently, for the four diﬀerent
models considered in our sample, this information is readily available. In particular, we
identify the respective estimation windows for each model according to the information
provided through the manufacturers’ websites, the Schwacke-List (http://schwacke.de), and
4Any additional information provided by a seller takes a free text form, which would require us to
manually convert these into a standardized format to be able to employ them for the analysis. However, the
set of features included within our sample is already quite comprehensive and suﬃces to explain much of the
variation observed in the stated prices.
5Source: http://www.kba.de.
6KBA-ranks not reported were taken by other models of VW (Passat, Polo) and Opel (Corsa).
7We do not consider cars that were ﬁrst registered before January 2000, since their values are very low.
Moreover, we thereby avoid a potential “left-digit” eﬀect with respect to the registration year: It has been
documented that some individuals tend to process numerical information in a way that the ﬁrst digits are
treated as more valuable information, i.e. are perceived to contain more signiﬁcant information than later
digits (see e.g. Brenner and Brenner, 1982; Bhattacharya et al., 2008).
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the Deutsche Automobil Treuhand (http://www.dat.de).8 Since all models in consideration
experienced at least one upgrade or change of series between 2000 and 2008, we deﬁne the
estimation periods accordingly and are thus able to conduct our analysis for eight diﬀerent
subsamples, as shown in Table 4.1.9
Table 4.1: Models Series and Estimation Periods
Make & Model Name of Series Production period Estimation period
VW Golf IV 10/1997 ∼ 09/2003 01/2000 - 09/2003
V 10/2003 ∼ 07/2008 01/2004 - 06/2008
BMW 3 E46 04/1998 - 11/2004 01/2000 - 11/2004
E90 (limousine) 12/2004 - 09/2008∗ 09/2005 - 08/2008
(estate) 06/2005 - 09/2008∗
Audi A4 B6 (limousine) 10/2000 - 11/2004 10/2001 - 10/2004
(estate) 09/2001 - 11/2004
B7 (limousine) 11/2004 - 11/2007 04/2005 - 09/2007
(estate) 11/2004 - 03/2008
Opel Astra G 02/1998 - 01/2004 01/2000 - 12/2003
H 02/2004 - 10/2007∗ 05/2004 - 10/2007
Notes: Entries with an asterisk indicate an upgrade of the current production series. If there were diﬀerent
introduction dates within a model series, we use the later date to determine the estimation period.
After each change of series, we include a short transition period before the respective
estimation window, to ensure that the cars within each subsample belong to the same series
of a model, i.e. can plausibly be perceived as close substitutes. Naturally, due to diﬀerent
variants oﬀered within a model series, e.g. limousine, estate car, or compact car, the latter are
no perfect substitutes. To account for such within-series variation, we distinguish between
ﬁve- and three door versions, add a large set of main attributes as controls, and exclude
convertibles from the sample. In this way, we capture a substantial share of the variation
in the price within a series and are thus able to obtain precise estimates of the inﬂuential
factors.
Since a complete description of all eight subsamples would go beyond the scope of the paper,
throughout the following we representatively focus on the samples of VW Golf series IV and
V, and provide the corresponding details for the other three models in Appendix 4.5. In all
cases, the analysis yields very similar and qualitatively robust results.
8The latter are commercial service providers who oﬀer benchmark evaluations for all kind of cars at a
small cost. In fact, they allow to account for the precise date of ﬁrst registration in an individual evaluation
of a car, which makes the discontinuities we are able to document in our data even more puzzling.
9Depending on their extent, these upgrades, or “face-lifts”, can invoke similar price eﬀects as a change
of series. If available, in the estimation we therefore treat the information on a face-lift similar to the
introduction of a new production line.
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4.2.3 Data description
In general, the value of an individual car from a speciﬁc model series depends on numerous
factors. Among others, this includes its age, its odometer reading, the power and fuel-type of
its engine, and the diﬀerent extras it is equipped with, e.g. an automatic gearbox, a sun-roof,
a seat-heating, or a cruise control. Along with the stated prices and the month and year of
ﬁrst registration, we therefore collected a large number of features for each of the cars to
control directly for quality diﬀerences. To measure their impact on the price of the car, we
assign a dummy variable to each of the observed extras in our analysis. For instance, if a
oﬀered car has a sun-roof, the dummy sun roof takes value 1 and 0 otherwise.10 Similarly,
we also add a dummy for both the door-count and the fuel type.11 Table 4.2 provides an
overview of the collected details and shows the corresponding summary statistics for the
samples of VW Golf series IV and V, respectively.12
Naturally, the restriction to the estimation windows as described above implies that 6,807
of the overall observations in the subgroup of VW Golf are not considered for the analysis,
reducing the sample size to 22,290. In addition, we drop all entries with missing-values for
one or more of the considered variables and correct for outliers with respect to mileage and
price.13 This leaves us with a ﬁnal sample of 6,034 and 15,247 observations in series IV and
V, respectively, or 95% of the initial data points within the relevant estimation periods.
The information on the month and year of the ﬁrst registration is stored in the variables
fr month ∈ [1, 12] and fr year ∈ [2000, 2008], respectively. For our empirical analysis, we
combine the latter to construct the measure totalage ∈ [1, 108], which displays the precise
age of a car in units of months:
totalage ≡ 12 · (2008− fr year) + (13− fr month),
where the normalization is such that a car’s age is measured relative to the most recent
FR-date included within our dataset, i.e. 12/2008, which corresponds to the minimum age
of 1 month. Analogously, for cars with an FR-date of 01/2000, i.e. the oldest cars in our
sample, totalage takes its maximum at 108 months.
10In the following, we use italics to denote the variable name in our data corresponding to an attribute.
11For air conditioning, airbags, and electric window lifters we ﬁnd almost no variation in the data. Since
by now these features are included in the basic conﬁguration of most cars, we omit them from the analysis.
12The corresponding tables for BMW 3, Audi A4 and Opel Astra are provided in Appendix 4.5.
13Outliers are classiﬁed as values above the respective 99th-percentile in each series. None of the results
depends on their omission.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - VW Golf
Panel A. Series IV Panel B. Series V
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 09/2003) (Est. Period: 01/2004 - 06/2008)
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max
price [EUR] 6,034 6,711 2,499 17,990 15,247 13,605 4,900 27,979
mileage [km] 6,034 115,978 2,000 225,500 15,247 55,343 1,000 221321
power [kW] 6,034 73 50 213 15,247 81 50 243
fr year 6,034 2001 2000 2003 15,247 2006 2004 2008
fr month 6,034 6 1 12 15,247 6 1 12
totalage [months]a 6,034 87 64 108 15,247 30 7 60
Dummiesb Value Frequency Percent Cum. Value Frequency Percent Cum.
diesel 0 3,771 62.5 62.5 0 5,998 39.3 39.3
(0 = petrol, 1 = diesel) 1 2,263 37.5 100.0 1 9,249 60.7 100.0
ﬁve-door 0 1,656 27.4 27.4 0 2,921 19.2 19.2
(0 = three, 1 = ﬁve) 1 4,378 72.6 100.0 1 12,326 80.8 100.0
auto gearbox 0 5,509 91.3 91.3 0 13,364 87.7 87.7
(0 = manu., 1 = auto) 1 525 8.7 100.0 1 1,883 12.4 100.0
cruise control 0 5,222 86.5 86.5 0 7,895 51.8 51.8
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 812 13.5 100.0 1 7,352 48.2 100.0
seat heating 0 4,554 75.5 75.5 0 7,712 50.6 50.6
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 1,480 24.5 100.0 1 7,535 49.4 100.0
all-wheel drive 0 5,879 97.4 97.4 0 7,712 50.6 50.6
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 155 2.6 100.0 1 7,535 49.4 100.0
sun roof 0 5,106 84.6 84.6 0 13,634 89.4 89.4
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 928 15.4 100.0 1 1,613 10.6 100.0
leathertrim 0 5,817 96.4 96.4 0 14,560 95.5 95.5
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 217 3.6 100.0 1 687 4.5 100.0
metallic paint 0 1,589 26.3 26.3 0 3,258 21.4 21.4
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 4,445 73.7 100.0 1 11,989 78.6 100.0
private seller 0 4,419 73.2 73.2 0 13,821 90.7 90.7
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 1,615 26.8 100.0 1 1,426 9.4 100.0
a totalage ≡ 12·(2008-fr year)+(13-fr month) displays the age of a car in units of months and is normalized such that the
minimum 1 =̂ 12/2008 and the maximum 108 =̂ 01/2000. For instance, the estimation period for VW Golf IV, i.e. 01/2000
to 09/2003, equals totalage ∈ [64, 108]. b Color dummies are not displayed to save on space.
Returning to Table 4.2, observe that the average series IV (V) Golf has an age of 87 (30)
months, exhibits an odometer reading of 115,978 km (55,343 km) and is oﬀered at a price
of e 6,711 (e 13,605), as shown in Panel A (B). In both series, most of the cars have ﬁve
doors, a manual gearbox, and a metallic paint. However, the frequency of diesel cars, seat
heatings, all-wheel drives, and cruise controls is considerably higher for the newer series V
than for series IV. Also note that a large majority of oﬀers originates from professional car
dealers, as indicated by the dummy private seller being equal to zero.
As we would expect, a correlation analysis for price yields a strong negative correlation
coeﬃcient with totalage (ρ = −0.85) and with mileage (ρ = −0.78). Conversely, power
(ρ = 0.45), diesel (ρ = 0.11), ﬁve-door (ρ = 0.16), and all of the considered extras are
signiﬁcantly positively related to the price of a car.14
14Among the explanatory variables, we ﬁnd that totalage and mileage co-move at a degree of ρ = 0.77.
While in general collinearity among the explanatory variables can be problematic, our sample size is
suﬃciently large to produce precise parameter estimates.
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While not listed in Table 4.2, another important determinant for the price of a car is its
color. We therefore additionally include a set of color-dummies to control for their impact
on price, where the eﬀects are measured relative to black. We ﬁnd that the prices are indeed
somewhat responsive to diﬀerent colors. For the sake of clarity, however, in the discussion
below the respective coeﬃcients for the color-dummies are not reported, but are available
from the authors upon request.
Figure 4.4: Distributions of Price and Age - VW Golf
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(a) Price Distribution - Series IV
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(b) Price Distribution - Series V
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(c) Age Distribution - Series IV
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(d) Age Distribution - Series V
Next, consider the distribution of price and age of the cars, which are depicted in Figure
4.4. For series IV, the prices are approximately normally distributed around the mean at
e 6,711 (Figure 4.4a). Likewise, the price pattern for series V concentrates around e 13,605,
though slightly more dispersed than the latter (Figure 4.4b). Regarding age, we ﬁnd a
very balanced distribution for series IV (Figure 4.4c), indicating that our sample contains
a suﬃcient number of observations for each FR-date in the estimation period. The same
applies for series V (Figure 4.4d), although the number of oﬀers ﬂuctuates considerably more
across registration dates. The highest frequency of oﬀers is observed for relatively new cars,
i.e. around an age of 7 to 15 months relative to 12/2008, which is not surprising given the
high number of professional car dealers that is active in this market segment (see Table 4.2).
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Figure 4.5: Relation Between Price and Age - VW Golf
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(a) Series IV
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(b) Series V
A graphical inspection of the relation between price and total age of the cars in Figure 4.5
yields a ﬁrst indication that information on the month of ﬁrst registration may not be
suﬃciently utilized. First, consider the graph for series IV (Figure 4.5a): Although the
linear ﬁts imply that prices decline in age, just as we would expect, surprisingly much of this
adjustment takes place across rather than within the vintages, as indicated by remarkable
drops where the FR-year changes. For instance, for almost all ﬁrst registration dates within
the years 2002 and 2001 the respective median price level remains approximately constant,
but between the years the median price slumps considerably downward. Stated diﬀerently,
despite a car ﬁrst registered in 12/2001 factually is almost a full year older than a car ﬁrst
registered in 01/2001, the median price does not change considerably during this period. In
contrast to that, there is a pronounced price diﬀerential between 01/2001 and 12/2000 though
ceteris paribus these cars merely diﬀer by one marginal month of age. Similar discontinuities
arise between the years 2003 and 2002, and also between 2002 and 2001. Likewise, also the
price pattern for series V shown in Figure 4.5b exhibits distinct discontinuities at 12/2004,
12/2005. To a lesser extent, the same applies to 12/2006 and 12/2007, even though the
precise age obviously has an increased impact on the prices of younger cars, as indicated
by the steeper slopes of the linear ﬁts within these vintages. Moreover, also for all series of
the other models in our data we ﬁnd qualitatively similar patterns (see Figures 4.8 - 4.10 in
Appendix 4.5). Importantly, however, there is no evident rationale why a car from the same
series should lose in value just because it displays a diﬀerent ﬁgure in its registration year.
However, all analyzed price patterns suggest that this is what actually happens.
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4.3 Empirical Analysis
A crucial feature of complex, or composite goods like the used cars in our sample is that
they can theoretically be decomposed into their constituent characteristics. Using a hedonic
regression model, we are thus able to obtain estimates for the contributory value of each
individual feature of a car, which in combination describe its overall quality and account for
its aggregate value, or price. In light of the ﬁndings inferred from a mere inspection of the
data, particularly the identiﬁcation of the relation between the price and the age of the used
cars is at the core of our interest. Before we present the results of the hedonic regression
analysis, we brieﬂy discuss the structural model our estimations are based upon. In a further
step we control for potential pitfalls in our data, discuss an alternative speciﬁcation, and
test for the validity of our ﬁndings with respect to the models of other makes in our dataset.
4.3.1 Estimation Model and Predictions
Since our main interest is to identify to what extent the observed prices fully reﬂect the
information provided on the age of a car, i.e. the precise date of its ﬁrst registration, we
need to separate the eﬀects of the month and the year of age in the estimation. In doing
so, we need to account for the fact that the patterns illustrated in Figure 4.5 indicate that
the value adjustment due to a change in the FR-year is not constant across diﬀerent years.
In particular, we decompose the variable fr year into dummies for each vintage, which thus
capture the eﬀect of an individual registration year on price if included as regressors. For
example, the eﬀect of vintage 2002 is measured by year2002, which takes value 1 if the ﬁrst
registration occurred during year 2002, and 0 otherwise. Since the estimation window for Golf
series IV (V) comprehends cars from four (ﬁve) subsequent years, this corresponds to four
(ﬁve) vintage-dummies, which by design are perfectly correlated. Thus, is suﬃces to include
only three (four) of them in the regression on price. As we drop year2003 (year2008 ) from
the regression for series IV (V), the resulting coeﬃcients for the included vintage-dummies
are to be interpreted as the total price diﬀerential relative to the youngest cars in the relevant
reference years, i.e. those registered in 12/2003 (12/2008).
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As also implied by Figure 4.5, the slope of the price pattern - i.e. the impact of a marginal
month - remains roughly constant within a vintage, but varies across vintages. Including
the measure totalage in the estimation model is therefore not suﬃcient to produce precise
estimates for the eﬀect of a marginal month on price. Instead, we take a diﬀerent tack. First,
we deﬁne the variable
month ≡ 13− fr month,
which reﬂects the age of a car in units of months within a particular vintage.15 For instance,
if a car was ﬁrst registered in December (January), i.e. fr month = 12 (fr month = 1),
we have that month = 1 (month = 12), which captures that these are the cars with the
youngest (oldest) age in the respective vintage. Second, to account for the variation in the
slopes across vintages, we interact this variable with each of the year dummies, and enter
the resulting interaction terms into the regression on price. Thereby, we are able to estimate
the impact of a marginal month separately for each vintage. For instance, the eﬀect of one
additional month of age in year 2002 is reﬂected through the coeﬃcient of
month2002 ≡ month× year2002,
where month2002 ∈ [1, 12] for year2002 = 1, and 0 otherwise. For all other years, the
interaction terms are deﬁned and labeled accordingly. Formally, this speciﬁcation corre-
sponds to the assumption of a piecewise linear relationship between price and the precise
age, which seems legitimate given the devolution of the price paths depicted above.16 All
other regressors are assumed to enter linearly into the regression model, which for the sample
of Golf series IV is thus given by
price = α + βm2000 ·month2000 + ... + βm2003 ·month2003
+ βy2000 · year2000 + βy2001 · year2001 + βy2002 · year2002
+ βmileage ·mileage + βpower · power + βX+ u,
where X includes all quality controls and u is an error term. The model for series V is
analogously deﬁned, only that the vintage-dummies and interaction terms are adjusted to
the respective estimation period.
15Note that this deﬁnition is equivalent to the second term on the RHS in the deﬁnition of totalage.
16Moreover, note that this speciﬁcation is essentially equivalent to the one employed in Englmaier and
Schmo¨ller (2009b) to identify the “birthday eﬀect” in the data of virtual football players. Since the main
purpose of this paper is to test for the external validity of this eﬀect, this resemblance is highly convenient.
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This approach allows us to analyze the price pattern for potential discontinuities due to a
change of the registration year, which reversely would imply that the information on the
precise age - i.e. the month of ﬁrst registration - is not eﬃciently utilized. Thereby, the
underlying rationale is that each regression returns two alternative measures for the price
diﬀerential between two vintages, because we separately account for the impact of years and
months. First, from the coeﬃcients for the vintage-dummies we are able to calculate the total
diﬀerence in the values between two subsequent FR-years. In the estimation for series IV, for
instance, the coeﬃcient βy2002 reﬂects the price diﬀerential between a car registered in
12/2002 relative one registered in to 12/2003. Second, holding the vintage (and all other
variables) constant the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms provide us with an estimate of
the impact of a marginal month of age within a particular year, e.g. βm2003 for 2003.
Clearly, if the prices of used cars decline continuously in their precise age in months, the
value loss per year should be fully captured through the aggregated monthly eﬀects within
this timespan. Hence, any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two measures identiﬁes an
additional value adjustment, i.e. a discontinuous drop in the price pattern, which can be
attributed to the mere change of display in the FR-year. However, factually the quality of a
car is completely unaﬀected by this event. More precisely, once we account for the impact
of the ﬁner information on the age of used cars in units of months by way of the interaction
terms with month, the noisier information conveyed through the variable fr year, i.e. the
registration year, should be redundant and have no further impact on price. Translated to the
estimation model, this is the case if and only if the coeﬃcients on the vintage-dummies solely
reﬂect the steady month-by-month decline of the price a car experiences during the course of
a year. Returning to the above example, we would rationally expect that 12 ·βm2003 = βy2002.
Formally, this implies the testable predictions regarding the relation between the coeﬃcients
of the vintage-dummies and those of the interaction terms as stated in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 If the market value of used VW Golf cars declines continuously in their
precise age in months, the value loss per year is fully captured through the aggregated marginal
month-eﬀects within this timespan. In the model framework, this is the case if and only if
βy(t−1) − βy(t) = 12 · βm(t),
where t ∈ [2000, 2003] for series IV, and t ∈ [2004, 2008] for series V.
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Since we measure the impact of the registration years relative to 2003 and 2008 for series
IV and V, respectively, this immediately implies that βy2003 = βy2008 = 0. A graphical
illustration of the estimation model is depicted in Figure 4.6, where we representatively
focus on series IV. It shows how the prices should evolve under the above assumption of a
piecewise linear relationship between price and age, and given that Hypothesis 1 holds.
Figure 4.6: Structural Model and its Predictions


Total age in months (relative to 12/2008)
Price
2003
72
2002
84
2001 2000
96

βy2002

ﬀ βm2003
1

βy2001

ﬀ βm2002
1

βy2000  ﬀ βm20011
4.3.2 Hedonic Regression Results
To test the validity of the predictions from Hypothesis 1, we start out with hedonic OLS
regressions on price, where in addition to the age variables we include the full set of controls
available in our data. The results from this approach are presented in Table 4.3 for VW Golf
series IV and V, respectively.
As indicated by the values of R2 and the F -statistics, in both regressions the underlying
estimation model predicts a substantial share of the variability in the data. Intuitively, this
reﬂects that much of the observed price dispersion can be attributed to variations in the set
of included regressors, yielding a considerable degree of explanatory power. This intuition is
further substantiated in Figure 4.7, which plots the predictions from the estimation model
against the actual prices observed in the data, indicating a considerable goodness of ﬁt.
Returning to Table 4.3, Panel A states the resulting coeﬃcients and standard errors for
the 6,034 observations in the subgroup of series IV Golfs. First, consider the set of control
variables. Consistent with the predictions from the above correlation analysis, with exception
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Price - VW Golf (OLS)
Panel A. Series IV Panel B. Series V
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 09/2003) (Est. Period: 01/2004 - 06/2008)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
month2000 -25.93∗∗∗ (6.71) month2004 -15.42∗∗ (7.09)
month2001 -20.13∗∗∗ (7.12) month2005 -5.09 (6.87)
month2002 -20.14∗∗∗ (7.53) month2006 -43.11∗∗∗ (8.23)
month2003 -54.80∗∗∗ (15.43) month2007 -109.29∗∗∗ (9.27)
month2008 -119.73∗∗∗ (19.74)
year2000 -1,734.41∗∗∗ (141.40) year2004 -4,770.43∗∗∗ (194.00)
year2001 -1,326.71∗∗∗ (142.90) year2005 -4,312.65∗∗∗ (194.66)
year2002 -816.96∗∗∗ (142.91) year2006 -3,357.15∗∗∗ (197.47)
year2007 -1,645.13∗∗∗ (193.46)
mileage -0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) mileage -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00)
power 37.02∗∗∗ (1.39) power 68.29∗∗∗ (0.78)
diesel 547.03∗∗∗ (35.14) diesel 913.03∗∗∗ (29.02)
ﬁve door 290.88∗∗∗ (30.20) ﬁve-door 279.69∗∗∗ (31.09)
auto gearbox -39.81 (56.47) auto gearbox 748.67∗∗∗ (45.40)
cruise control 291.58∗∗∗ (50.60) cruise control 148.84∗∗∗ (29.02)
seat heating 144.21∗∗∗ (33.92) seat heating 302.75∗∗∗ (28.40)
all wheel drive 389.62∗∗∗ (140.83) all-wheel-drive 882.82∗∗∗ (134.54)
sun roof 17.28 (39.84) sun roof 771.33∗∗∗ (49.71)
leathertrim 830.26∗∗∗ (133.93) leathertrim 1,504.34∗∗∗ (87.46)
metallic paint 68.58∗∗ (34.49) metallic paint 47.50 (34.99)
private seller -220.73∗∗∗ (30.87) private seller -365.69∗∗∗ (45.68)
Intercept 7,402.98∗∗∗ (157.19) Intercept 12,483.68∗∗∗ (201.58)
Color dummies  Color dummies 
R2 0.66 R2 0.84
N 6,034 N 15,247
F(25;6,008) 385.59 F(27;15,219) 2,483.39
Notes: Dependent variable is price. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*)
level. The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted relative to the reference years 2003 (Panel A)
and 2008 (Panel B), respectively. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses.
of auto-gearbox and sun-roof, all considered features have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on
the price of a used car, indicating that the sellers take these factors into account when they
choose their price. For instance, a marginal kilometer on the odometer reduces the price of
a series IV Golf on average by an amount of e 0.02. Conversely, as indicated by a positive
sign of the respective coeﬃcients, all else equal the average price of a car increases with the
horsepower of the engine, if it runs on diesel rather than petrol, and if it has ﬁve instead
of three doors, all signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. Similarly, additional extras like a
seat-heating or a leather interior are also signiﬁcantly positively related to the price level.
The results for series V Golfs in Panel B are qualitatively similar.
Second, in both panels also the coeﬃcients for the vintage-dummies are of large magnitude
and signiﬁcant at the highest level, indicating that there is indeed a declining relationship
between the age of an used VW Golf and its price. For example, all else equal, the fact that
βy2002 is negative in Panel A indicates that the price for a car from series IV registered in
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Figure 4.7: Model Fit - Predicted vs. Observed Prices
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12/2002 is on average by e 817 lower compared to one that was registered in 12/2003. As
pointed out above, if price declines continuously in age, this signiﬁcant reduction will solely
reﬂect the aggregated eﬀects of the value loss per month during the year 2003. In line with
this argument, observe that the coeﬃcient for month2003, i.e. βm2003, has a negative sign
and is statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that a marginal month does have an impact on the
price. The same applies for all other years in the estimation period for series IV.
However, a test of the theoretical predictions reveals surprising results. Aggregated over the
whole period of 2003, the price reduction due to the month-per-month decline only amounts
to −e 660 = 12 · βm2003, or 80.7% of the total price diﬀerential of −e 817 between 2003 and
2002, as implied by the coeﬃcient βy2002. Irrespective of the steady decline per month, due to
the change in the FR-year a car from 2002 thus on average looses some additional 19.3%, or
e 157, in value. A Wald-Test conﬁrms that this drop in the price is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10%-level (p-value: 0.0696). In relation to the measured impact of one marginal month
in 2003, i.e. βm2003 = −e 55, and counterfactual to a fully continuous decline, the price
pattern exhibits a substantial discontinuity at this point. Similarly, the total price diﬀerential
between the years 2002 and 2001 is given by βy2001 − βy2002 = −e 510, while the steady
month-by-month decline during 2002 only amounts to −e 240 = 12 · βm2002, or 47.1% of the
former. The remaining 52.9% (−e 270) establish another discontinuity between 01/2002 and
12/2001, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the highest level (p-value: 0.0003). Finally, since
the month-by-month reduction in price during 2001, i.e. 12 ·βm2001 = −e 240, accounts only
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for 59.0% of the total drop between 2001 and 2000, which is given by βy2000−βy2001 = −e 407,
this identiﬁes a third discontinuity of 41.0% (−e 167) of the total decline located between
these two vintages (p-value: 0.0136).
In Panel B, a similar pattern arises for VW Golf series V. Relative to 12/2008, the price
for a car registered in 12/2007 is on average lower by e 1,645. Since only 87.5% (−e 1440
= 12 · βm2008) are explained by the aggregated month-by-month decline during 2008, 12.5%
(e 205) of the total price diﬀerential are caused by the mere change in the year count
(p-value: 0.0175). Analogously, at 12/2006, 12/2005, and 12/2004, we ﬁnd discontinuities
of 23.6% (e 404), 46.0% (e 440), and 86.9% (e 397), respectively, all statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1%-level.17
Table 4.4: Measured Discontinuities for the Diﬀerent Models
VW Golf BMW 3 Audi A4 Opel Astra
Vintage Series IV Series E46 Series B6 Series G
2000 -167∗∗ -363∗∗∗ -261∗
(41.0%) (33.5%) (87.9%)
2001 -270∗∗∗ -233∗∗ -608∗∗ -172∗∗
(52.9%) (39.3%) (54.1%) (37.4%)
2002 -157∗ -460∗∗∗ -389∗∗∗ -154∗∗∗
(19.2%) (39.0%) (51.1%) (23.4%)
2003 -167 -446∗∗∗
(22.8%) (31.2%)
VW Golf BMW 3 Audi A4 Opel Astra
Vintage Series V Series E90 Series B7 Series H
2004 -397∗∗∗ -17
(86.9%) (2.5%)
2005 -440∗∗∗ -766∗∗∗ -328∗∗∗ -286∗∗∗
(46.0%) (46.7%) (34.9%) (79.9%)
2006 -404∗∗∗ -1183∗∗∗ -690∗∗∗ -161∗
(23.6%) (60.3%) (30.7%) (11.1%)
2007 -205∗∗ -1546∗∗∗
(12.5%) (60.2%)
Notes: All values are calculated from the corresponding regression coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote
statistical signiﬁcance as indicated by a Wald-test at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Shares of
total drop are stated in parentheses.
By the same method, we also analyze the price patterns for the series of BMW 3, Audi A4,
and Opel Astra within the deﬁned estimation windows.18 Table 4.4 shows an overview of
the jumps in the price pattern that remain unexplained by the aggregated month-by-month
decline within the preceding vintage, in absolute terms and as the relative share of the total
value diﬀerential. Also for the other models, we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant discontinuities of
17Observe that the impact of a marginal month in 2005 goes in the right direction, but is no longer
statistically signiﬁcant. Note that this implies that the prices do not adjust at all to the precise age within
this year, making our result even stronger. In the calculation of the discontinuity at 12/2004, we account
for βm2005 despite its insigniﬁcance.
18For the sake of clarity, the respective regression results are provided in Tables 4.9- 4.11 in Appendix 4.5.
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sizeable magnitude at a change of the FR-year, indicating that this is a systematic pattern
in this market and not idiosyncratic for the VW Golf. For instance, comparing the prices for
BMW 3 series E90 registered in 01/2008 to those registered in 12/2007 we ceteris paribus
ﬁnd a dramatic value adjustment of e 1,546, which accounts for 60.2% of the total price
diﬀerential between these two registration dates. Importantly, except that the latter are one
marginal month older than the former, the only real diﬀerence is that the last digit of the
ﬁgure in the year count has changed.
Overall, we ﬁnd considerable evidence that the price patterns for used cars exhibit distinct
discontinuities at changes of the FR-year, indicating that their prices do not suﬃciently react
to their precise age as measured in units of months, which leads us to reject Hypothesis 1. Our
intuition is that this eﬀect arises because the sellers do not eﬃciently account for the stated
month of ﬁrst registration when forming their evaluation of a car, even though it represents
much ﬁner information than the year of ﬁrst registration alone. As a consequence, the average
price for used cars ﬁrst registered in January of some vintage is signiﬁcantly higher than that
for the ones registered in December of the respective preceding vintage, even though they
belong to the same series and their quality is held constant. Surprisingly, although there are
considerable amounts of money at stake, the prices for used cars thus exhibit an analog to
the “birthday eﬀect”, which was documented in Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2009b) for the
virtual HT economy. Stated diﬀerently, the ﬁndings we are able to document in our data
establish suggestive evidence for the external validity of the “birthday eﬀect”. Moreover, in
light of the fact that a large fraction of the oﬀers is made by professional car dealers, who
should have considerable expertise, this ﬁnding is even more puzzling.
4.3.3 Robustness of Results
Before we turn to a discussion of possible explanations and the economic implications of
our main ﬁnding, we brieﬂy present a series of robustness tests. First, we provide a short
summary of the results from alternative regression procedures that are used to account for
potential pitfalls in the data. Subsequently, we analyze whether the eﬀects persist if we relax
our above assumption of a constant slope of the price curve within each vintage.19
19In doing so, we again representatively focus on the VW Golf samples. The corresponding results for the
other models are qualitatively similar and available form the authors upon request.
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4.3.3.1 Alternative Estimation Methods
Especially since our analysis is based on ﬁeld data, in deriving our results we naturally control
for potential pitfalls like multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Each of our subsamples
contains suﬃciently many observations, hence we do not ﬁnd the ﬁrst to be a problem.
However, testing for a non-constant variance of the residuals, both a Breusch-Pagan and a
White test indicate heteroscedasticity in the data. In all of the above OLS regressions, we
thus account for possible correlations of the residuals across observations by applying Huber-
White-Sandwich-estimators to produce robust standard errors. An alternative remedy to
heteroscedasticity is to perform a log-linear transformation of the dependent variable. If we
use the natural logarithm of price instead of the raw values as the dependent variable, all
results from the standard OLS approach prove highly robust and carry through virtually
unattenuated.20 For instance, the analysis for series IV reveals that 26.5% (at 12/2002),
53.0% (at 12/2001), and 42.9% (at 12/2000) of the total price diﬀerential to the preceding
vintage are not explained through the steady month-by-month decline, all statistically
signiﬁcant and remarkably close to the shares derived in the standard OLS procedure.
The same holds true for series V, where we measure highly signiﬁcant slumps of 18.3%
(at 12/2007), 30.6% (at 12/2006), 52.4% (at 12/2005), and 88.2% (at 12/2004) of the total
value diﬀerential.
In addition, we also perform a robust regression approach that uses an iteratively re-weighted
least squares procedure to control for the possibility of inﬂuential outliers. By this method,
each observation is assigned a weight ω ∈ [0, 1] with higher weights given to better behaved
observations, where ω is iteratively determined and extremely deviant cases are excluded
from the analysis. The regression results obtained from this approach, which qualitatively
mirror those from the OLS estimation in Table 4.3, are shown in Table 4.13 in Appendix
4.5. A test of the predictions from Hypothesis 1 substantiates that our results are also not
driven by inﬂuential outliers.21 Hence, within the speciﬁed estimation model, we conclude
that the documented frictions prove to be robust across alternative estimation methods.
20See Table 4.12 in Appendix 4.5 for the regression output from this approach.
21For series IV, the measured discontinuities are given by 35.9% at 12/2002, 54.2% at 12/2001, and 33.7%
at 12/2000, respectively. While we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect at 12/2007 for series V, all other discontinuities
are signiﬁcant on the highest level and given by 20.0% at 12/2006, 47.4% at 12/2005, and 90.6% at 12/2005.
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4.3.3.2 Alternative model speciﬁcation
Motivated by the insights from the graphical inspection of the data, the results presented
so far rely on the assumption of a piecewise linear relationship, i.e. that the impact of a
marginal month remains constant during the course of a year. In the following we relax
this assumption and estimate a diﬀerent model, in which we determine the impact on price
separately for each individual month. In doing so, we ﬁrst introduce the dummies Jan to
Dec to indicate the month of the year. For instance, Nov takes value 1 if a car was ﬁrst
registered in November, and 0 otherwise. As a second step, we interact the latter with the
year dummies, thereby obtaining a dummy variable for each possible registration date within
the estimation period. For example,
Nov2002 ≡ Nov × year2002,
such that Nov2002 takes value 1 for cars ﬁrst registered in 11/2002, and 0 otherwise. For
all other FR-dates, an analogous variable is deﬁned and labeled accordingly. Included as
regressors, the coeﬃcient for each of these variables measures the impact of a particular
marginal month on the price, relative to the “youngest” FR-date in each subsample, i.e.
09/2003 for series IV and 06/2008 in series V. Intuitively, if the observed discontinuities are
indeed caused by the change of the registration year, we would expect that the coeﬃcients
for two consecutive months within the same FR-year should not diﬀer much, and most of the
price adjustment should be located between December and January of the next vintage. The
results from this approach are shown in Table 4.5. For simplicity, we focus the presentation
on a four-month period around each change of the registration year.
First, consider the results for series IV in Panel A. The coeﬃcients for Feb2003 and Jan2003
are of similar magnitude, and similarly for Dec2002 and Nov2002. As conﬁrmed by a
t-test, in neither case the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are equal can be rejected at
p-values of 0.8133 and 0.7176, respectively. However, consistent with an over-proportional
price adjustment due to a change of the registration year, βDec2003−βJan2002 < 0 proves to be
statistically signiﬁcant at a p-value of 0.0691. Similarly, while neither the diﬀerence between
the coeﬃcients for Feb2002 and Jan2002 (p-value: 0.8349), nor that between Nov2001
and Dec2001 (p-value: 0.2101) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, we ﬁnd that βDec2002 −
βJan2001 < 0 (p-value: 0.0023). Yet, we do not ﬁnd a similar pattern between 2001 and 2000.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of Price - VW Golf Monthwise Model (OLS)
Panel A. Series IV Panel B. Series V
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 09/2003) (Est. Period: 01/2004 - 06/2008)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
Nov 2000 -1,609.24∗∗∗ (163.24) Nov 2004 -4,250.5∗∗∗ (102.37)
Dec 2000 -1,398.07∗∗∗ (167.03) Dec 2004 -4,099.9∗∗∗ (101.91)
Jan 2001 -1,462.98∗∗∗ (164.24) Jan 2005 -3,943.9∗∗∗ (111.02)
Feb 2001 -1,245.52∗∗∗ (172.18) Feb 2005 -3,772.7∗∗∗ (113.09)
Nov 2001 -1,100.60∗∗∗ (169.05) Nov 2005 -3,771.0∗∗∗ (118.92)
Dec 2001 -1,263.69∗∗∗ (175.10) Dec 2005 -3,762.9∗∗∗ (110.15)
Jan 2002 -852.58∗∗∗ (173.70) Jan 2006 -3,254.3∗∗∗ (112.67)
Feb 2002 -879.01∗∗∗ (169.47) Feb 2006 -3,322.3∗∗∗ (108.36)
Nov 2002 -636.23∗∗∗ (175.62) Nov 2006 -2,699.0∗∗∗ (135.49)
Dec 2002 -685.00∗∗∗ (172.15) Dec 2006 -3,005.0∗∗∗ (126.18)
Jan 2003 -410.14∗∗ (188.43) Jan 2007 -2,136.2∗∗∗ (156.17)
Feb 2003 -447.32∗∗ (178.45) Feb 2007 -2,208.9∗∗∗ (162.89)
Nov 2007 -1,275.8∗∗∗ (104.65)
Dec 2007 -879.54∗∗∗ (113.45)
Jan 2008 -379.84∗∗∗ (124.09)
Feb 2008 -836.11∗∗∗ (102.39)
mileage -0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) mileage -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00)
power 36.98∗∗∗ (1.40) power 68.24∗∗∗ (0.78)
diesel 541.75∗∗∗ (35.06) diesel 900.56∗∗∗ (29.13)
ﬁve-door 289.09∗∗∗ (30.28) ﬁve-door 286.98∗∗∗ (31.31)
auto gearbox -34.55 (56.82) auto gearbox 741.60∗∗∗ (45.40)
private seller -221.60∗∗∗ (30.99) private seller -360.70∗∗∗ (45.80)
Intercept 7,179.21∗∗∗ (170.88) Intercept 11,886.07∗∗∗ (101.44)
Extras  Extras 
Color dummies  Color dummies 
All other months  All other months 
R2 0.66 R2 0.84
N 6,034 N 15,247
F(59;5,971) 160.75 F(71;15,175) 960.31
Notes: Dependent variable is price. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level.
The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted relative to the reference months 09/2003 (Panel A) and
06/2008 (Panel B), respectively. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. To save on space, the details on the
extras are omitted from the presentation. All results from the standard OLS regressions fully carry over.
Next, turn to Panel B, which states the coeﬃcients obtained for series V. For every turn of
the registration year in the estimation period, we ﬁnd a clear trend for the price diﬀerential
to increase, with pronounced eﬀects between January and December. Though all coeﬃcients
around the change from 2008 to 2007 turn out to diﬀer signiﬁcantly, in line with our
argument, the largest adjustment is located between 12/2008 and 01/2007. In addition,
between the years 2007 and 2006 only the diﬀerence of the coeﬃcients for Jan2007 and
Dec2006 is statistically signiﬁcant at the highest level (p-value: 0.0000). The same holds
true around the change from 2006 to 2005, where βDec2005 − βJan2006 < 0 at a p-value of
0.0000. Between the years 2005 and 2004, however, again none of the displayed coeﬃcients
diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
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Importantly, by design of this approach, the estimates for the impact of an individual month
are based on rather few observations within a relatively short time interval, implying a
considerable degree of noise due to price ﬂuctuations in the data. Despite this fact, we
still ﬁnd clear evidence for a signiﬁcant downward adjustment of the price at a turn of the
registration year. Moreover, an analysis of the other models yields similar results. Hence,
we take this as further indication that it is indeed the change of the registration year that
triggers the discontinuities in the price pattern.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
We employ a hedonic regression analysis to examine empirically to what extent the stated
prices for used cars reﬂect available information. Based on detailed ﬁeld data on used car
oﬀers from the online vehicle market platform mobile.de, we ﬁnd strong evidence for biased
information processing. Despite the large monetary stakes involved, our ﬁndings suggest that
people in this market systematically fail to eﬃciently aggregate the information provided on
speciﬁc attributes of the items on sale. In particular, although the precise date of ﬁrst
registration is clearly stated, the pattern of observed prices exhibits sizeable discontinuities,
indicating that a substantial fraction of the value adjustment due to the age of a car is
located where the FR-year changes. As a consequence, across two consecutive vintages the
price diﬀerential for cars with otherwise close-by registration dates is signiﬁcantly larger than
rationally justiﬁed, given that they only marginally diﬀer in their precise age. This ﬁnding
proves highly robust across several estimation approaches and if we separately control for
the impact of each possible registration date, and indicates that an evaluation bias like the
“birthday” eﬀect can have economic implications in the real world.
The fact that we are able to provide suggestive evidence for a systematic friction in an
otherwise highly competitive market, where in addition individual choices are conceivably
subject to profound deliberations, naturally raises two closely related questions. First, what
are the driving forces behind this eﬀect? And second, what are the economic consequences
of this ﬁnding? Along the lines of Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2009b) and Englmaier and
Schmo¨ller (2009a),22 where we study both the behavior of buyers and sellers in the virtual
HT economy, there are several possible answers to these questions.
22See Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, respectively.
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First, recall that our ﬁndings derive from asking prices stated by the sellers of used cars.
Therefore, one possibility is that they act strategically and deliberately charge higher prices
for cars that are factually not much older than others, but just belong to the next higher
vintage in terms of their registration year. Intuitively, this would be a rational reaction if
the population of potential buyers at least partially consists of agents who are inattentive to
the precise age of the oﬀered cars. Stated diﬀerently, what we observe could be the result of
the sellers trying to exploit a bias on the demand side of the market for used cars, and it is
actually the buyers who ineﬃciently utilize the provided information conveyed through the
FR-month. Alternatively, it may be the sellers themselves, who disproportionately cling to
the ﬁgure displayed in the FR-year, while in turn under-weighing the information embodied
in the FR-month, such that the latter will not be eﬃciently incorporated into their pricing
considerations. Finally, the documented behavior may apply to both sides of the market.
Although in this environment, other than in the auction market analyzed in Englmaier and
Schmo¨ller (2009b), the economic consequences are likely to be mitigated by the possibility
of negotiation, from the perspective of rational buyers a substantial fraction of cars will be
overpriced, potentially leading to too little trade.
Several extensions to this research suggest themselves. As shown in Englmaier and Schmo¨ller
(2009b), a potential source for this eﬀect may be linked to the design of the ﬁlter mechanism,
which the people can use to screen and cross compare diﬀerent oﬀers. Due to the fact that
it is not possible to directly ﬁlter for the FR-month on platforms like mobile.de, it may be
tempting to perceive this information as unimportant and to overly focus one’s attention
on the more salient FR-year. It would therefore be interesting to see whether the size of
the discontinuities is aﬀected by including this feature in the ﬁlter mechanism. Moreover,
though we consider a large number of factors that have an signiﬁcant impact on the price of
a used car, clearly we are not able to include all possible dimensions, and the results may
potentially aﬀected by other confounding factors. Hence, controlled laboratory experiments
could be a promising route in the study of the utilization of information. Although ﬁeld
evidence might have higher external validity than controlled laboratory results, the latter
allow for systematic variations of the market design features and the degree of valuation
uncertainty, while at the same time the asking and ﬁnal prices can be observed and detailed
information on the decisions of each individual participant are provided.
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In his seminal contribution to information economics, Akerlof (1970) employs the information
asymmetries between buyers and sellers of used cars as his prime example to illustrate the
famous “lemons-problem”. Although adverse selection due to asymmetric information with
respect to unobservables is undeniably still a major problem within this market, our ﬁndings
suggest that ineﬃciencies may also arise with respect to observable characteristics. People
seem to be inattentive to subtle, but nevertheless valuable details of the available information.
Clearly, more research is needed to identify the driving forces and behavioral motivations
behind an ineﬃcient utilization of information, as we are able to document in the evaluation
of complex goods.
The Evaluation of Complex Goods 123
4.5 Appendix
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics - BMW 3
Panel A. Series E46 Panel B. Series E90
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 11/2004) (Est. Period: 09/2005 - 08/2008)
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max
price [EUR] 7,458 10,562 3,990 20,000 10,866 22,607 8,500 48,578
mileage [km] 7,458 113,130 6,163 227,000 10,866 58,220 1,000 226150
power [kW] 7,458 110 75 185 10,866 126 85 247
totalage [months] 7,458 77 50 108 10,866 26 5 40
Dummies Value Frequency Percent Cum. Value Frequency Percent Cum.
diesel 0 4,373 58.6 58.6 0 3,007 27.7 27.7
(0 = petrol, 1 = diesel) 1 3,085 41.4 100.0 1 7,859 72.3 100.0
auto gearbox 0 5,730 76.8 76.8 0 7,579 69.8 69.8
(0 = manu., 1 = auto) 1 1,728 23.2 100.0 1 3,287 30.3 100.0
cruise control 0 5,067 67.9 67.9 0 4,453 41.0 41.0
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 2,391 32.1 100.0 1 6,413 59.0 100.0
seat heating 0 3,793 50.9 50.9 0 3,309 30.5 30.5
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 3,665 49.1 100.0 1 7,557 69.6 100.0
all-wheel-drive 0 7,222 96.8 96.8 0 10,414 95.8 95.8
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 236 3.2 100.0 1 452 4.2 100.0
sun roof 0 4,735 63.5 63.5 0 6,848 63.0 63.0
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 2,723 36.5 100.0 1 4,018 37.0 100.0
leathertrim 0 5,359 71.9 71.9 0 7,684 70.7 70.7
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 2,099 28.1 100.0 1 3,182 29.3 100.0
metallic paint 0 1,091 14.6 14.6 0 2,957 27.2 27.2
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 6,367 85.4 100.0 1 7,909 72.8 100.0
private seller 0 5,544 74.3 74.3 0 10,350 95.3 95.3
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 1,914 25.7 100.0 1 516 4.8 100.0
 This sample was the ﬁrst we collected. At that time, we exclusively considered ﬁve-door cars to control for convertibles,
which could not be distinguished from other three-door vehicles. In the other samples an upgrade of the parsing software
allowed us ﬁlter directly for convertibles.
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics - Audi A4
Panel A. Series B6 Panel B. Series B7
(Est. Period: 10/2001 - 10/2004) (Est. Period: 04/2005 - 09/2007)
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max
price [EUR] 4,055 11,986 4,000 21,900 6,938 18,249 6,900 39,990
mileage [km] 4,055 111,448 9,729 233,550 6,938 90,143 1,000 234000
power [kW] 4,055 106 66 169 6,938 115 66 294
totalage [months] 4,055 68 51 87 6,938 34 16 45
Dummies Value Frequency Percent Cum. Value Frequency Percent Cum.
diesel 0 2,655 48.1 48.1 0 1,440 20.8 20.8
(0 = petrol, 1 = diesel) 1 2,864 51.9 100.0 1 5,498 79.2 100
auto gearbox 0 3,936 71.3 71.3 0 4,735 68.3 68.3
(0 = manu., 1 = auto) 1 1,583 28.7 100.0 1 2,203 31.8 100
cruise control 0 3,877 70.3 70.3 0 3,236 46.6 46.6
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 1,642 29.8 100.0 1 3,702 53.4 100
seat heating 0 2,641 47.9 47.9 0 2,126 30.6 30.6
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 2,878 52.2 100.0 1 4,812 69.4 100
all-wheel-drive 0 4,892 88.6 88.6 0 5,752 82.9 82.9
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 627 11.4 100.0 1 1,186 17.1 100
sun roof 0 4,719 85.5 85.5 0 5,974 86.1 86.1
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 800 14.5 100.0 1 964 13.9 100
leathertrim 0 4,545 82.4 82.4 0 5,337 76.9 76.9
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 974 17.7 100.0 1 1,601 23.1 100
metallic paint 0 938 17.0 17.0 0 1,710 24.7 24.7
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 4,581 83.0 100.0 1 5,228 75.4 100
private seller 0 4,276 77.5 77.5 0 6,506 93.8 93.8
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 1,243 22.5 100.0 1 432 6.2 100
 The Audi A4 production line includes no three-door version.
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Table 4.8: Summary Statistics - Opel Astra
Panel A. Series G Panel B. Series H
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 12/2003) (Est. Period: 05/2004 - 10/2007)
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max
price [EUR] 2,825 5,332 1,750 9,950 8,358 10,820 3,900 19,900
mileage [km] 2,825 108,788 2,732 206,000 8,358 63,969 1,000 206,000
power [kW] 2,825 69 48 188 8,358 80 55 177
totalage [months] 2,825 85 61 108 8,358 35 15 56
Dummies Value Frequency Percent Cum. Value Frequency Percent Cum.
diesel 0 2,104 74.5 74.5 0 3,817 45.7 45.7
(0 = petrol, 1 = diesel) 1 721 25.5 100.0 1 4,541 54.3 100.0
ﬁve-door 0 463 16.4 16.4 0 760 9.1 9.1
(0 = three, 1 = ﬁve) 1 2,362 83.6 100.0 1 7,598 90.9 100.0
auto gearbox 0 2,574 91.1 91.1 0 7,878 94.3 94.3
(0 = manu., 1 = auto) 1 251 8.9 100.0 1 480 5.7 100.0
cruise control 0 2,649 93.8 93.8 0 1,007 12.1 12.1
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 176 6.2 100.0 1 7,351 88.0 100.0
seat heating 0 2,653 93.9 93.9 0 7,472 89.4 89.4
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 172 6.1 100.0 1 886 10.6 100.0
sun roof 0 2,679 94.8 94.8 0 8,202 98.1 98.1
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 146 5.2 100.0 1 156 1.9 100.0
leathertrim 0 2,738 96.9 96.9 0 7,968 95.3 95.3
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 87 3.1 100.0 1 390 4.7 100.0
metallic paint 0 520 18.4 18.4 0 1,390 16.6 16.6
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 2,305 81.6 100.0 1 6,968 83.4 100.0
private seller 0 2,395 84.8 84.8 0 7,832 93.7 93.7
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 430 15.2 100.0 1 526 6.3 100.0
 None of the observations for Opel Astra included an all-wheel drive.
Table 4.9: Determinants of Price - BMW 3 (OLS)
Panel A. Series E46 Panel B. Series E90
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 11/2004) (Est. Period: 09/2005 - 08/2008)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
month2000 8.25 (-10.81) month2005 -14.60 (-48.07)
month2001 -60.27∗∗∗ (-10.95) month2006 -73.19∗∗∗ (-11.93)
month2002 -29.89∗∗∗ (-10.87) month2007 -65.31∗∗∗ (-18.66)
month2003 -60.00∗∗∗ (-10.05) month2008 -84.93∗∗∗ (-31.96)
month2004 -47.07∗∗∗ (-13.33)
year2000 -3,587.09∗∗∗ (-132.14) year2005 -6,171.47∗∗∗ (-309.38)
year2001 -2,504.03∗∗∗ (-133.36) year2006 -4,529.36∗∗∗ (-296.59)
year2002 -1,911.20∗∗∗ (-129.86) year2007 -2,565.81∗∗∗ (-306.27)
year2003 -730.90∗∗∗ (-126.73)
mileage -0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) mileage -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00)
power 41.97∗∗∗ (-0.95) power 81.02∗∗∗ (-1.29)
diesel 573.46∗∗∗ (-41.52) diesel 1,681.84∗∗∗ (-59.87)
auto gearbox -56.35 (-44.06) auto gearbox 1,087.39∗∗∗ (-61.58)
private seller 38.44 (-42.45) private seller -475.41∗∗∗ (-139.67)
Intercept 11,068.34∗∗∗ (-143.93) Intercept 16,439.34∗∗∗ (-320.66)
Extras  Extras 
Color dummies  Color dummies 
R2 0.74 R2 0.81
N 7,458 N 10,866
F(26;7,431) 792.58 F(24;10,841) 1,462.92
Notes: The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted relative to the reference years 2004 (Panel
A) and 2008 (Panel B), respectively. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Since all coeﬃcients for the extra are qualitatively similar to
the ones obtained for VW Golf, they are omitted from the presentation to save on space.
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Table 4.10: Determinants of Price - Audi A4 (OLS)
Panel A. Series B6 Panel B. Series B7
(Est. Period: 10/2001 - 10/2004) (Est. Period: 04/2005 - 09/2007)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
month2001 96.60 (111.09) month2005 -89.80∗∗∗ (13.70)
month2002 -42.65∗∗∗ (12.48) month2006 -51.22∗∗∗ (13.00)
month2003 -30.50∗∗ (13.87) month2007 -129.70∗∗∗ (40.67)
month2004 -82.20∗∗∗ (16.84)
year2001 -3,315.33∗∗∗ (282.24) year2005 -3,190.15∗∗∗ (371.25)
year2002 -2,190.99∗∗∗ (164.94) year2006 -2,249.79∗∗∗ (376.30)
year2003 -1,430.03∗∗∗ (172.72)
mileage -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00) mileage -0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
power 26.73∗∗∗ (1.68) power 50.29∗∗∗ (1.62)
diesel 808.96∗∗∗ (56.31) diesel 1,841.56∗∗∗ (69.37)
auto gearbox 81.98 (59.44) auto gearbox 461.37∗∗∗ (57.51)
private seller -128.01∗∗ (62.26) private seller -333.42∗∗∗ (121.69)
Intercept 14,308.04∗∗∗ (226.10) Intercept 17,570.93∗∗∗ (413.66)
Extras  Extras 
Color dummies  Color dummies 
R2 0.62 R2 0.72
N 4,055 N 6,938
F(25;4,029) 260.17 F(23;6,914) 659.58
Notes: The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted relative to the reference years 2004 (Panel
A) and 2007 (Panel B), respectively. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Since all coeﬃcients are qualitatively similar to the ones
obtained for VW Golf, the details on the extras are omitted from the presentation to save on space.
Table 4.11: Determinants of Price - Opel Astra (OLS)
Panel A. Series G Panel B. Series H
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 12/2003) (Est. Period: 05/2004 - 10/2007)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
month2000 -13.72∗ (8.05) month2004 -74.71∗∗∗ (14.17)
month2001 -3.37 (8.27) month2005 -55.80∗∗∗ (6.81)
month2002 -23.89∗∗∗ (9.14) month2006 -5.56 (7.67)
month2003 -42.04∗∗∗ (10.64) month2007 -107.51∗∗∗ (15.64)
year2000 -1,415.08∗∗∗ (109.07) year2004 -2,503.53∗∗∗ (148.15)
year2001 -1,117.58∗∗∗ (108.59) year2005 -1,815.47∗∗∗ (138.66)
year2002 -658.21∗∗∗ (110.67) year2006 -1,457.06∗∗∗ (145.45)
mileage -0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) mileage -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00)
power 17.30∗∗∗ (1.57) power 51.51∗∗∗ (1.20)
diesel 123.01∗∗∗ (43.27) diesel 660.75∗∗∗ (34.38)
ﬁve-door 328.06∗∗∗ (40.68) ﬁve-door -402.37∗∗∗ (53.27)
auto gearbox 80.40 (55.22) auto gearbox 298.40∗∗∗ (66.54)
private seller -192.50∗∗∗ (43.20) private seller -516.91∗∗∗ (64.62)
Intercept 6,949.84∗∗∗ (153.53) Intercept 10,743.14∗∗∗ (179.54)
Extras  Extras 
Color dummies  Color dummies 
R2 0.61 R2 0.65
N 2,825 N 8,358
F(24;2,800) 203.91 F(25;8,332) 597.13
Notes: The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted relative to the reference years 2003 (Panel
A) and 2007 (Panel B), respectively. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. Since all coeﬃcients are qualitatively similar to the ones
obtained for VW Golf, the details on the extras are omitted from the presentation to save on space.
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Table 4.12: Determinants of Log-Price - VW Golf (OLS)
Panel A. Series IV Panel B. Series V
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 09/2003) (Est. Period: 01/2004 - 06/2008)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
month2000 -0.0050∗∗∗ (0.0011) month2004 -0.0021∗∗∗ (0.0006)
month2001 -0.0033∗∗∗ (0.0011) month2005 -0.0004 (0.0006)
month2002 -0.0028∗∗∗ (0.0010) month2006 -0.0028∗∗∗ (0.0006)
month2003 -0.0048∗∗∗ (0.0017) month2007 -0.0054∗∗∗ (0.0006)
month2008 -0.0057∗∗∗ (0.0011)
year2000 -0.2200∗∗∗ (0.0170) year2004 -0.2921∗∗∗ (0.0111)
year2001 -0.1505∗∗∗ (0.0168) year2005 -0.2470∗∗∗ (0.0111)
year2002 -0.0781∗∗∗ (0.0162) year2006 -0.1777∗∗∗ (0.0111)
year2007 -0.0843∗∗∗ (0.0105)
mileage -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) mileage -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
power 0.0049∗∗∗ (0.0002) power 0.0047∗∗∗ (0.0001)
diesel 0.0913∗∗∗ (0.0050) diesel 0.0700∗∗∗ (0.0020)
ﬁve-door 0.0551∗∗∗ (0.0044) ﬁve-door 0.0226∗∗∗ (0.0023)
auto gearbox -0.0091 (0.0075) auto gearbox 0.0462∗∗∗ (0.0029)
private seller -0.0297∗∗∗ (0.0045) private seller -0.0313∗∗∗ (0.0034)
Intercept 8.8972∗∗∗ (0.0196) Intercept 9.3941∗∗∗ (0.0113)
Extras  Extras 
Color dummies  Color dummies 
R2 0.67 R2 0.85
N 6,034 N 15,247
F(25;6,008) 459.34 F(27;15,219) 2,871.86
Notes: Dependent variable is lnprice. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*)
level. The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted relative to the reference years 2003 (Panel A)
and 2008 (Panel B), respectively. Robust standard errors are stated in parentheses. To save on space, the details
on the extras are omitted from the presentation. All results from the standard OLS regressions fully carry over.
Table 4.13: Determinants of Price - VW Golf (Robust Regression)
Panel A. Series IV Panel B. Series V
(Est. Period: 01/2000 - 09/2003) (Est. Period: 01/2004 - 06/2008)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Dev.
month2000 -24.18∗∗∗ (6.57) month2004 -17.69∗∗ (7.77)
month2001 -21.96∗∗∗ (6.69) month2005 -3.45 (7.46)
month2002 -17.04∗∗ (6.72) month2006 -41.28∗∗∗ (8.17)
month2003 -30.18∗∗ (11.74) month2007 -112.55∗∗∗ (7.58)
month2008 -157.86∗∗∗ (15.30)
year2000 -1,408.55∗∗∗ (111.00) year2004 -4,953.22∗∗∗ (157.96)
year2001 -1,011.25∗∗∗ (110.25) year2005 -4,511.53∗∗∗ (159.30)
year2002 -564.79∗∗∗ (110.16) year2006 -3,570.59∗∗∗ (160.09)
year2007 -1,883.32∗∗∗ (152.81)
mileage -0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) mileage -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00)
power 30.39∗∗∗ (0.84) power 67.73∗∗∗ (0.65)
diesel 590.29∗∗∗ (29.00) diesel 795.91∗∗∗ (26.53)
ﬁve-door 370.28∗∗∗ (26.96) ﬁve-door 253.95∗∗∗ (30.91)
auto gearbox -19.06 (43.61) auto gearbox 710.80∗∗∗ (37.05)
private seller -278.52∗∗∗ (27.51) private seller -334.36∗∗∗ (41.03)
Intercept 7,518.74∗∗∗ (122.10) Intercept 12,661.52∗∗∗ (160.93)
Extras  Extras 
Color dummies  Color dummies 
R2 0.68 R2 0.85
N 6,034 N 15,247
F(25,6008) 508.15 F(27,15219) 3,232.22
Notes: Dependent variable is price. The RREG procedure controls for inﬂuential outliers by computing point-
speciﬁc weights for the contribution of each observation to the ﬁnal regression. Asterisks denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%(***), 5%(**) or 10%(*) level. The coeﬃcients of the vintage-dummies are to be interpreted
relative to the reference years 2003 (Panel A) and 2008 (Panel B), respectively. Standard errors are stated in
parentheses. To save on space, the details on the extras are omitted from the presentation. All results from the
standard OLS regressions fully carry over.
The Evaluation of Complex Goods 127
Figure 4.8: Relation Between Price and Age - BMW 3
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Figure 4.9: Relation Between Price and Age - Audi A4
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Figure 4.10: Relation Between Price and Age - Opel Astra
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Chapter 5
Strategic Seller Actions in Auctions with
Asymmetric Bidders
5.1 Introduction
A fundamental principle of an auction is to endogenously generate a price for an item,
whenever the seller, or “auctioneer”, is uncertain or has only incomplete information about
the exact valuations of the potential buyers in the population. The ﬁnal price the winner
has to pay depends on various factors, like the auction mechanism implemented, the number
of bidders, and the intensity of competition among them to name only a few. In economic
theory, auctions are modeled as non-cooperative games of incomplete information and a
very common assumption is that the buyers are ex ante symmetric with respect to the
distribution of their valuations. While there exists an extensive body of literature for the
case of symmetric bidders, far less general properties of asymmetric (ﬁrst-price) auctions
are identiﬁed so far. Among the rather few general properties, Maskin and Riley (2000)
demonstrate that even one of the most principal ﬁndings in auction theory, the revenue
equivalence theorem (Vickrey, 1961), is no longer generally valid when bidders are asymmet-
ric.1 However, Cantillon (2008) shows in a very general framework that in both ﬁrst and
second price auctions a reduction in the degree of asymmetry leads to an increase of expected
revenue for the auctioneer. Intuitively, asymmetry hurts the seller, as competition among
bidders is reduced resulting in a lower expected ﬁnal price. We use this ﬁnding to analyze
1As a consequence, revenues can be either higher or lower in ﬁrst and second price auctions. Moreover,
asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions involve a tendency for weak bidders to bid more aggressively. Thus, although
an equilibrium exists, the outcome may no longer be eﬃcient, since the good is not always assigned to the
bidder with the highest valuation.
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its implications for the strategic scope an auctioneer may have once the auction format has
been set. In a setting, where she has some means at hand to manipulate the valuations of
the bidders after she committed to an auction mechanism, we analyze how she optimally
acts to maximize her expected revenue.
Since the seminal contributions in auction theory, e.g. Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), or
Riley and Samuleson (1981), an extensive strand of literature has emerged in this ﬁeld
of research. In addition to numerous papers dealing with the optimal design of auction
mechanisms, much of the theoretical literature exhibits a strong focus on the behavior
of bidders. Apart from optimal bidding strategies, topics range from bidder collusion to
situations like discussed in Schwarz and Sonin (2005), where bidders can take investments or
other private actions that aﬀect their valuation.2 In sharp contrast, the seller most commonly
is assigned a merely passive role once the auction mechanism has been decided.3 The main
focus of this paper is to analyze what happens, if we allow the seller to take actions after the
bidders signed up to the auction but before the bidding stage has started. More precisely,
throughout the paper we maintain the assumption that the seller has full commitment with
respect to the chosen allocation mechanism but can inﬂuence the bidders’ valuations through
another dimension of strategic choice.4 Intuitively, by taking actions to support the weaker
of two participating bidders, the seller can make them more competing rivals which in turn
leads to an increase of her expected revenue. In this respect, it may then be optimal for the
seller to favor a weaker bidder over the one who is ex ante most likely to win the auction.
However, this results in ex post ineﬃciency in terms of social surplus, whenever strong bidder
still wins and the seller “invested” in the ex post losing bidder.
The idea that supporting speciﬁc bidders may be beneﬁcial to the auctioneer has been
documented before. In an earlier study, Rothkopf et al. (2003) theoretically analyze public
procurement auctions and ﬁnd that subsidies to a class of relatively weaker competitors can
lower the expected project cost to the government, since other bidders rationally respond
by bidding more aggressively. Corns and Schotter (1999) conduct an experimental study for
the case of aﬃrmative action, where minorities are supported by the government. Against
2A comprehensive overview of the literature on auction theory is provided by e.g. Klemperer (2000).
3One exception is analyzed in Eso and Szentes (2007). In their model, the auctioneer has some superior
information on a common-value good and can enter a signaling stage before the auction to share this
information with the buyers.
4For an analysis of mechanism design problems with imperfect commitment see Bester and Strausz (2000).
Strategic Seller Actions 130
the common argument that interference into the competitive process which prevents the
most capable of being chosen must be wasteful and costly, they both argue that aﬃrmative
action may decrease the cost of government procurement under some circumstances, that
is if the competition among bidders is suﬃciently strong. McAfee and McMillan (1987)
argue theoretically that preferential price treatment for designated bidders may be optimal
in terms of revenue for the seller. Goeree and Oﬀerman (2004) show that in some auction
formats it can even be optimal for the auctioneer to award the highest losing bidder an ex-
post premium that depends on the size of the bid she submitted. However, both subsidies
and aﬃrmative action programs are typically controversial and hard to justify, be it due
to the need to raise (distortive) taxes to ﬁnance them or for political reasons. Moreover,
all the above measures aiding designated bidders involve an direct interference with bids
and the allocation mechanism and result in a mere redistribution of value. Our paper
contributes to this strand of literature by demonstrating that auctioneers may have also
other, more general means at hand to aﬀect the bidders valuations. For example, prior
to the actual auction stage a seller may add or alter some minor features of the item on
sale, which asymmetrically aﬀect the valuations of the bidders. In addition, we show that
a seller can thereby exploit the beneﬁcial eﬀects of reducing asymmetries among bidders,
but that this may cause ineﬃciencies with respect to social surplus. Say, for example, that
prior to the execution of the auction the seller can add one or more features to the item on
sale, which have no or very little intrinsic value themselves. However, they are assumed to
asymmetrically aﬀect the valuations of the bidders when added to the item, i.e. the bidders
attach diﬀerent values to these extra features.
To facilitate the analysis and to keep things tractable, we impose a number of simplifying
assumptions on our model. As in much of the existing literature on asymmetric auctions,
we assume there are exactly two bidders, one ”strong” and the other ”weak”.5 Hence,
bidders are ex ante heterogeneous in the sense that their valuations are drawn from diﬀerent
distributions, such that one bidder is more likely to have a higher valuation than the other.
Moreover, we consider second price auctions, where even with asymmetries present bidding
one’s true valuation is a dominant strategy for each bidder. Finally, we assume that the
item is sold with certainty to one of the two bidders in the sense that the seller cannot
5The assumption of only two bidders is a convenient way to simplify notation and proofs. Moreover, the
situation in this setting could also be interpreted similar to the second stage in Klemperer’s (1998) Anglo
Dutch Auction, where the two bidders are those who remain after a ﬁrst round of a two stage auction process
consisting of a ﬁnal sealed-bid stage included into an otherwise-ascending auction.
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credibly commit to not selling the item. Hence, a reserve price is non-credible in this setting
in the sense that the bidders will anticipate that some kind of renegotiation or auction-like
mechanism will subsequently be used to allocate the item.6 These assumptions permit us to
analyze the optimal strategy for the seller, when she can inﬂuence the bidders’ valuations,
and thus the degree of asymmetry among them.
This paper proceeds as follows. The basic setting of the model is presented in Section
5.2 and, following the lines of Cantillon (2000), the general eﬀect of bidder asymmetries
on expected auction revenue relative to a symmetric benchmark is discussed. Section 5.3
analyzes a simple scenario, where the seller has some ﬁxed endowment she can use to indi-
vidually support each of the two asymmetric bidders. Her choice will aﬀect the latters’ valua-
tions and thereby also has consequences for the expected revenue she gains from the auction.
A possible real world application for such a situation is discussed, before we turn to a scenario
including the issues of standard setting and compatibility in Section 5.4. There, the basic
model is extended to the case where the sellers action is costly and moreover may impose a
negative eﬀect on one of the bidder’s valuation. Section 5.5 concludes. An Appendix collects
formal proofs and provides an extension of the model.
5.2 Model Setting and Eﬀect of Asymmetries
We focus on the case of two potential buyers i ∈ {w, s} bidding for one unit of an indivisible
object. The value bidder i attaches to the object is represented by vi, and we assume that
the independent-private values paradigm applies. While the valuation is private information
to the individual bidder, it is common knowledge that vi is independently drawn from the
continuously diﬀerentiable atom-less cumulative distribution function Fi with support on
[vi; vi]. Thus, the seller is able to identify diﬀerent types of bidders, though not the actual
valuation of any particular bidder. Deﬁne Si = vi − vi as the spread of the support for
bidder i. The corresponding probability density function (PDF), fi(v) = F
′
i (v), is ﬁnite and
bounded away from zero. Moreover, assume that both bidders are risk neutral.
6See also Kirkegaard and Overgaard (2005).
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Assumption 1 (Information:) (i) Each of the two bidders knows the rules of the auction
that the seller has chosen (and committed herself to). (ii) Bidder i knows her own valuation
vi, i ∈ {w, s}. (iii) Bidders’ risk attitudes and the probability distributions of their valuations
are common knowledge.
In general, the two bidders are regarded as heterogeneous or asymmetric if Fw 	= Fs. To put
more structure on the asymmetry, we employ the assumption that the value distributions of
the bidders can be ranked according to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, which is standard
in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions. Thus, for any realization v, one
bidder has a higher probability of receiving an outcome equal to or better than v than
the other.7 Without loss of generality, suppose that Fs ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
Fw, that is Fw(v) ≥ Fs(v) ∀ v. Hence, there exists a “strong” bidder (s) who has a
comparative advantage over the “weak” bidder (w) with respect to their valuations and
winning probabilities. Note that ﬁrst order-stochastic dominance applies if we assume that
the bidders draw their valuations from distributions with diﬀerent but intersecting supports.8
Assumption 2 (Bidder w is weak, bidder s is strong:) Suppose that the boundaries of
the supports are such that vw ≤ vs < vw ≤ vs.
By Assumption 2, we have that Fw(v) ≥ Fs(v) ∀ v ∈ (vw; vs). The ﬁrst auction mechanism
analyzed is a second-price sealed-bid auction, which is highly appealing due to its analytical
simplicity. Moreover, since the highest-valuation bidder will be the one who actually wins
the auction, the outcome is still eﬃcient when bidders are asymmetric.9 This allows us to
highlight the phenomena caused by the existence of a strategic seller action during the course
of the auction without getting too entangled in complex bidding mechanics.
Lemma 1 In a second-price sealed bid auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid one’s
own valuation. These bidding strategies are unaltered by the introduction of asymmetries.
Proof. See Appendix 5.6.1.1.
7Note that under the given assumptions on the boundaries of the supports and the underlying
distributions, also the stronger assumption of reverse hazard rate dominance ( hs1−Hs ≤ hw1−Hw ∀ v) is satisﬁed,
which is also often imposed and implies ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
8See Figure 5.2a in Section 5.3. Also note that Assumption 2 ensures that supports are non-nested. In
that case, hazard rate dominance and hence ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance would be violated.
9Eﬃciency is not necessarily maintained in an asymmetric ﬁrst price auction, since the object is assigned
to a bidder other than the one with the highest valuation with positive probability. See e.g. Krishna (2002).
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An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that distribution of the selling price in a sealed-bid
second price auction is given by:10
D(P ) = Pr[min{vw, vs} ≤ P ] = Fw(P ) + Fs(P )− Fw(P ) · Fs(P )
where P ∈ {vw, vw}, because from Assumption 2 the maximum price that a bidder po-
tentially has to pay from an ex ante perspective is equal to the maximum realization the
weak bidder’s valuation can take. Since it is optimal for the bidders to bid their true value
in a second price auction, the winner is always the one with the highest valuation.Note
that Fw(P ) · Fs(P ) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the expected highest
realization from (Fw, Fs). Moreover, for any realized valuation vi of bidder i, bidder j’s value
will be higher with probability (1 − Fj(vi)) for i 	= j. Hence, the price that accrues to the
seller equals the expectation of the second highest value, which we denote by vw,s(2) :
ER(Fw, Fs) ≡ vw,s(2) =
∫ vw
vw
v(1− Fs(v))fw(v)dv +
∫ vs
vs
v(1− Fw(v))fs(v)dv, (5.1)
where the ﬁrst term on the RHS is the expected valuation of bidder w conditional on bidder
s winning the auction, and vice versa for the second integral. Since the supports of the
distributions for the two bidders overlap, we can replace the integral borders by the respective
minimum and maximum possible realizations from (Fw, Fs). By Assumption 2, these are
given by vw and vs, respectively. Thus, we can rearrange equation (5.1) to obtain a more
intuitive expression for the expected seller revenues:
vw,s(2)
Ass.2
=
∫ vs
vw
v(1− Fs(v))fw(v)dv +
∫ vs
vw
v(1− Fw(v))fs(v)dv
=
∫ vs
vw
vfw(v)dv +
∫ vs
vw
vfs(v)dv −
∫ vs
vw
vFs(v)fw(v)dv −
∫ vs
vw
vFw(v)fs(v)dv
=
∫ vs
vw
v [fw(v) + fs(v)] dv −
∫ vs
vw
vd [Fs(v)Fw(v)]
=
∫ vs
vw
v [fw(v) + fs(v)] dv − vw,s(1) , (5.2)
where the last term, vw,s(1) , denotes the expected highest order statistic, i.e. the ex ante
expected highest valuation among the two bidders.
10See e.g. Krishna (2002).
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Before we turn to an analysis of a potential strategic scope for the seller to aﬀect the
auction outcome to her advantage, it proves useful to demonstrate the eﬀect of asymmetries
on the seller’s revenue in general. Therefore, we proceed along the lines of Cantillon
(2000), who constructs a symmetric benchmark auction environment to compare it to the
expected revenue in the asymmetric case. We adopt the terminology from her paper, where
she deﬁnes a combination of cumulative distribution functions {Fi, Fj} as a conﬁguration.
The symmetric benchmark she designs is a new symmetric conﬁguration of CDFs for the
valuations of the two bidders labeled {F, F}, which has the following properties: First,
by construction the expected highest order statistic, that is the expected highest realized
valuation, is the same for both environments. Hence, the expected potential social surplus
(“the size of the pie”) is the same under both conﬁgurations. Second, she assumes that also
the distribution of social surplus, i.e. the distribution of the highest order statistic, is the
same for both conﬁgurations. In other words, if v is the highest realization from {Fw, Fs}
with probability p, then with probability p, v will also be the highest realization in the
symmetric conﬁguration.11
Deﬁnition 1 Given two cumulative distribution functions Fw(v) and Fs(v) with supports
on [vw, vw] and [vs, vs], respectively, their corresponding symmetric benchmark distribution
is deﬁned by F (v) =
√
Fw(v) · Fs(v) ∀ v and has support on [v, v], where v = max{vw, vs}
and v = max{vw, vs}.
Deﬁnition 1 implies that the respective CDFs of the highest order-statistics are indeed the
same for both conﬁgurations, i.e. F (v)F (v) = Fw(v)Fs(v). Let f(v) = F
′(v) denote the
probability density function of the symmetric valuation primitive. The expected revenue to
the seller is thus given by
v(2) =
∫ v
v
v(1− F (v))f(v)dv +
∫ v
v
v(1− F (v))f(v)dv
= 2
∫ v
v
v(1− F (v))f(v)dv
= 2
∫ v
v
vf(v)dv − 2
∫ v
v
vF (v)f(v)dv
= 2
∫ v
v
vf(v)dv − v(1), (5.3)
11Deﬁnition 1 corresponds to Deﬁnition 1 in Cantillon (2000), p. 6. For a more extensive discussion on
the properties and the construction of an appropriate benchmark refer to Cantillon (2008).
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where, analogously to above, v(1) denotes the expected highest order statistic in the bench-
mark setting. Since by construction we have that v(1) = v
w,s
(1) , by subtracting (5.2) from
(5.3) the last term in both expressions cancels out. Moreover, since v = vw and v = vs the
diﬀerence in expected revenues across the two conﬁgurations amounts to
v(2) − vw,s(2) = 2
∫ vs
vw
vf(v)dv −
∫ vs
vw
v [fw(v) + fs(v)] dv
= 2
∫ vs
vw
vf(v)dv −
∫ vs
vw
v [fw(v) + fs(v)] dv
IBP
= −2
∫ vs
vw
F (v)dv +
∫ vs
vw
[Fw(v) + Fs(v)] dv
=
∫ vs
vw
[√
Fw(v) +
√
Fs(v)
]2
dv > 0, (5.4)
where the last steps are obtained through integration by parts (IBP). Since the expected
highest order statistic is the same for both conﬁgurations, i.e. the maximum social surplus
that can be attained, the strictly positive diﬀerence implies that the share of social surplus
that the seller captures is reduced by asymmetry.
Proposition 1 The expected revenue from a second-price auction for any asymmetric con-
ﬁguration (Fw, Fs) is lower than that under its corresponding symmetric benchmark (F, F ).
12
Having laid out the general result that asymmetries hurt the auctioneer in terms of expected
revenue from a second-price auction, we now turn to the question that is at the core of our
interest: What is the optimal strategy for the seller, if she has some instrument at hand that
allows her to inﬂuence the bidders’ valuations - and hence the degree of asymmetry - during
the course of the auction? For this purpose it proves useful to rearrange the expression for the
auctioneers expected revenue. By Assumption 2, and since we have that Fs(·) = 0 ∀v < vs
and Fw(·) = 1 ∀ v ≥ vw, equation (5.1) can be written as
vw,s(2) =
∫ vs
vw
vfw(v)dv +
∫ vw
vs
v(1− Fs(v))fw(v)dv +
∫ vw
vs
v(1− Fw(v))fs(v)dv. (5.5)
12Proposition 1 recapitulates Theorem 1 in Cantillon (2008). In her paper, she shows that this result holds
under very general conditions for a wider class of mechanisms than second-price auctions and under relaxed
assumptions on the construction of the symmetric benchmark.
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The ﬁrst term captures the expected revenue whenever the realization of bidder w lies below
vs, such that bidder s will win the auction for sure. Conditional on the expected second
highest value falling into the region where the supports of the two distribution functions
overlap,13 the latter two terms describe the expected price that bidder w (or s, respectively)
has to pay if she has the highest valuation. Furthermore, in what follows we relax the
assumption from Deﬁnition 1 of a constant expected highest order statistic and focus on the
maximization of expected revenue from an absolute perspective rather than in terms of the
share of social surplus captured by the seller.
5.3 Scenario I: A Simple Model of Seller Interference
In most of the theoretical literature on auctions, the seller is assigned a passive role once
the auction mechanism and speciﬁcations (e.g. the level of reserve price) have been set.
In contrast to that, the main idea of this paper is that it is reasonable to assume that
in some situations circumstances may arise that allow the seller to actively inﬂuence the
bidders’ valuation before the auction is actually carried out. Say, for example, that prior to
the execution of the auction the seller can add or alter some features of the item on sale.
While these may have no or very little intrinsic value themselves, they potentially aﬀect the
valuations of the bidders when added to the item, i.e. the latter possibly attach diﬀerent
values to these extra features. For instance, think of an expert and a layman bidding for a
complex machine used to produce of some good, and that the latter has only very limited
knowledge on how to operate the machine. In that case, an announcement of the seller during
the course of the auction that he will provide technical assistance after the sale is likely to
aﬀect the laymen’s valuation, while the expert is indiﬀerent to this additional service, or
“feature”. In this section we will explicitly allow for such a possibility, where the seller has
means to take impact on the distribution of valuations and ask for her optimal strategy.
13See the graph to the left of Figure 5.2a in the next section.
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5.3.1 A Cake of Size x to Distribute
Within the standard framework presented in Section 5.2, the timing of events is as follows
(see Figure 5.1): First, the auctioneer announces the auction for the item on sale, implements
the design, and commits to the chosen mechanism. After this stage, the seller is assumed to
remain passive. In the next step, the potential buyers - knowing their valuations - sign up
for participation in the auction and place their bids. Finally, the auction is carried out, the
winner is allocated the item and pays the price determined by the auction.
Figure 5.1: Timing of Events
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
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The novel feature of this paper, however, is to introduce an interim stage after the bidders
have signed up, but before bidding takes place. During this stage, we assume that there
exists scope for the seller to pursue a strategic action that aﬀects the bidders’ valuations.
To start with, we concentrate on a stylized setting as a benchmark. Suppose that, in addition
to the object on sale, the auctioneer has a divisible cake of size x which is valuable to the
bidders but has no value to herself. In the interim stage, she can decide to split up this cake
and allocate any fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] to bidder i, and (1−γ) to bidder j. From the auctioneer’s
perspective, a non-negative allocation of a share of x to any of the bidders will result in an
upward shift of the latters’ value distribution: The weak bidders support shifts to the right
by the additional value he gets, γx, and by (1 − γ)x for the strong bidder, respectively.14
In general terms, the resulting CDFs and PDFs after the shifts will depend on the actual
choice of γ and therefore we denote them by Gi(v, γ) and gi(v, γ), respectively, for i ∈ w, s.
14Alternatively, instead of shifting the supports, one could also imagine a slightly diﬀerent model, where
the auctioneer’s action puts stronger probability weight on the region of higher realizations while the original
supports are maintained. Since this also increases the expected second highest value, and thus the expected
revenue, we would get qualitatively similar results. However, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on shifts in
the support.
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Figure 5.2: Shift of Supports by Strategic Seller Action
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(b) Shift of supports by strategic seller action
Figure 5.2a depicts the original supports and Figure 5.2b illustrates the eﬀect of the seller’s
choice for two asymmetric uniform distributions. Note that both the expected highest order
statistic and the degree of asymmetry are aﬀected by these shifts: While in either case the
expected highest valuation increases, the maximum possible social beneﬁt, i.e. the highest
possible valuation, is only increased if the strong bidder receives a non-negative share (γ < 1).
At the same time, the seller’s expected revenue is equivalent to the expectation of the second
highest value. Therefore, depending on the size of x relative to the degree of asymmetry
among the bidders, from her perspective it might be beneﬁcial to fully allocate x or at least
a large fraction of it to the weak bidder. Intuitively, a reduction in the degree of asymmetry
leads to more intense competition among the bidders. Importantly, after the seller has chosen
the allocation, the situation is as if the valuations were drawn from the shifted distributions,
even if the true initial valuations of the bidders are already realized.
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Note further that bidding behavior is unaltered by the events in the interim stage: After
the action took place it is still a (weakly) dominant strategy for each bidder to bid her true
valuation. Hence, for any given cake size x, in the interim stage the auctioneer chooses the
share to the weak bidder γ as to maximize the expected revenue from the auction, i.e.
max
γ
vw,s(2) =
vs+(1−γ)x∫
vw+γx
vgw(v)dv +
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
v(1−Gs(v, γ))gw(v, γ)dv +
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
v(1−Gw(v, γ))gs(v, γ)dv, (5.6)
The ﬁrst order condition of the above expression with respect to γ implicitly determines the
optimal allocation:15
∂vw,s
(2)
∂γ
=
vs+(1−γ)x∫
vw+γx
vg′w(v, γ)dv +
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
v [(1−Gs(v, γ)) · g′w(v, γ)−G′s(v, γ) · gw(v, γ)] dv
+
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
v [(1−Gw(v, γ))·g′s(v, γ)−G′w(v, γ)·gs(v, γ)] dv
− gw(vw + γx, γ)·(vw + γx)·x+gw(vw + γx, γ)·(vw + γx)·(1−Gs(vw + γx, γ))·x
+ gs(vs + (1− γ)x, γ)·(vs + (1− γ)x)·(1−Gw(vs + (1− γ)x, γ))·x = 0. (5.7)
On this general level, we can only infer that the optimal allocation choice depends on the
properties of the underlying distribution functions from which the bidders’ valuations are
realized and their reaction to changes in γ. To be able to derive more intuitive insights, we
additionally impose the simplifying assumption that the valuation primitives follow uniform
distributions of the form
Gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vw + γx
v−(vw+γx)
vw−vw if vw + γx<v< vw + γx
1 if v≥vw + γx
and
Gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vs + (1−γ)x
v−(vs+(1−γ)x)
vs−vs if vs + (1−γ)x< v<vs + (1−γ)x
1 if v≥vs + (1−γ)x
for the weak and the strong bidder, respectively.16 The corresponding densities are given by
15See Appendix 5.6.1.2 for the details of the calculation.
16We focus on uniform distributions for the sake of tractability. In Appendix 5.6.2 we present a numerical
simulation employing doubly truncated normal distributions yielding qualitatively similar results.
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gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1vw−vw if vw + γx<v< vw + γx0 otherwise and
gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1vs−vs if vs + (1−γ)x<v< vs + (1−γ)x0 otherwise
Conveniently, the functional form of the uniform densities is unaltered by the shifts in
the support. Hence, we have that ∂gi(·)
∂γ
= 0. Moreover, this speciﬁcation allows us to
derive a closed form solution for the optimal allocation from the ﬁrst order condition.17
In particular, the optimal share to the weak bidder, γ, must satisfy
γ =
1
2
+
−(vw − vs) +
√
Ss · Sw
2x
, (5.8)
where Ss = vs − vs and Sw = vw − vw. Intuitively, the term −(vw − vs) +
√
Ss · Sw can
be interpreted as a measure for the degree of asymmetry among the two bidders. From this
relation, we can derive a ﬁrst set of results. First, as one would expect from the analysis
in Section 5.2, whenever the bidders draw their valuations from the same distribution, an
equal split of the cake x among the bidders is optimal. In other words, in the absence of
asymmetry the seller will not favor any bidder over the other in the auction process.
Proposition 2 (Symmetric bidders) For vw = vs and vw = vs the optimal allocation
choice is given by γ = 1
2
.
Proof. When bidders are symmetric, we have that vs = vw ≡ v and vs = vw ≡ v. Hence,
the numerator in the last term of (5.8) becomes v− v +√(v − v)2 = 0, giving the result.
Second, as long as the shift in the support is not suﬃcient to outweigh the relative asymmetry
among the bidders, it is always optimal to allocate the full amount of x to the weak bidder. In
line with the intuition from Section 5.2 above, reducing the asymmetry has a positive eﬀect
on expected revenue. Conversely, if the cake size is large enough to fully compensate for the
asymmetry, both bidders receive a positive share from x, with over-proportional weight on
the weaker bidder (γ > 1
2
). Third, the optimal share to w ceteris paribus increases in the
spreads of the supports (Ss and Sw), and decreases with the length of the intersection region
17See Appendix 5.6.1.3 for the detailed derivation.
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(vw − vs). Intuitively, the larger the comparative advantage of the strong bidder, the larger
are the beneﬁts to the seller from supporting the weaker one. Proposition 3 summarizes
these ﬁndings.
Proposition 3 (Allocation choice) (i) If x ≤ −(vw−vs)+
√
Ss · Sw the optimal allocation
is a corner solution at a share of γ = 1. (ii) For x ≥ −(vw − vs) +
√
Ss · Sw the seller sets
1
2
≤ γ < 1, and bidders are symmetric ex-post. If x becomes large, the optimal allocation
converges to an equal split in the limit. (iii) The share to the weak bidder increases in the
spreads of the supports, ∂γ
∂Ss
= ∂γ
∂Sw
= 1
4x
√
Sw·Ss > 0, and decreases in the length of their
intersection region, ∂γ
∂(vw−vs) = −
1
2x
< 0.
Proof. For result (i) it suﬃces to show that γ = 1 if the last term on the RHS of (5.8)
is greater than or equal to 1
2
. This is the case if and only if the above condition holds,
i.e. x ≤ −(vw − vs) +
√
Ss · Sw. The reverse argument applies to the ﬁrst part of result
(ii), respectively. The second part of (ii) is a direct implication of result (i): Whenever
the degree of asymmetry is smaller than x, the auctioneer optimally allocates the cake such
that symmetry among bidders is restored. All remaining results are directly implied by the
partial derivatives of the optimality condition w.r.t. Si for i = {w, s} and (vw − vs).
To emphasize these ﬁndings, Figure 5.3 depicts the results from a numerical simulation within
the uniform speciﬁcation.18 For the given set of parameters, the expected revenue function
in relation to the share γ for diﬀerent cake sizes is depicted. Consistent to above, the ﬁgure
shows that for x suﬃciently small vw,s(2) takes its maximum at γ = 1 (corner solution). If the
impact of the seller action gets large relative to the degree of asymmetry, the optimal share
to the weak bidder becomes smaller and also the strong bidder is allocated a non-negative
share of the cake. In the limit, γ converges to 1
2
, conﬁrming our above conjecture.
Summarizing, if the seller has an action to inﬂuence the bidders during the course of the
auction, she will exclusively favor the weak bidder whenever the impact of her action is
smaller than the degree of asymmetry among the bidders. By doing so, she can make them
more competing rivals, leading to an increase in the expected second highest value, and
hence her expected proﬁt.
18The propositions have proven to be valid for any parameter constellation satisfying Assumption 2 and
even carry over to some cases where the supports of the bidders are nested (though the ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance property no longer applies). Moreover, they hold for a wide class of distribution functions. See
Appendix 5.6.2 for an analogous simulation involving truncated normal distributions.
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Figure 5.3: Optimal Allocation (Uniform)
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Parameter constellation: vw = 3, vw = 6, vs = 4, vs = 7.
Relative degree of asymmetry: −(vw − vs) +
√
Ss · Sw = 1.
To simplify the analysis, up to now we imposed the assumption that the seller’s decision is
merely an allocation choice and free of cost. Thus, in this simple setting the allocation choice
is unambiguously revenue enhancing, since otherwise the seller could always opt to forego
her action and dispose x.19 In Section 5.4 we relax this restriction and turn to the analysis
of a model, where we introduce costly actions. Before that, however, we brieﬂy discuss a
real world application, where a scenario similar to that presented in this section might arise.
5.3.2 A Real World Application
One potential application for the above scenario can be found in the context of the sale of
state-owned energy-sector assets. More precisely, we consider privatizations of the gas-
distribution network. In its Guideline 2003/55/EG the EU-Commission advocates the
liberalization of network-industries as a way to increase eﬃciency, competition, and service
quality at reduced prices. Even earlier, in 2000, it called for a fast realization of a single
European energy market and devised a schedule for obligatory stepwise liberalization. As
a consequence, a large number of privatizations was observable in the recent years within
current and prospective EU-member countries.20
19Though this outside option is not explicitly included in the model, is straightforward to show that
expected revenue is increasing in x.
20A detailed overview of the European policies and guidelines regarding the gas and energy markets is
available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/index en.htm.
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This required liberalization clearly involves several objectives for national governments.
First, one target of privatization is to yield a high price for tendering the assets at stake.
Second, to maintain the security of energy supplies, national governments might favor the
creation of a national-champion ﬁrm, which is able to take a strong strategic position in
the future international competition with other global players and has its roots within the
country.21 While the ﬁrst goal can be achieved by a well-designed selling mechanism like an
auction, the second objective is more complex since the EU imposes a non-discrimination
principle for public tenders. Hence, neither subsidies to speciﬁc bidder ﬁrms nor aﬃrmative
actions are eligible in the tender process.
However, in this industry large economies of scale can emerge, for instance from increasing
total uninterrupted pipeline length or extending the capacity diameter of the pipes.22 Thus,
as the imposed liberalization plan involves a stepwise privatization, the choice of the selling
sequence may create an alternative instrument for the national governments. The intuition
for this is that a network distributor may derive additional beneﬁts from scale economies,
whenever she manages to purchase a sector that has a direct connection to the pipeline
network it already owns.23
Translated to our model setting, consider a small national ﬁrm (NC) and a strong global
player (GP ), where both are interested in acquiring a part of a country’s gas-distribution
network. It is reasonable to assume that NC is ﬁnancially weaker than GP , i.e. draws
its valuation from a distribution with lower support in our terminology. Suppose that
the gas distribution network in state ownership consists of three separate divisions, where
the geographic placement is such that NC (GP ) owns parts of the network in the direct
neighborhood of division A (C), as illustrated in Figure 5.4. For the remaining division no
such direct connection exists. Thus, in this conﬁguration the “cake” that can be allocated
by the seller (the government) can be thought of the synergy-eﬀects that potentially can
accrue to one of the bidders, when a speciﬁc sector is put on sale ﬁrst.
21One recent example for such intentions of national governments can be seen in the case of Endesa. After
the German company E.ON made an oﬀer to takeover the Spanish energy supplier, the Spanish government
intervened, stating it wanted Endesa to remain under “Spanish ownership”. Even though the EU-commission
instituted proceedings against the governmental intervention, ﬁnally the debate ended with E.ON redrawing
its oﬀer after fruitless negotiations.
22For a technical approach to the costs of gas distribution networks refer to e.g. Yepez (2008). An empirical
study to estimate the components driving the cost of pipeline operation is provided in Bernard et al. (2002).
23Note that in line with our assumptions the government derives no direct value from the synergy eﬀects.
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Figure 5.4: Network Structure and Direct Connections
NC Div A Div B Div C ﬀ
GP
Notes: Arrows indicate a direct connection to a division of the network
in state ownership. NC (GP ) has a direct connection to division A (C),
while no direct connection exists for division B.
Suppose the government has committed to a sealed-bid second-price-auction. As discussed
above, it cannot take any direct measures to favor the NC. However, by selling division A
ﬁrst it can implicitly allocate additional beneﬁts from increased economies of scale to the
national ﬁrm in case it should win the auction, which will not accrue to GP. As a consequence,
the relative degree of asymmetry among the two competitors is reduced.24 This way, the
government achieves both increased auction revenues and a better position for the NC, even
if it may be still the case that GP is most likely to win.
We perceive this scenario as a nice illustration of the main motivation behind this paper,
namely that there may be very indirect though important channels through which a seller
can take inﬂuence on the bidders valuations, which should not be neglected. However, given
the complex nature of network industries and the energy sectors, this example is clearly an
over-simpliﬁcation of the reality and neglects numerous crucial aspects. To name only a few
examples, tender oﬀers typically involve other standards than second-price auctions, vertical
integration of service providers and network operators makes (legal) ownership-unbundling
an important topic, and pre-auction oﬀers to the candidates most likely to win are not
unusual despite the restrictive EU-regulation.
5.4 Scenario II: Bidders with Diverging Tastes
Until now we only considered costless actions with an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the
bidders’ valuations. In this section, we now turn to the case where the seller’s choice is costly.
These costs are assumed to be twofold: First, the action involves a direct implementation cost
for the seller, which accrues upon its execution. Second, we introduce a second dimension of
24Note that this scenario will produce a corner solution, since a ﬁrm gets either beneﬁts from the synergy
or not. For simplicity, we assume that the value from the synergy eﬀect is the same across bidders.
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asymmetry among the two bidders. Suppose they are not only asymmetric with respect to
their distributions of value, but also diﬀer in their taste for a certain speciﬁcation of some
feature or standard of the item on sale. In other words, favoring bidder i may trigger a
negative impact on the valuation of bidder j. This is illustrated in Figure 5.5 for the case of
uniform distributions.
Figure 5.5: Shift of Supports if Seller Moves Toward Standard of Weak Bidder (γ > 12 )
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Analogously to above, assume that a seller faces a “weak” and a “strong” bidder interested
in an item sold via a second-price auction. Before the bidding stage, the seller can decide to
implement a change of the standard γ at cost C(γ), where C(·) is convex and γ is continuous
on the interval [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, assume that standard γ = 0 is preferred by
the strong bidder, while bidder w has a preference for standard γ = 1. If no investment is
taken, the initial standard of γ = 1
2
is kept, and no costs accrue to the seller with C(1
2
) = 0
and C ′(1
2
) = 0. Suppose the seller implements a standard closer to the one preferred by
bidder w, that is γ > 1
2
. In that case, we assume that the latter gains an additional utility
of (2γ − 1)x > 0 from increased complementarity, while bidder s experiences a disutility
of (1 − 2γ)x < 0. Vice versa, if the seller instead moves toward the other extreme, the
inequalities are reversed.25
For example, the standards in our model could reﬂect rival software applications for enterprise
resource planning. Suppose a ﬁrm is target for takeover by two asymmetric competitors, w
25For the ease of exposition, we treat the maximum complementarity beneﬁts x equally for both bidders.
If this assumption is relaxed, it is straightforward to show that the tendency of the seller to favor the weak
bidder becomes stronger whenever xw > xs. For xw < xs there exists a cut-oﬀ value at xsxw ≡ z, below
which the auctioneer still moves towards w’s preferred standard. The level of z depends on the parameter
speciﬁcation of the valuation primitives, the supports, and the cost function.
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and s. Say, the weak bidder uses SAP-software for its daily business, while bidder s works
with Oracle, which exhibit only a limited degree of compatibility to each other.26 Assume
further, that the target ﬁrm initially operates some third software, that exhibits an equal
degree of compatibility to both. However, incurring some implementation cost, the ﬁrm can
switch parts of its system towards the preferred standard of one of the bidders before the
actual auction stage starts. More general, one could think of operating systems, technical
standards, organizational topics, and many other features, for which the bidders might diﬀer
in their preferences.
Analytically, the seller chooses the standard as to maximize his expected revenues net of the
implementation costs, Π = vw,s(2) − C(γ):
max
γ
vs+(1−2γ)x∫
vw+(2γ−1)x
vgw(v)dv +
vw+(2γ−1)x∫
vs+(1−2γ)x
v[(1−Gs(v, γ))gw(v, γ)dv + (1−Gw(v, γ))gs(v, γ)]dv − C(γ), (5.9)
where analogously to above Gi(v, γ) and gi(v, γ) denote the CDFs and PDFs that result
from the chosen standard γ (see Figure 5.5). Taking the derivative of (5.9) with respect to
γ and rearranging yields the optimality condition.27
∂vw,s
(2)
∂γ
=
vs+(1−2γ)x∫
vw+(2γ−1)x
vg′w(v, γ)dv +
vw+(2γ−1)x∫
vs+(1−2γ)x
v [(1−Gs(v, γ))g′w(v, γ)−G′s(v, γ)gw(v, γ)] dv
+
vw+(2γ−1)x∫
vs+(1−2γ)x
v [(1−Gw(v, γ))g′s(v, γ)−G′w(v, γ)gs(v, γ)] dv
− 2x · gw(vw + (2γ − 1)x, γ) · (vw + (2γ − 1)x)
+ 2x · gw(vw + (2γ − 1)x, γ) · (vw + (2γ − 1)x) · (1−Gs(vw + (2γ − 1)x, γ))
+ 2x · gs(vs + (1− 2γ)x, γ) · (vs + (1− 2γ)x) · (1−Gw(vs + (1− 2γ)x, γ))
= C ′(γ) (5.10)
Intuitively, in the optimum the marginal beneﬁt from moving towards one of the bidders’
preferred standard equals the sum of marginal costs due to the downward shift of the other
bidders distribution and the marginal implementation costs. To simplify the analysis, we
26In fact, until quite recently, Oracle followed a strategy of foreclosure to bind its customers and increase
the obstacles to switch to rival enterprise resource planning vendors.
27Calculations are analogous to those presented in Appendix 5.6.1.2.
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again focus on uniformly distributed valuation primitives. The CDFs and PDFs for the
uniform speciﬁcation are stated below. Note that the expressions are similar to the previous
example except for the diﬀerent eﬀects on the boundaries of the supports.
Gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vw + (2γ − 1)x
v−(vw+(2γ−1)x)
vw−vw if vw + (2γ − 1)x<v< vw + (2γ − 1)x
1 if v≥vw + (2γ − 1)x
Gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vs + (1−2γ)x
v−(vs+(1−2γ)x)
vs−vs if vs + (1−2γ)x< v<vs + (1−2γ)x
1 if v≥vs + (1−2γ)x
gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1vw−vw if vw + γx<v< vw + γx0 otherwise
gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩ 1vs−vs if vs + (1−γ)x<v< vs + (1−γ)x0 otherwise
Suppose further that the implementation costs take a quadratic form: C(γ) = λ(1
2
− γ)2,
where λ > 0 is an exogenous cost parameter.28 In this case a closed form solution to the
auctioneer’s problem can be derived. More precisely, the optimal standard is given by29
γ =
1
2
+
8(vs − vw)x2 − λSwSs +
√
SwSs (λ2SwSs + 16λx2(vw − vs) + 64x4)
32x3
, (5.11)
where Ss = vs − vs and Sw = vw − vw. This conditions allows us to infer several insights,
which are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (Optimal standard under costly action) (i) If bidders are symmetric,
the optimal standard is given by γ = 1
2
. (ii) For x suﬃciently small, it is optimal for the
auctioneer to implement the standard preferred of the weak bidder at γ = 1. (iii) If the gains
28Note that indeed C(· ) = 0 and C ′(· ) = 0 if the original standard of γ = 12 is maintained. Qualitatively,
the results do not depend on the speciﬁc form of the cost function.
29The second-order condition is non-positive and thus the above condition describes indeed a local
maximum. For the sake of brevity we omit the details of the purely mechanical but somewhat tedious
derivation.
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from complementarity (x → ∞), or the implementation costs (λ → ∞) become large, the
optimal standard ceteris paribus converges to γ = 1
2
.
Proof. See Appendix 5.6.1.4.
Note further, that in absence of direct implementation costs (λ = 0), the ﬁrst order condition
reduces to
γ =
1
2
+
vs − vw +
√
Sw · Ss
4x
, (5.12)
which closely resembles the optimality condition (5.8) that was derived in Section 5.3. Hence,
our previous results from Proposition 3 qualitatively carry over to this scenario. In particular,
the second term on the RHS of (5.12) is smaller than the corresponding term on the RHS
of (5.8) by factor 1
2
. Intuitively, while favoritism towards the weak bidder is still an optimal
strategy, for any x the seller favor weak bidder relatively less compared to the case without
the externality on bidder s.
Figure 5.6: Optimal Standard (Uniform)
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(a) Revenue in relation to importance of standard
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(b) Revenue in relation to implementation cost
Parameter constellation: vw = 3, vw = 6, vs = 4, vs = 7, λ = 1 (Figure a), and x = 0.5 (Figure b).
Also for this setting we conduct numerical simulations to illustrate our ﬁndings. Holding the
cost parameter λ constant, Figure 5.6a depicts the relation between the choice of standard γ
and the expected proﬁt for diﬀerent values of complementarity gains, measured as the impact
of x on the bidders’ utility. We ﬁnd that with increasing importance of the complementarity,
the auctioneer becomes more reluctant to move away from its original value. In other words,
if x becomes suﬃciently large, even a small change of standard suﬃces to mitigate the
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eﬀects of asymmetry. Conversely, as long as x is suﬃciently small it is revenue enhancing to
implement the weak bidder’s preferred standard at γ = 1.
The simulation underlying Figure 5.6b analyzes how the auctioneer’s optimal decision varies
if the cost parameter λ increases for a given x. Clearly, if implementation costs are small
compared to the gains from reduced asymmetry, it is optimal for the auctioneer to move
towards bidder w’s standard. For larger costs, the optimal choice converges to taking no
action at all and sustaining the initial standard.
Summarizing, in terms of expected auction revenue it can be optimal for the auctioneer
to move the standard towards the preference of the weak bidder. However, unlike the
previous scenario, by doing so she hurts bidder s in this case, because the latter’s maximal
possible valuation is reduced if a standard less preferred to her is implemented. Moreover,
if we interpret the strong bidders ex ante maximum valuation as the highest social surplus
attainable, from a welfare perspective the seller’s action causes an ineﬃciency as potential
value is destroyed: vs + (1− 2γ) < vs for γ > 12 . Intuitively, in case the strong bidder wins
the auction, his valuation is not only reduced indirectly by more competition on behalf of the
weak bidder, but also directly through the externality caused by the seller’s action. Thus,
total social surplus is lower than without the auctioneer’s interference.
5.5 Conclusion
We examine theoretically a setting where the auctioneer faces two asymmetric bidders. The
novel feature is that we introduce a possibility that she can “strategically” inﬂuence the
degree of asymmetry, and thus competition, by shifting the distribution of the latters’
valuations. Our model provides two main insights. First, it is revenue enhancing for the
seller to support the bidder who is originally the most likely to lose. The origin of this eﬀect
stems from the structure of a second-price auction: Since the revenues to the seller equal
the second highest bid, the only way to improve upon her proﬁt is to increase the expected
second highest order statistic, i.e. the expected payment by the winning bidder. Furthermore,
we show that this result holds true even if this favoritism causes a negative impact on the
competing “strong” bidder. Second, we argue that this support may take place during an
interim stage, when the auction mechanism is already set up and committed to, without
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violating the rules of the implemented auction. At a policy level, these results suggest that
in merger analysis and public tenders involving auctions, interference with the competitive
outcomes may occur through more subtle and indirect channels other than handicaps or
aﬃrmative action.
Our ﬁndings complement those of Bulow et al. (1999). They analyze the eﬀect of one bidder
owning a toehold in a company subject for takeover in a setting with (ascending) ﬁrst-price
auctions and common-values. Among other things, they show that the “board of a target
company may [...] wish to ’level the playing ﬁeld’ by selling a toehold to a new bidder [...]”
(Bulow et al., 1999, p.450). In other words, under some circumstances it can be beneﬁcial
in terms of revenue for the non-bidding shareholders to oﬀer a toehold in form of a cheap
(or even free) stake in the ﬁrm to another competing bidder. The intuition for this result
is that “a bidder that owns a toehold has an incentive to bid aggressively since every price
it quotes represents not just a bid for the remaining shares but also an ask for its own
holdings”(Bulow et al., 1999, p.428). Hence, by allocating a toehold to a second bidder, the
competitiveness among bidders – and thereby expected revenues from the auction – can be
increased. Though their setting diﬀers in several aspects, this ﬁnding is similar to ours if we
interpret the “action” of the seller as the oﬀer of a (cheap) stake in the item to the “weak”
bidder, partially making him a residual claimant of the auction outcome.30
Another interpretation arises from a governance perspective. Intuitively, in our takeover
example, the board’s (i.e. the “auctioneer” in our terminology) action to favor the “losing
bidder” may be falsely perceived as a poison pill by the shareholders, since the most likely
candidate to win the auction is made worse oﬀ. However, as our model shows, it actually
acts in their interest by maximizing expected revenue. Consider for example the case of the
enterprise software provider PeopleSoft. During 2003 a possible takeover in the future was
anticipated, presumably by its rival, Oracle Corporation. In reaction, PeopleSoft guaranteed
a refund up to ﬁve times the cost of a product license to its customers in case the customer
support was reduced within the next four years. Commonly, this measure was considered
as a strategy to deter the takeover, because this would impede the expected plans of Oracle
to phase out former Peoplesoft products in case of a successful acquisition. However, in
the light of our model another interpretation arises. Suppose the takeover took an auction
30However, note that such an oﬀer targeted exclusively to a speciﬁc bidder potentially collides with
established competition regulations on non-discrimination.
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format and that there was a (weaker) candidate other than Oracle to compete for PeopleSoft,
who plans to continue the latter’s product line after the takeover. Such a company would
not necessarily be harmed by the refund guarantee. Conversely, it might even beneﬁt from
increased long term relationship with existing customers. As a result, the refund might be
a way to exploit the revenue enhancing eﬀect of reduced asymmetry.
Several extensions to this research suggest themselves. First, it would be interesting to
generalize the idea of the model to other auction formats like the ﬁrst-price or the English
auction.31 Second, our approach includes a number of simplifying assumptions on the
environment which could be relaxed. For example, a generalization for arbitrary distribution
functions and an extension to the N bidder case might be interesting. Third, we do not
consider the welfare implications for the buyers, which might be also worthwhile to pursue.
Finally, we abstract from the issue of reserve prices by restricting our attention to “must-
sell” auctions, where a reserve price is not applicable for reasons laid out above. However, it
might also be interesting to compare the eﬀects of the seller action on expected revenue to
a setting where the seller sets a non-negative reserve price. This is left to future research.
31Though the ﬁndings in Bulow et al. (1999) suggest that similar eﬀects might persist in that case,
the driving forces behind them are likely to diﬀer substantially involving a fully-ﬂedged analysis of bidder
behavior and bidding strategies.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Proofs and calculations
5.6.1.1 Lemma 1
The proof for the ﬁrst part of the lemma is a standard textbook result (cf. Krishna, 2002,
p.15). If bidder i bids his true valuation, she will win the auction whenever vi > pj and she
will lose if vi < pj where pj = maxj 	=i bj is the highest competing bid. It remains to show,
that deviating by bidding less (more) than his true valuation, i.e. zi < vi (zi > vi), is not
proﬁtable.
First, consider the cases where either pj < zi < vi or zi < vi < pj. For both cases, the
auction outcome and proﬁts are unaltered if she bids zi instead of her valuation. However,
if vi > pj > zi then bidder i loses the auction, whereas she would have won and experienced
a positive surplus if she had bid vi. Thus, deviating by bidding less than ones own valuation
can never be proﬁtable. In the same lines, bidding more than one’s valuation can never be
optimal. Given that in equilibrium all other j bidders play according to the bidding strategy
β(v) = v, this is also a (weakly) dominant strategy for bidder i.
Moreover, the same arguments also apply for the second part of Lemma 1. Since the
individual rationale of this proof does not depend on the valuation primitives but on the
actual realizations of the bidders, the introduction of asymmetries does not aﬀect the bidding
behavior and it is still a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder to bid her true valuation.
5.6.1.2 General optimality condition (Section 5.3)
To derive the FOC from (5.6) with respect to γ, we proceed stepwise by applying the Leibniz
rule for parametric integrals to each of the three integral terms separately. The derivative
of the ﬁrst term yields the following expression.
vs+(1−γ)x∫
vw+γx
vg′w(v, γ)dv−[gw(vs + (1− γ)x, γ)(vs + (1− γ)x)x]−[gw(vw + γx, γ)(vw + γx)x] (5.13)
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Next, from the second term in (5.6) we get
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
[v (−G′s(v, γ)) gw(v, γ) + v(1−Gs(v, γ))g′w(v, γ)] dv
+ gw(vs + (1− γ)x, γ)(vs + (1− γ)x)(1−Gs(vs + (1− γ)x, γ))x
+ gw(vw + γx, γ)(vw + γx)(1−Gs(vw + γx, γ))x. (5.14)
Equivalently, applying the Leibniz rule to the third term yields
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
[v (−G′w(v, γ)) gs(v, γ) + v(1−Gw(v, γ))g′s(v, γ)] dv
+ gs(vs + (1− γ)x, γ)(vs + (1− γ)x)(1−Gw(vs + (1− γ)x, γ))x
+ gs(vw + γx, γ)(vw + γx)(1−Gw(vw + γx, γ))x. (5.15)
By deﬁnition, we have that Gw(vw + γx, γ) = 1 ∀ γ and Gs(vs + (1− γ)x, γ) = 0 ∀ γ. Using
this fact and adding up equations (A) through (C) yields (5.7). To save on space, we omit
the second-order condition at this stage.
5.6.1.3 Optimality condition for uniform distributions (Section 5.3)
If the valuations are uniformly distributed, the objective function for the seller simpliﬁes to
max
γ
vw,s(2) =
vs+(1−γ)x∫
vw+γx
v
vw−vw dv +
vw+γx∫
vs+(1−γ)x
v
[(
1− v−vs−(1−γ)x
vs−vs
)
1
vw−vw +
(
1− v−(vw−γx)
vw−vw
)
1
vs−vs
]
dv.(5.16)
Taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to γ, equating to zero, and
rearranging yields the following optimality condition:
x
4x2γ2 + 4(b− c− x)xγ + x2 + 2(vs − vw)x + v2s + v2w + vw(vs − vs)− vw(vs + vs)
(vs − vs)(vw − vw)
= 0.
Solving for γ determines the optimal allocation, which is given at
γ =
1
2
+
vs − vw +
√
(vs − vs) · (vw − vw)
2x
.
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Finally, we have to verify that we found a local maximum and the second order condition of
(5.16) is fulﬁlled, i.e.
−2
3
· 6x
2 [(vw + γx)− (vs + (1− γ)x)]
(b− a)(d− c) < 0.
Note that above expression is negative, if the bracketed term in the numerator is positive,
(vw + γx)− (vs + (1− γ)x) > 0 ⇔ vw − vs > (1− 2γ)x.
Substituting (5.8) for γ yields
vw − vs >
(
1− 2
(
1
2
+
vs − vw +
√
(vs − vs)(vw − vw)
2x
))
x
⇔ vw − vs > −vs + vw −
√
(vs − vs)(vw − vw)
⇔ 0 > −
√
(vs − vs)(vw − vw).
Hence, the second-order condition is indeed non-positive.
5.6.1.4 Proposition 4
We begin by proving part (i). Since bidders are symmetric, denote vs = vw ≡ v and
vs = vw ≡ v. Thus, Sw = Ss = v − v. Substituting into (5.11) yields
γ =
1
2
+
1
32x3
(
8x2(v − v)− λ(v − v)2 +
√
(v − v)2 (λ2(v − v)2 + 16λx2(v − v) + 64x4)
)
=
1
2
+
1
32x3
(
8x2(v − v)− λ(v − v)2 + (v − v)
√
(λ(v − v)− 8x2)2
)
=
1
2
+
1
32x3
(
8x2(v − v) + λ(v − v)2 − λ(v − v)2 + 8x2(v − v)) = 1
2
.
Hence, in absence of asymmetry the second term on the RHS cancels out and the optimal
standard is indeed given at γ = 1
2
.
For part (ii), we need to show that for any λ, the optimal standard converges to γ = 1 if x
becomes small. The optimality condition (5.11) is a complicated equation in x but we can
characterize its asymptotic behavior by concentrating only on the higher-order terms. Let
O(·) denote the order. If x becomes large, then the polynomial in the second term on the
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RHS is of order O(x3), while all the other lower-order terms can be disregarded. Hence, for
x→ 0 the term converges to inﬁnity. However, γ is bounded above by 1, yielding lim
x→0
γ = 1
for any λ.
It remains to show part (iii) of the proposition. Similarly as above, for x → ∞ the above
term converges to zero, as the denominator becomes arbitrarily large. Hence, we have that
lim
x→∞
γ = 1
2
. Finally, taking limits with respect of λ while concentrating only the highest-
order, O(λ), yields lim
x→∞
= 1
2
+sign[−(Sw · Ss) + (Sw · Ss)] ·∞ = 12 , which conﬁrms our initial
conjecture.
5.6.2 Simulations with Truncated Normal Distributions
Uniform distributions prove useful due to their mathematical traceability, but it is worthwhile
to reexamine the models for a more general class of distributional assumptions. Therefore,
we conduct a numerical simulation for the case when bidder i′s valuation is a draw from a
normal distribution with mean vi ∼ N(μi, σi). The PDF and CDF for a normal distribution
are given by
fi(v) =
1
σi
√
2π
e
− 1
2
(
v−μi
σi
)2
and Fi(v) =
1
σi
√
2π
v∫
−∞
e
− 1
2
(
t−μi
σi
)2
dt.
Since the valuations are constrained to the closed interval [vi, vi] for i ∈ w, s, it is necessary
to truncate the normal distributions both above and below. Let hi(v) denote the resulting
PDF, and Hi(v) the CDF conditional on vi lying within the considered support, respectively.
hi(v) =
⎧⎨⎩
fi(v)
Fi(vi)−Fi(vi) if vi≤ v≤vi
0 otherwise
and Hi(v) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vi
Fi(v)−Fi(vi)
Fi(vi)−Fi(vi) if vi< v<vi
1 if v≥vi
If bidders’ valuations are drawn from normal distributions, we can relax Assumption 2 in the
sense that the bidders can now share identical supports. However, to ensure that s ex-ante
is still the “strong” bidder in terms of ﬁrst-order-stochastic dominance, we need to impose
some restrictions on the relation of the means and the standard deviations.32
32In addition, the standard deviations must be suﬃciently large relative to the length of the supports.
Particularly, a property of the normal distribution is that about 95% of the time a value within two standard
deviations around the mean will be realized. If the standard deviation becomes suﬃciently small, so does
the uncertainty of the seller about the bidders valuations.
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Assumption 3 Let the distributions characterizing the two bidders be such that (i) μw ≤ μs,
(ii) σw ≥ σs, and (iii) vw ≤ vs < vw ≤ vs.
In what follows, we assume that at least one condition of Assumption 3 is always satisﬁed
with strict inequality. Using this speciﬁcation, the remainder of this section reconsiders the
two scenarios discussed above.
5.6.2.1 Scenario I revisited
Analogously to above, the auctioneer’s action in the interim stage will alter the supports of
the value distributions. More precisely, in addition to the truncation bounds, also the mean
of the value distribution will be shifted upwards yielding μ˜w(γ) = μw + γx for the weak, and
μ˜s(γ) = μs + (1− γ)x for the strong bidder, respectively. Let
gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩
fw(v)
Fw(vw+γx)−Fw(vw+γx) if vw + γx≤ v≤vw + γx
0 otherwise
and
gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩
fs(v)
Fs(vs+(1−γ)x)−Fs(vs+(1−γ)x) if vs + (1− γ)x≤ v≤vw + (1− γ)x
0 otherwise
denote the resulting densities for bidder w and s, respectively. The corresponding cumulative
distribution functions are stated below.
Gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vw + γx
Fw(v)−Fw(vw+γx)
Fw(vw+γx)−Fw(vw+γx) if vw + γx< v<vw + γx
1 if v≥vw + γx
and
Gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vw + (1− γ)x
Fs(v)−Fs(vs+(1−γ)x)
Fw(vs+(1−γ)x)−Fw(vs+(1−γ)x) if vw + (1− γ)x< v<vi + (1− γ)x
1 if v≥vw + (1− γ)x
The objective function for the auctioneer is again described by (5.6). However, for expo-
sitional simplicity, we conduct a numerical calibration instead of presenting an analytical
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solution to the seller’s problem.33 Figure 5.7 illustrates the relation between the expected
revenue vw,s(2) and the share γ resulting from the simulation for diﬀerent “cake” sizes x. The
parameters can be chosen arbitrarily as to satisfy Assumption 3.
Figure 5.7: Optimal Allocation (Truncated Normal)
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Parameter constellation: vw = 3, vw = 6, vs = 4, vs = 7, μw = 4.5,
μs = 5.5 and σw = σs = 1.
For simplicity, let the boundaries of the supports and means be speciﬁed as in the previous
simulation in Section 5.3, i.e. μi =
vi+vi
2
. In addition, consider the special case where
σw = σs = 1. At the assumed parameter constellation, the degree of asymmetry is thus
reﬂected by the diﬀerence of the original means, i.e. μs − μw = 1. If x ≤ 1, Figure 5.7
reveals that it is optimal for the auctioneer to allocate the full cake to the weak bidder. For
x > 1, expected revenues from the auction are maximized if the bidders are made virtually
symmetric, i.e. μs(v, γ) = μw(v, γ) or γ =
1
2
+ vs+vs−(vw+vw)
4x
.34 Qualitatively similar ﬁndings
arise for a large range of parameters satisfying at least one condition of Assumption 3. We
next turn to case, where the eﬀect of the seller’s action has negative externalities on one of
the bidders.
33It can be shown that a solution exists, but since this involves the “error function” that is encountered in
integrating the normal distribution, a numerical approach appears more promising to infer intuitive insights.
34For the given parameters the optimal allocations in the example are thus given by γ(x=0.5) = γ(x=1) = 1,
γ(x=1.5) = 0.83, γ(x=2) = 0.75 and γ(x=3) = 0.67.
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5.6.2.2 Scenario II revisited
For bidders with diverging tastes, the PDFs and CDFs of the truncated normal distribution
are given by
gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩
fw(v)
Fw(vw+(2γ−1)x)−Fw(vw+(2γ−1)x) if vw + (2γ − 1)x≤ v≤vw + (2γ − 1)x
0 otherwise
,
gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎨⎩
fs(v)
Fs(vs+(1−2γ)x)−Fs(vs+(1−2γ)x) if vs + (1− 2γ)x≤ v≤vs + (1− 2γ)x
0 otherwise
,
Gw(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vw + (2γ − 1)x
Fw(v)−Fw(vw+(2γ−1)x)
Fw(vw+(2γ−1)x)−Fw(vw+(2γ−1)x) if vw + (2γ − 1)x< v<vw + (2γ − 1)x
1 if v≥vw + (2γ − 1)x
,
Gs(v, γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if v≤vw + (1− 2γ)x
Fs(v)−Fs(vs+(1−2γ)x)
Fw(vs+(1−2γ)x)−Fw(vs+(1−2γ)x) if vw + (1− 2γ)x< v<vi + (1− 2γ)x
1 if v≥vw + (1− 2γ)x
.
The optimality condition is obtained by substituting the above functions into the auction-
eer’s objective (5.9) and maximizing with respect to γ. Accordingly, Figure 5.8 illustrates
the results from a numerical simulation, which we based on the same set of parameters
as in Section 5.4. Clearly, the results remarkably resemble those of Figure 5.5. Thus, we
conclude that our conjectures from the previous sections are robust to a more general class
of distribution functions.
Figure 5.8: Optimal Standard (Truncated Normal)
x = 0 x = 0.5 x = 1
x = 1.5 x = 2
g
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(a) Revenue in relation to importance of standard
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(b) Revenue in relation to implementation cost
Parameter constellation: vw = 3, vw = 6, vs = 4, vs = 7, μw = 4.5, μs = 5.5, σw = σs = 1, λ = 1 (Figure a), and x = 0.5
(Figure b).
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